Essays on Artefactual and Virtual Field Experiments in Choice Under Uncertainty by Tsang, Ming
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Economics Dissertations Department of Economics
Winter 12-2016
Essays on Artefactual and Virtual Field Experiments
in Choice Under Uncertainty
Ming Tsang
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economics Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tsang, Ming, "Essays on Artefactual and Virtual Field Experiments in Choice Under Uncertainty." Dissertation, Georgia State
University, 2016.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/127
ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON ARTEFACTUAL AND VIRTUAL FIELD EXPERIMENTS  
IN CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
BY 
MING TSANG 
DECEMBER 2016 
Committee Chair: Dr. Elisabet Rutström 
Major Department: Economics  
In the area of transportation policy, congestion pricing has been used to alleviate traffic 
congestion in metropolitan areas.  The focus of Chapter 1 is to examine drivers’ perceived risk of 
traffic delay as one determinant of reactions to congestion pricing.  The experiment reported in 
this essay recruits commuters from the Atlanta and Orlando metropolitan areas to participate in a 
naturalistic experiment where they are asked to make repeated route decisions in a driving 
simulator.  Chapter 1 examines belief formation and adjustments under an endogenous 
information environment where information about a route can be obtained only conditional on 
taking the route.  If the subjects arrive to the destination late, i.e. beyond an assigned time 
threshold, they are faced with a discrete (flat) penalty.  In contrast, Chapter 2 examines 
subjective beliefs in a setting where the penalty for a late arrival is continuous, such that a longer 
delay incurs additional penalty on the driver.  The primary research question is: does belief 
formation differ when the late penalty is induced as a continuous amount compared to when it is 
induced as a discrete amount?  In particular, will we observe a difference in learning across the 
  
 
 
range of congestion probabilities under different penalty settings?  In the continuous penalty 
setting, we do not observe a difference in learning across the range of congestion probabilities.  
In contrast, in the discrete penalty setting we observe significant belief adjustments in the lowest 
congestion risk scenario. 
In Chapter 3 the “source method” is used to examine how uncertainty aversion differs 
across events that have the same underlying objective probabilities but are presented under 
varying degrees of uncertainty.  Subjects are presented with three lottery tasks that rank in order 
of increasing uncertainty.  Given the choices observed in each task a source function is estimated 
jointly with risk attitudes under different probability weighting specifications of the source 
function.  Results from the Prelec probability weighting suggest that, as the degree of uncertainty 
increases, subjects display increased pessimism; in contrast, the Tversky-Kahneman (1992) and 
the Power probability weightings detect no such difference.  Thus, the conclusion regarding 
uncertainty aversion are contingent on which probability weighting specification is assumed for 
the source function.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The common theme across the three chapters in this dissertation is the study of decision 
making under uncertainty.  The first two chapters investigate risk perception in the context of 
driving.  In a driving simulator experiment, subjects are presented with an unknown probability 
of traffic delay and make route choices over multiple periods under a range of exogenous 
congestion probabilities.  This allows us to compare if learning differs across the range of 
congestion probabilities.  The third chapter examines if behavior differs across events that are 
presented under varying degrees of uncertainty in a context free task.   
The goal of Chapters 1 and 2 is to examine drivers’ perceived risk of travel delay in 
explaining their route choices.  For any given trip, there are uncertainties about the amount of 
time that it takes to complete a trip as well as the level of congestion on the route.  The 
importance of subjective beliefs in influencing drivers’ behavior is well-stated in Hensher, Li and 
Ho (2014):  
Travelers need to assess the probability distribution of possible travel times for a 
future trip based on their experience, beliefs, etc.… Since travel time variability is 
best described under uncertainty rather than risk, respondents should be asked to 
provide their judged probabilities associated with different travel outcomes (i.e., 
subjective probabilities for uncertainty) in a choice study. 
Consistent with this suggestion, the experiment described in Chapters 1 and 2 allow us to infer 
drivers’ subjective beliefs over the uncertain risk of travel delay from their observed choices.  
The experiment is conducted using field drivers from the Atlanta and Orlando metropolitan 
areas, and the choice task that they participate in is designed with many features of a natural 
driving experience.  These field subjects are asked to make route decisions as they are driving in 
a driving simulator.  Using a driving simulator as an instrument to examine drivers’ behavior is a 
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relatively novel development in transportation experiments (Dixit, Harrison and Rutström 
(2014)).  We apply this experimental approach to examine route choices in a repeated choice 
setting.   
One design feature of the experiment is that subjective beliefs are elicited under an 
endogenous information environment: information about a route (such as its congestion level, 
travel time variability) can only be obtained if one drives on that route, thus information 
gathering is endogenous.  This is an information environment that commonly occurs in practice, 
but has not received much attention in the literature on belief formation and learning.  
In the experiment subjects are asked to make a binary choice between a route that has an 
uncertain level of congestion and an alternate route with no risk of congestion.  For the route that 
has an uncertain level of congestion, four treatments are implemented that differ in terms of the 
range of congestion probabilities.  The treatments range from a low risk of congestion to a high 
risk of congestion.  Subjects are assigned monetary incentives for the value of making the drive, 
the penalty for arriving late to the destination, and the toll charged on the non-congested route.  
Apart from some prior information about frequency of congestion on the uncertain route, drivers 
only obtain additional information if they actually choose to drive on it.  The research questions 
are: will the subjects be able to discern different levels of congestion risk (that are not told to 
them)?  Furthermore, as the subjects gain experience driving, will we observe learning as well as 
differences in learning across the four levels of congestion risk?  Our hypothesis is that, in this 
endogenous information environment, subjects who started with a prior belief of low congestion 
(i.e., those who are in the low-congestion risk treatment) are more likely to drive on the uncertain 
route and thus are able to obtain more information to revise their prior belief.  Therefore, these 
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subjects should display more learning than their counterparts who are in the high-congestion risk 
treatments.  
Both Chapters 1 and 2 ask the same set of questions with respect to subjective beliefs. 
However, the two chapters differ in one crucial aspect.  The difference is in the penalty that is 
associated with a late arrival.  In Chapter 1 the penalty for a late arrival is fixed regardless of the 
extent of delay.  In contrast, in Chapter 2 the penalty is variable and is contingent on the extent 
of delay.  In other words, in Chapter 1 the penalty for a late arrival is discrete, whereas in 
Chapter 2 the penalty for a late arrival is continuous.  While there is not yet a theoretical model 
that takes into account the possible behavioral difference under these two penalty settings, the 
empirical significance of this question is worth investigating.  Since the delay penalty for each 
trip may differ depending on the purpose of the trip or the characteristics of the travelers, it is 
natural to investigate route behavior by delay penalties as it realistically reflects different types 
of trips and/or different groups of travelers. 
Recall that in an endogenous information environment, we expect to observe more 
learning in the low-congestion risk treatments than in the high-congestion risk treatments.  We 
can then ask if the same pattern of behavior will still take place when the penalty is induced in a 
discrete vs. a continuous manner.  To examine behavior in a setting where the late penalty is 
continuous calls for an experimental design that has variability in arrival times so that the extent 
of delay varies.  The advantage of using driving simulators in a choice task is that the amount of 
time it takes to complete the drive varies depending not only on route selection, and the 
congestion scenario on the uncertain route, but also on how the subjects drive on the simulator.  
In this way, the arrival times along with late penalties are naturalistically induced as continuous 
variables.   
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 Chapter 3 builds on the previous two chapters, and the goal is to examine how this same 
group of field subjects perceive the unknown probabilities that are presented under varying 
degrees of uncertainty.  Here the research question is: if an event with an unknown probability is 
presented to subjects under separate scenarios that vary in degrees of uncertainty, will it result in 
variations in behavior?  In particular, does behavior vary in a systematic manner going from the 
least uncertain scenario to the most uncertain scenario?  In the experiment, subjects are asked to 
complete three types of lottery tasks that are ranked in order of increasing uncertainty.  Subjects’ 
uncertainty attitudes are analyzed using the “source method” that is introduced by Abdellaoui, 
Baillon, Placido and Wakker (2011). 
The source method assumes that different types of events imply potentially different 
sources of uncertainty, and that attitudes toward uncertainty and the perception of the likelihoods 
may be revealed by comparing decision weights inferred across different types of events.  These 
decision weights are modeled using probability weighting functions (or source functions), and 
the parameters estimated from the source functions give rise to two indices of uncertainty 
aversion: pessimism and likelihood insensitivity.  From here, behavior under uncertainty can be 
analyzed in a tractable manner using these indices.  This allows one to pinpoint if the behavioral 
variation across different types of events is due to differences in pessimism and/or likelihood 
insensitivity.  Chapter 3 asks if the behavioral variation going from the least uncertain scenario to 
the most uncertain scenario is due to an increased pessimism and/or likelihood insensitivity. 
If the indices of uncertainty aversion are based on the estimates that are derived from a 
source function, one theoretical concern is whether different specifications of the source function 
imply different estimates of uncertainty aversion indices.  In other words, is the analysis of 
behavior under uncertainty robust when we assume different specifications of the source 
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function?  Or will the observed behavior be better captured by one specification of the source 
function than another?  The results show that the behavioral difference under uncertainty is better 
captured by the Prelec specification (Prelec (1998)) than the Tversky-Kahneman (1992) or 
Power specification.  Thus, conclusions regarding uncertainty aversion are contingent on which 
specification is assumed for the source function. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Estimating Subjective Beliefs in Naturalistic Tasks with Limited Information 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the area of transportation policy, congestion pricing has been used to alleviate traffic 
congestion in metropolitan areas.  The policy reduces traffic congestion by charging drivers for 
using congested routes.  This gives them incentives to use an alternate route or mode of 
transportation.  When drivers do not know the actual probability of delay and can only base their 
decisions on past experience on the routes or information from others, their expectations of delay 
as well as risk attitudes are crucial elements in determining their route choices.  As pointed out 
by Savage (1971), to identify the model of decision making under risk one needs to understand 
the preference function of an agent and the way they perceive the probability of the unknown 
event (their subjective probabilities).  This essay examines the perception of travel delay in 
explaining reactions to congestion pricing.  Commuters from Atlanta and Orlando metropolitan 
areas are recruited to participate in an experiment that uses driving simulators and their 
subjective probabilities of the uncertain risk of delay are inferred through the route choices they 
make.  The primary research question is whether the field subjects are able to form estimates of 
the risk of delay that vary with the underlying congestion probabilities in a simulator 
environment.  Furthermore, do they adjust their beliefs in the direction of the objective 
congestion probability?  Does the adjustment of beliefs differ depending on the underlying 
objective congestion probability? 
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 An important and novel aspect of the design is information gathering is endogenous: the 
prior information of congestion on a route can only be updated if one decides to take that route, 
otherwise no new information is generated.  Given some initial belief about the riskiness of a 
potentially congested route, those who start with a lower belief of congestion risk may be more 
inclined to take the risky route than those who start with a higher belief, thus leading to subjects 
with a lower belief of congestion risk obtaining more information than those with a higher belief 
of congestion risk, ceteris paribus.  In a dynamic setting, the implication for belief adjustment is 
that subjects who start with a lower belief of congestion risk will experience faster belief 
adjustment than those who start with a high belief of congestion risk.   
 Another important design feature of this experiment is information about risk is presented 
using visual and immersive simulations.  While much is known about beliefs in stylized 
experiments, such as those using urns of colored balls to model uncertain prospects, there is less 
known about risk perceptions in natural or naturalistic simulated environment.  It has been 
suggested in the psychology literature that, depending on the framing of the experimental task, 
subjects may employ different decision heuristics, and thus there are reasons to believe that this 
may lead to different degrees of bias.  For example, the dual-process theory suggests that some 
frames may induce slower cognitive modes that involves explicit deliberation, whereas others 
may induce faster cognitive modes that involves emotions and heuristics.1  Applying the insights 
of dual process theories to decision making under risk and uncertainty, Mukherjee (2010) 
suggests that if people vary in their disposition to use either of these cognitive processes, then the 
task construction can directly affect the weight that either gets in the valuation of an uncertain 
                                                          
1 See Chaiken and Trope (1999) for a discussion of dual-process theory.  
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prospect.  Thus it is important that the experimental task imitates the real-life setting in which the 
agent would normally make the decision, so as to promote a more natural mode of decision 
making.  Fiore, Harrison, Hughes and Rutström (2009) show that in visual and immersive 
simulations of risky environments, the estimated beliefs are closer to the actual underlying risk 
than in environments with some of the characteristics of standard survey instruments. 
 The purpose of this experiment is to elicit subjects’ perceptions of the probability, p, of 
travel delay.  This probability partly depends on the probability of congestion, which is given 
exogenously but varies across four scenarios.  However, drivers also drive on non-congested 
parts of the route which contributes to their delay.  Subjects’ latent subjective probabilities are 
revealed through their binary choices over two routes: one has an uncertain level of congestion 
risk, the other has no congestion risk.  One objective congestion probability is randomly assigned 
to each subject and stays constant through the session.  This probability is known to the 
experimenter, but not to the subjects.  Four levels of this probability are used: {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}.  
The hypothesis is that, as subjects go through the ten driving periods of the experiment, their 
perception of the probability will change throughout, but only to the extent that they choose the 
relatively risky route to receive information feedback about its congestion conditions.  When 
they choose the risk-free route they get no information feedback about the congestion conditions 
on the risky route.  
 The latent subjective beliefs of delay are estimated controlling for risk attitudes, and the 
task for eliciting risk attitudes (i.e., the preference functions) is implemented using stylized 
binary lottery choices.  Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström (2014) and Manski (2014) 
emphasize that separate tasks are needed to identify both the preference function and the 
perceived probabilities, and this essay follows that advice.  This experiment deviates from 
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Manski (2014) in that incentivized tasks are used to reveal both the risk perceptions and the risk 
attitudes of the subjects.  There is much evidence that hypothetical methods can lead to biases in 
subject responses: for example, Harrison (2014) reports evidence of hypothetical bias in the 
estimation of risk perceptions, whereas Holt and Laury (2002) and Harrison (2005) report 
evidence of hypothetical bias in the estimation of risk attitudes.  
 The estimation results show that the subjective beliefs of delay, p, rank in the order of the 
objective probabilities of congestion.  Across the driving periods only subjects in the lowest 
congestion risk treatment express significant adjustment in the belief of delay.  In the higher risk 
treatments there is no belief adjustment.  The result is consistent with the hypothesis that in an 
endogenous information environment collecting information about a route that has an uncertain 
level of congestion is perceived as riskier when the subjective probability of delay is higher.  
This leads to limited or no updating.  The implication of this finding is that drivers in the field 
who habitually select an expressway over an alternative local route may do so because they 
persistently hold a high belief about the congestion level on the alternative route whether or not 
the objective congestion probability is high.  This would imply that responses to congestion 
pricing could be limited since drivers would be reluctant to try the alternative route.  In addition, 
if drivers are unable to adjust their beliefs about congestion after traffic events such as 
construction, lane closings, or lane conversions, it will result in suboptimal traffic allocation 
across alternate routes.   
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1.2 Literature Review 
 In experimental economics, different methods are used to elicit subjective beliefs in the 
laboratory.  These methods include: survey questionnaires with hypothetical payoffs; the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method; choice tasks that are constructed in a Multiple Price List 
(MPL) format; or proper scoring rules such as the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR).  For example, 
in hypothetical questionnaires, the experimenter may directly ask subjects what they think is the 
true probability of an event occurring, or what they think is the true state of nature out of the 
many possible states presented (Attneave (1953)).  Regardless of which response subjects 
provide or which outcome will be played out, the payoffs that subjects “receive” are hypothetical 
(i.e., $0), which does not incentivize subjects to truthfully report their beliefs.  Furthermore, it is 
well known in the valuation and the risk attitude elicitation literature that hypothetical bias exists 
(Harrison (2006, 2014)), therefore it is reasonable to suspect that belief elicitations that do not 
use monetary incentives may suffer from such hypothetical biases.  Another approach is to use 
the BDM method to elicit subjective probabilities (rather than willingness to pay) (Holt and 
Smith (2009)).  However, the instruction of the BDM may be difficult for subjects to understand 
thus potentially compromising its effectiveness.  Choice tasks that are constructed in the MPL 
format may be used to elicit subjective probability intervals (rather than risk attitudes).  The task 
may involve a series of lottery choice tasks (Moreno and Rosokha (2015)), or a series of betting 
tasks where subjects place bets with multiple bookies who offer different odds (Antoniou, 
Harrison, Lau and Read (2015, 2016)).  Proper scoring rules such as the QSR can be 
implemented through a “slider task” that is constructed using the formula of the QSR.  On a 
computer screen a number of possible events are shown to the subjects, and subjects are asked to 
allocate earnings or points across these events by adjusting the slider that represents each event 
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(Andersen, Fountain, Hole, and Rutström (2014); Harrison (2014); Harrison and Swarthout 
(2014)).  The above mentioned elicitation methods are used in stylized or non-naturalistic 
settings with the exception of Fiore, Harrison, Hughes and Rutström (2009), who use visual and 
immersive simulations to present subjects with information about the unknown risk in a virtual 
reality setting.  The study reports that the beliefs elicited in a virtual reality setting are closer to 
the objective risk than those elicited in a stylized setting with still images and/or textual 
descriptions.    
 Two classic experiments in the psychology literature: Preston and Baratta (1949) and 
Attneave (1953), exemplify the early experimental approach to belief elicitation.  In both 
experiments, subjective beliefs are elicited and the elicitation procedure were not incentivized for 
the truthful reporting of subjective beliefs.  Preston and Baratta (1949) present subjects with a 
series of gambles, and for each gamble the privilege to play the gamble is auctioned off to a 
number of subjects, who are bidders in the experiment.  The highest bidder obtains the privilege 
to play the gamble.  Probability theory would suggest that if a bidder on average pays in excess 
of the mathematical expectation for the privilege to play the gamble, then a long series of plays 
will result in systematic losses; vice versa if a bidder pays in less than the mathematical 
expectation.  The study examines subjects’ bidding prices of the gambles, or subjects’ implied 
subjective probabilities.  Under the range of probabilities studied, subjects tended to make high 
bets for events with objective probabilities that are below 0.2, and low bets for events with 
objective probabilities that are above 0.2.  In other words, subjects overestimated low 
probabilities and underestimated high ones with an equality point at about 0.2.2  The results of 
                                                          
2 An equality point occurs when the subjective probability equals the objective probability.  Results regarding 
equality points differ across experiments: some find an equality point around 02 or around 0.5, whereas others find 
no equality point, see Edwards (1954) for a detailed review.  
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the study may need to be taken with caution as it is well known in the auction literature that 
bidding price in a first-price sealed-bid auction is a function of the number of bidders present 
(Kagel and Levin (2011); Fullbrunn and Neugebauer (2013)), thus the number of bidders in the 
experiment may confound with subjects’ subjective probabilities.  Similar to the findings in 
Preston and Baratta (1949), Attneave (1953) reports that events with low frequencies of 
occurring are systematically overestimated and events with high frequencies of occurring are 
systematically underestimated.  The Attneave (1953) experiment presents subjects with a 
newspaper clipping that has a thousand letters in it, and asks them to guess the occurrence of 
each of the 26 letters in the alphabet in the newspaper clipping.   
To examine the importance of using incentivized methods in belief elicitation 
experiments, Harrison (2014) compares the subjective probabilities elicited using incentivized 
methods to the ones elicited using hypothetical methods.  The study elicits the subjective belief 
distribution of subjects over various health risk and financial matters, using either an 
incentivized QSR or one with hypothetical payment.  Subjects report their beliefs over possible 
events by allocating earnings across these events using a slider task shown on a computer screen.  
As subjects adjust the height of the slider for an event, the height on the slider corresponds to the 
earnings allocated to that event.  Pooling across subject responses, the average belief differs 
significantly between the group who receive salient payment and the group for whom the 
payment is hypothetical.  Furthermore, when controlling for demographic variations, 
hypothetical bias varies significantly across demographic sub-samples.   
Subjective beliefs can be estimated as a discrete probability or as a probability 
distribution.  It is important to control for subjects’ risk attitudes when subjective belief is 
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estimated as a discrete probability estimate.3  For example, when subjects are asked to report 
beliefs in a QSR, risk averse subjects would be drawn toward a 50/50 report, thus they under-
report high probabilities and over-report low probabilities (Offerman et al. (2009); Andersen, 
Fountain, Harrison and Rutström (2014)).  To examine the importance of controlling for risk 
attitudes, Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström (2014) compare the subjective 
probabilities that are elicited with controlling for subjects’ risk attitudes to those that are elicited 
without controlling for risk attitudes.  Subjective probabilities are elicited over outcomes of the 
2008 Presidential Election, and over the performance of a randomly chosen man and woman 
from the group of subjects in the experiment on a test in psychology known as the Eyes Test.  
Subjects report their beliefs over possible events by allocate earnings across the events using a 
slider task.4  The payoff formula is designed using either the quadratic or the linear scoring rule.  
Beliefs are jointly estimated with risk attitudes assuming Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) and 
Rank Dependent Utility (RDU).  The study reports that both the utility function and the 
probability weighting function are concave, and thus it is important to control for risk attitudes 
through utility curvature and probability curvature.   
Many of the studies described above estimate a discrete probability estimate for an 
unknown event assuming a representative agent.  Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, Hole and 
Rutström (2011) (hereafter, AFHHR) present subjects with a range of bookies offering odds on 
the outcome of some unknown event.  As the subject allocates earnings over the range of 
offering odds, the individual’s probability distribution over the possible probabilities for an 
                                                          
3 When subjective probability is estimated as a probability distribution, Harrison, Martinez-Correa, Swarthout, and 
Ulm (2013) show that adjusting for risk attitudes is not needed if one is willing to assume that subjects behave 
consistently with EUT.   
4 Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström (2014) and Harrison (2014) both use a slider task to elicit subjective 
beliefs.  The former uses a slider task with two bins to elicit a discrete probability, and the latter uses a slider task 
with ten bins to elicit a probability distribution.   
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unknown event is elicited.  The study examines events that differ across a range of objective 
probabilities, and reports that in the low-probability treatment where the objective probability is 
0.1 or 0.2, in each case the mode and the mean of the subjective distribution are significantly 
greater than its corresponding objective probability.  As for the medium-probability and high-
probability treatments, where the objective probabilities are 0.5 or 0.55, and 0.75 or 0.8, 
respectively, the mean of the subjective probability distributions are virtually the same as the 
objective probabilities.  The experiment is conducted with stationary probabilities and real 
monetary incentives.  Subjective beliefs are corrected for risk attitudes by including a lottery 
choice task and inferring beliefs with joint estimation methods.  
Comparing the AFHHR (2011) study to the classic psychology studies of Preston and 
Baratta (1949) and Attneave (1953), a common finding is that subjects tend to overestimate low 
probabilities.  This therefore seems to be true whether or not one uses monetary incentives or 
adjusts for risk attitudes.  However, in the medium-probability and high-probability range, the 
perception of probabilities may differ depending on incentives and the task at hand.  
 
Repeated Choice  
The studies reviewed so far examine subjective probabilities in a one-task setting where 
beliefs are elicited only once.  Gallistel et al. (2014) was interested in assessing beliefs in a 
dynamic setting with multiple periods.  In each period, subjects are given signals and the 
(posterior) belief is elicited.  The experimental task involves presenting subjects with “a box of 
circles” displayed on a computer screen that has unknown probabilities of green and red circles.  
In each period, the subject is allowed to sample one circle from the box and is asked to state 
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his/her guess as to the proportion of green circles, p, by submitting the answer through a moving 
slider.  Ten subjects are recruited for a flat fee and each go through 1,000 trials.  An important 
feature in the design is that subjects are told that p changes randomly throughout the experiment 
(i.e., p is non-stationary), and thus the estimate of p needs to update with changes in the 
distribution.  In each round, after the subjects submit their answers they receive no information 
feedback as to what the true p is.  At any time during the experiment if the subjects think the 
proportion of circles in the box has changed they are told to click on the button that says “I think 
the box has changed.”  The study reports that “the mapping from the true probability to median 
report probability is the identity,” which suggests that the frequency of overestimating the true 
probability is equal to the frequency of underestimating the true probability.  Gallistel et al. 
(2014) do not compare the subjective probabilities to the true probabilities, therefore one cannot 
infer the degree to which subjects overestimate or underestimate the true probabilities.   
To understand how subjects assess probabilities in a repeated choice setting, many 
studies have focused on belief updating.  Conditional on a prior belief, if subjects update new 
information in a Bayesian manner, the posterior beliefs should converge on the objective 
probabilities over time as new information is acquired.  Conversely, if subjects overweight or 
underweight new information, the posterior beliefs should deviate from objective probabilities.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Grether (1980) and Grether (1992) report that subjects tend to 
make decisions based on how similar or representative the sample distribution is to the parent 
population (known as representativeness), disregarding any prior information they may have.  
Grether (1980) presents subjects with two urns with varying number of colored balls where the 
distribution of each urn is known to the subjects.  Subjects are told that one of the urns will be 
randomly chosen and the (prior) probability of each being chosen is equal.  After an urn is 
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chosen, the experimenter draws six signals (with replacement) from the chosen urn, and subject’s 
belief about the true urn is elicited.  The study reports that subjects do not accurately weight the 
prior information in a Bayesian manner and that they tend to over-weight the new information.  
Building upon the design of Grether (1980, 1992), El-Gamal and Grether (1995) present subjects 
with two cages where the distribution of each cage is known to the subjects.  Subjects are told 
that one of the cages will be randomly chosen and the (prior) probability of each cage being 
chosen may or may not be equal.  Three (prior) probability treatments are examined.  The study 
reports the three commonly-used updating rules used by subjects: (a) Bayes rule, (b) 
representativeness (over-weighting the new signal), and (c) conservatism (under-weighting the 
new signal).  In these belief updating experiments, subjects are given extra monetary payment if 
their responses are correct.   
Building upon past experiments on belief updating, Moreno and Rosokha (2015) examine 
belief updating between two environments.  One environment is a compound risk environment 
where subjects are presented with a compound urn and are told of its composition “process” (i.e., 
its possible distributions).  The second is an ambiguous environment where subjects are 
presented with an ambiguous urn in which they are not told of its composition process.  Each 
treatment lasts for five rounds.  In each round subjects are given three signals from the urn and 
are asked to state their choices in the MPL between a sure amount of money and a lottery (e.g. 
$X if black, $0 otherwise).5  As subjects go through the rounds and gather more signals, one 
would expect their choices in the MPL to adjust and reflect learning.  Subjective beliefs are 
                                                          
5 A MPL is often used to elicit a subject’s valuation of an event that has some subjective risk.  The task involves 
presenting subjects with an array of ordered prices in a table.  In each row, the subject is asked to choose between a 
fixed amount of money and taking a gamble.  The gamble option stays the same throughout but the fixed amount of 
money changes across rows.  The switching point between the two options would indicate subject’s valuation for the 
event and hence their subjective probability interval if the subject is risk neutral.   
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estimated controlling for risk attitudes assume a generalized model of reinforcement learning and 
Bayesian updating.  The study reports that subjects significantly underweight new information in 
an ambiguous environment compared to in a compound risk environment, and as a result the 
updating process is less volatile.   
In a belief updating experiment, Antoniou, Harrison, Lau and Read (2015) use a 
revealed-preference approach to examine if subject’s inferred posterior belief deviates from 
Bayes Rule across a range of low and high probabilities.  Subjects are presented with a white box 
and a blue box, each containing 10-sided dice.  The white box contains N 10-sided dice that each 
has 6 white and 4 blue sides, and the blue box contains similar dice that each has 6 blue and 4 
white sides.  Within each treatment, N is the same for both boxes; across treatments, N may take 
on the value of 3, 5, 9, or 17.  Subjects are told that one of the boxes is randomly selected with 
0.5 (prior) probability but they do not know which box.  After a box is selected, a student-
monitor randomly draws signals (or sample information) from the selected box.  Next, the 
subjects are asked to place a bet in one of the available 19 betting houses offering different odds; 
this way, their choice of a betting house reveals their belief about the selected box.  Each subject 
participates for 30 rounds of betting task, and at the end of the 30 rounds one of the bets is 
randomly selected for payment.  In the experiment a separate task with known probabilities is 
implemented to elicit risk attitudes.  Inferred beliefs are estimated assuming Subjective Expected 
Utility controlling for risk attitudes.  The study reports that, in the low probability range subjects 
overestimate the (posterior) probability, and in the high probability range subjects underestimate 
the (posterior) probability.  Furthermore, when one assumes (incorrectly) linear utility the 
deviation from Bayes Rule is higher.   
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What possibly explains the violation of Bayes Rule?  Griffin and Tversky (1992) propose 
the strength-weight hypothesis as a plausible theory to explain violation of Bayes Rule.  
According to this hypothesis, decision makers who are fallible to the strength-weight bias tend to 
pay too much attention to the extremity (strength) of the information and too little attention to its 
predictive validity (weight).  In an experiment that did not use incentive compatible elicitation 
methods, Griffin and Tversky (1992) report that the magnitude of bias is significant and in some 
cases probabilities diverge from Bayes Rule by 28%.  Antoniou, Harrison, Lau and Read (2016) 
builds on the experimental design of Antoniou, Harrison, Lau and Read (2015) and test if the 
strength-weight bias is plausible when using an incentive compatible elicitation method and 
controlling for risk attitudes.  The 2016 study reports an average bias of 6%, and after controlling 
for non-linear utility further reduces the bias.   
In the studies with a single choice reviewed above, subjects consistently overestimate low 
probabilities.  This result has been found in studies both with and without implementing 
incentivized elicitation methods or adjusting for risk attitudes.  There is less consensus in the 
medium-probability and high-probability range where subjects underestimate the true 
probabilities in some settings but in others form an unbiased estimate.  The consensus is that 
subjects do not typically form an unbiased estimate of the true probabilities over the range of 
objective probabilities.  This generalization is further supported by the belief updating literature, 
which reports that subjects do not update probabilities in a Bayesian manner.  If subjects do not 
properly weight the priors and update new information, then the elicited (posterior) probabilities 
will likely deviate from the objective probabilities. 
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Experimental Frame  
The belief elicitation and updating experiments reviewed above are conducted in stylized 
environments.  In contrast, Fiore, Harrison, Hughes and Rutström (2009) elicit beliefs using a 
virtual reality environment.  To examine how the interactive and visual presentations of risk may 
contribute to differences in the perception of risk, Fiore, Harrison, Hughes and Rutström (2009) 
conduct an experiment that examines subjective beliefs under three settings that differ in the 
degree of interactiveness and immersiveness: 2-picture treatment, 52-picture treatment, and a 
virtual reality treatment.  Subjects are presented with images or virtual simulations of a wild 
forest fire, and they have monetary interest in a property in the area where the fire can potentially 
be spreading.  In a MPL subjects are asked for their willingness to pay for fire protective actions.  
Subjective beliefs are estimated controlling for risk attitudes.  Given that the true probability of 
wild fire damage is 0.29, in the 2-picture treatment the estimated subjective probability was 0.45; 
in the 52-picture treatment it increases to 0.52; and in the virtual reality treatment it decreases to 
0.25 which is quite close to the true probability.  The study concludes that the immersive aspect 
of the virtual reality experiment has the effect of generating subjective beliefs that are closer to 
the objective risk than still images and/or textual descriptions.   
It is well known in the psychology literature that the environment in which agents make 
decisions may affect how information is processed.  The concept of “ecological rationality” 
claims that the rationality of a particular decision depends on the circumstances and environment 
in which it takes place (Gigerenzer and Todd (1999); Gigerenzer (2008)).  Furthermore, when 
agents make decisions under risk and uncertainty, dual process theories suggest that two decision 
processes may be at work: the deliberative system and the affective system (Chaiken and Tope 
(1999); Stanovich and West (2000); Kahneman (2003); Evans and Frankish (2009); Mukherjee 
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(2010)).  This suggests that an agent may value a gamble differently depending on which 
cognitive system is used, and which cognitive system is used depends on a number of attributes 
including the disposition of the agent, the framing of the task and the outcome of past gambles.  
Applying this insight to the construction of belief elicitation task, the framing of the 
experimental task may possibly lead to different degrees of bias in the perception of risk.  
This essay employs virtual reality in order to elicit beliefs that are more relevant for 
discussions of beliefs as they apply in the field.  This essay assumes that the immersive nature of 
the driving simulator has the effect of generating beliefs of delay that are closer to the actual risk 
of delay than if subjects are presented with still images and/or textual descriptions.  The second 
purpose of this essay is to examine belief adjustment in an environment where information 
gathering is endogenous, such that subjects will acquire new information about a route only if 
they choose that route.  This is an information condition that has not been studied in previous 
belief updating experiments.  This information condition could mean that for sufficiently high 
risk cases belief adjustment will be very slow and possibly result in subjective risk deviating 
significantly from the objective risk.   
 
1.3 Experimental Design 
This experiment uses real money incentives.  Each subject is presented with a driving simulator 
task with ten driving periods that elicit subjective beliefs and four binary lottery tasks that elicit 
risk attitudes.  The experiment is not designed to elicit or infer the beliefs of individual subjects, 
but to do so using data pooled across subjects.  This section describes the design of each task 
followed by the recruitment and experimental procedure.   
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1.3.1 Simulator Route Choice Task  
The driving simulator task is designed to mimic a real-life commuting experience.  The 
subjects drive in a simulator environment installed on a laptop that is equipped with a steering 
wheel, gas and brake pedals, and views everything from the perspective of sitting in the driver’s 
seat.  They drive from a simulated home origin to a simulated work destination as they make a 
binary choice between a route that has free-flow traffic and another route that could be congested 
with some probability.  Each drive is referred to as a work day.  If the subjects choose to take the 
free-flow route there is a toll charge that varies across subjects but is stationary across the drives.  
The drive takes approximately 2 to 4 minutes, depending on which route they take, which 
scenario they are in, and how they drive.  To increase the realism of the setting, simulated 
vehicles are added to the road and subjects are required to follow general traffic rules, such as 
speed limits.   
The number of variables that are assigned to the subjects include: a wage that serves as a 
monetary endowment for each drive, a time limit within which they have to arrive to work, a 
monetary penalty if they arrive to work late, a toll charge when taking the risk-free route, and an 
unknown probability of congestion on the risky road.  These variables are adjusted on a between-
subject basis.  The wage can be a high wage of $5.00 or a low wage of $2.50.  If travel time 
exceeds a certain time threshold, a discrete penalty amount will be subtracted from the wage.  
Table A1 shows the ranges of tolls, penalties and time thresholds.  Tolls range from $0.50 to 
$2.00 if wage if $2.50, and from $0.50 to $4.00 if wage is $5.00.  The range of toll is in 10-cent 
increments.  Penalties range from $0.50 to $2.00 if the wage is $2.50, and from $0.50 to $4.00 if 
the wage is $5.00.  The range of penalty is in 50-incent increments.  Time thresholds range from 
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2 minutes and 10 seconds to 2 minutes and 45 seconds in 5-second increments.  These 
assignments are constant across drives.   
Each task is paid sequentially to avoid the issues that arise with random payment 
protocols.6  Across the driving periods the cumulative earnings may present a wealth effect on 
risk aversion, such that an increase in earnings could reduce risk aversion in the following 
periods.  However, an increase in earnings theoretically should not affect the belief of delay, and 
it should only affect the belief estimate indirectly through its effect on risk aversion.  Cox, 
Sadiraj and Schmidt (2015) report that the PAS protocol did not induce a significant wealth 
effect; the same result is reported in Cox and Epstein (1989) and Cox and Grether (1996) who 
also use the PAS protocol.  In contrast, Dixit, Harb, Martinez and Rutström (2015), who use the 
PAS protocol in a driving simulator task with exogenous delay probabilities, report that 
cumulative wealth significantly reduce risk aversion (p-value <1%).  Here the cumulative wealth 
effect is assumed to be negligible on the belief estimate. 
An aerial view of the simulated city where the subjects drive is shown in Figure A1.  In 
the simulation, 7th Avenue is the express route that is risk free, and 9th Avenue is the alternate, 
local road that is congested with some probability.  Before driving, subjects are shown a deck of 
                                                          
6 The payment protocol that is used to elicit lottery choices must be compatible with the decision model in order to 
be incentive compatible.  The pay-one-randomly (POR) protocol implicitly assumes that subjects view each 
outcome in each binary choice independently of each other, such that their behavior is in accordance with the 
Compound Independence Axiom (CIA).  This payment protocol is incentive compatible under EUT (see Harrison 
and Swarthout (2014) and Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt (2015)).  However, it is incompatible with non-EUT models 
that are not based on the CIA, including Rank Dependent Utility (RDU).  
This essay models choices over risky lotteries using both EUT and RDU, which necessitates the use of a payment 
protocol that is incentive compatible under both.  The Pay-All-Sequentially (PAS) protocol does not rely on the CIA 
and is thus incentive compatible with both.  However, PAS is not problem-free since it may induce a cumulative 
wealth effect.  An alternative approach is to assume that there is one CIA that applies to the evaluation of a given 
lottery (in our case the evaluation of each route) and another CIA that applies to the payment protocol.  One can then 
relax the former CIA and estimate the RDU model, while maintaining the assumption of the latter CIA.  It is then 
possible to use the POR payment protocol and legitimately estimate the RDU model. 
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toll cards (face-down) and are asked to draw one card that will determine their toll fee if they 
were to take 7th Avenue.  On 9th Avenue congestion is induced using a school bus that makes 
frequent stops on the road causing delay.  The objective probability of congestion, or the 
probability of a school bus being present, takes four possible values, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, or 0.8, and is 
varied across subjects but constant within subjects.  Subjects are not told what probability 
treatment that they are assigned to nor are they told that these are the four possible congestion 
levels.  Subjects are told that the congestion level stay the same across the ten drives.  
To implement the random congestion process, at the start of each period subjects are 
presented with a deck of cards, where some of the cards have the word “bus” on them and others 
have the words “no bus” on them.  They choose a card without seeing if the card says “bus” or 
“no bus”.  Next, the research assistant loads up the scenario stated on the chosen card.  To ensure 
that subjects can trust that the research assistant actually loads the scenario indicated by the card 
drawn, the cards selected are saved in an envelope and revealed at the end of the ten drive tasks.  
Subjects do not know if a bus card is drawn unless they choose to drive on 9th Avenue in which 
case they will find out by experience.  Thus, the information obtain on 9th Avenue will only be 
obtained if the route is selected.  If the subjects drive very slowly, then late arrival is possible 
even when a bus does not come.7  Prior to starting the drive task, subjects draw ten cards from 
the deck of bus cards with replacement, allowing them to form prior beliefs.  
Earnings are recorded after each drive and tracked, along with cumulative earnings, 
throughout the drive periods in a transparent way.  
                                                          
7 These cases are not common.  Pooling across all the drives and across all subjects, there are only 20 out of a total 
of 479 drives where the subjects take 9th Avenue, do not see a bus, and are still late (relative to the assigned time 
threshold).  These are the subjects who are assigned the lowest time threshold and are late by less than 10 seconds; 
many of them are late by only 2 or 3 seconds.  
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1.3.2 Binary Lottery Task 
Subjects are asked to complete four binary lottery tasks that elicit their risk attitudes.  
Figure A2 presents a screenshot from the lottery used in the practice task, and the set of prizes 
and probabilities used is listed in Table A2.  In each task, a binary decision is made between a 
relatively safe lottery and a relatively risky one.  After a decision is made, the outcome of the 
lottery is determined by the roll of a dice.  Within each task the probability of getting the high 
prize is the same for the risky lottery and the safe lottery, but the probability varies across tasks.  
The tasks are randomly assigned to subjects.  Each of the four lottery tasks is actualized 
sequentially, and the research assistants keep track of the task earnings along with the cumulative 
earnings in a way that was transparent to subjects.  
 
1.3.3 Recruitment and Experimental Procedure 
Subjects in this essay are selected from United States Postal Service (USPS) mailing lists 
and are recruited by invitation letters.  The invitation letters direct them to a web page where 
they are instructed to create an anonymous Gmail account to use exclusively for this experiment 
to ensure strict privacy.  Admission to participate in the experiment is contingent on being at 
least 18 years of age, holding a valid driver’s license, and using a vehicle with a valid vehicle 
insurance.   
The experimental tasks analyzed in this essay are part of a larger experiment described in 
Rutström et al. (2011).  The larger experiment consists of four meetings separated by 
approximately two weeks each.  The simulator driving task with uncertain congestion risk is only 
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one of several tasks that subjects perform and is conducted during the second meeting.  Two of 
the lottery tasks are conducted during the first meeting and the last two at the end of the second 
meeting.  Subjects are paid for all tasks, and earnings for each task, along with cumulative 
earnings, are tracked in a clear and transparent manner.  The subjects are commuters from the 
Atlanta and Orlando metropolitan areas and a total of 141 subjects are included for the purpose 
of this analysis.  
 
1.4 Theory 
The experiment described in this essay is designed with features of a theoretical model 
that is commonly used in transportation economics: the scheduling model.  Below we provide a 
description of the scheduling model, and then followed by hypotheses and a description of the 
Subjective Expected Utility model that is assumed for structural analysis.   
 
1.4.1 Scheduling Model in Transportation   
One theoretical approach to modeling traveling decision is the scheduling model that was 
introduced by Small (1982).  The difference between preferred arrival time (PAT) and actual 
arrival time is defined as schedule delay (SD).  A late arrival relative to PAT is a schedule delay-
late (SDL) and an early arrival relative to PAT is a schedule delay-early (SDE).  There are two 
versions to this model.  The first version specifies the arrival time as a discrete variable and 
hence assumes a discrete penalty (or fixed penalty) for any late arrival.  The model is given in 
the following equation:  
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𝑈 =  𝛼𝑇 +  𝛽(𝑆𝐷𝐸) +  𝛾(𝑆𝐷𝐿) +  𝜃𝐷𝐿                 
where utility U is a function of travel time T, schedule delay-early SDE, schedule delay-late SDL, 
and a fixed penalty for any late arrival 𝐷𝐿.  𝐷𝐿 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when there is a 
delay and 0 otherwise.  The estimated parameters (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝜃) are assumed to be negative.  
The first version of the scheduling model does not include risk, hence there is not a probability 
attached to being early or late. 
An example of a scenario that has a discrete arrival time that incurs a fixed late penalty is 
in airline travels, where the travelers’ decision model considers only two possible arrival 
outcomes: arrive earlier than desired, or arrive late and miss the flight, thus the penalty is the 
same independent of how late the arrival is.  Another example is for travelers who are motor-
vehicle users and choose their departure time without having to adhere to a fixed timetable.  
They may choose their departure time away from the peak congestion hours and postpone 
traveling until the peak hours subside, thus departure times (as well as arrival times) may 
experience a “jump” before or after peak hours.8   
Noland and Small (1995) relax the assumption that the arrival time is a discrete variable 
by extending it to include continuous arrival times by adding a probability distribution of travel 
times.  When travel time T is assumed to be continuous and follows a probability distribution, the 
uncertainty about T propagates onto uncertainties about actual arrival times, also onto 
uncertainties about SDE, SDL, and late arrival.  Thus, each of these variables also follows a 
probability distribution: 
                                                          
8 Another example of a discrete arrival time is for travelers of public transport who plan their time of departure in 
accordance with a fixed timetable that is preset by a scheduler.  Their time of departure may be, for example, every 
15 minutes on the clock; it then follows that their time of arrival is also every 15 minutes.   
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𝐸(𝑈) =  𝛼𝐸(𝑇) +  𝛽𝐸(𝑆𝐷𝐸) +  𝛾𝐸(𝑆𝐷𝐿) +  𝜃𝑃𝐿             
where the expected utility 𝐸(𝑈) is dependent on expected (or mean) travel time E(T), expected 
schedule delay-early E(SDE), expected schedule delay-late E(SDL), and the probability of 
arriving late 𝑃𝐿.  Trips where there is no additional cost associated with the probability of 
arriving late would have 𝜃 = 0.  
This scenario is more representative of travelers who use private transport (i.e., motor-
vehicles) and who choose departure times at any given moment without having to adhere to a 
fixed timetable.  Hence their departure times as well as arrival times, are continuous variables.   
In this continuous time setting the Noland and Small (1995) model can be generalized to 
model discrete penalty (i.e., fixed lump-sum amount), or continuous penalty (i.e., each minute of 
delay incurs an additional penalty).9  In a setting where the late penalty is continuous, the 
traveler’s decision model considers a distribution of arrival outcomes: arrive early, 1 minute of 
late penalty, 2 minutes of late penalty, …, etc.  An example of this scenario is if the purpose of 
the trip is to attend an economics seminar, the longer the delay the more information is missed.   
 
1.4.2 Hypotheses 
This essay examines how field subjects perceive the risk of delay that is uncertain in a 
driving simulator.  Specifically, are field subjects able to form estimates of the risk of delay that 
vary with the underlying objective congestion probability?  Furthermore, under an endogenous 
                                                          
9 Note that Chapters 1 and 2 both examine route choices in a setting where arrival time is continuous (following the 
model of Noland and Small (1995).  Chapter 1 examines route choices where the late penalty is fixed, whereas 
Chapter 2 examines route choices where the late penalty is continuous. 
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information environment, do they adjust their beliefs in the direction of the objective congestion 
probability?  Does the adjustment of beliefs differ depending on the underlying objective 
congestion probability?  
The probability of delay depends partly on the probability of congestion, which is 
unknown to the subjects.  When there is a bus, subjects could be late to work; but when there is 
not a bus, subjects could still be late to work.  In other words, the perceived risk of delay depends 
on the following factors: (1) the probability of congestion, (2) the probability of delay 
conditional on the presence of congestion, and (3) the probability of delay conditional on the 
absence of congestion.   
Once the subject selects 9th Avenue and finds out if a bus appears or not, the uncertainty 
about congestion is resolved, thus the conditional probabilities of delay in (2) and (3) is 
independent of the congestion probability in (1).  To illustrate, supposed Subjects X and Y are 
two subjects from this essay.  Subject X is assigned to a treatment where the probability of a bus 
is 0.2 on 9th Avenue (i.e., low congestion risk), whereas Subject Y is assigned to a treatment 
where the probability of a bus is 0.8 on 9th Avenue (i.e., high congestion risk), ceteris paribus.  If 
Subject X decides to choose 9th Avenue and the bus appears, the chance of her arriving late is 
high.  On a separate and independent choice task, if subject Y decides to choose 9th Avenue and 
the bus appears, the chance of him arriving late is high.  In other words, any subject who chooses 
9th Avenue and encounters a bus has a high chance of arriving late.  This is true whether the 
subject is assigned to a low risk scenario or a high risk scenario.  In other words, the probability 
of delay conditional on a bus is theoretically expected to be similar for all subjects; the same 
logic applies to the probability of delay conditional on no bus.  
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Recall that the perceived risk of delay depends on (1), (2) and (3).  Since (2) and (3) are 
theoretically expected to be constant regardless of (1), it follows that the perceived risk of delay 
should follow the same rank-ordering as (1).  In this essay, the perceived risk of delay is 
estimated without decomposing it into (1), (2) and (3).  
The following two hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis I – Subjects are able to form estimates of the risk of delay, and the perceived risk of 
delay will be ranked in the order of the congestion probabilities.  
Hypothesis II – Subjects who start with a lower belief of delay will experience more belief 
adjustment than those who start with a higher belief.  In an endogenous information 
environment, subjects who perceive that a route has a higher risk of delay also perceive 
collecting information to be riskier, therefore they are less like to drive on the route or to collect 
information.  Since little or no information is gathered, it leads to limited or no belief adjustment.  
Subjects are assumed to have a subjective belief of late arrival on each route.  Conditional 
on their subjective beliefs and risk attitudes, they compare the utilities across routes and choose 
the one with a higher subjective expected utility.   
 
1.4.3 Simulator Route Choice Task 
Subjects are presented with a binary route choice: 7th Avenue is a risk-free route with no 
congestion and 9th Avenue is a risky route with an unknown probability of congestion.  Subjects’ 
route choices are modeled initially using Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) and Constant 
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Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function.  The subjective expected utility of the risk-free 
route, 7th Avenue, is: 
𝑆𝐸𝑈7 =  (
𝑚7(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                   (1) 
where 𝑟 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
𝑚7 = 𝑤 − 𝑡 is money payoff,  
𝑤 is wage, and 
𝑡 is the toll charge on 7th Avenue. 
Similarly, the subjective expected utility of the risky route, 9th Avenue, is: 
 𝑆𝐸𝑈9 =  𝑝 ∗ (
𝑚9𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 –  𝑝)  ∗ (
𝑚9𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                                                   (2) 
 where 𝑝 is the subjective probability of late arrival when taking 9th Avenue,  
𝑚9𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑤 − 𝑙  is the money payoff when subject takes 9
th Avenue and arrives late, 
where 𝑙 is the late penalty for arriving late, and 
𝑚9𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑤  is the money payoff when subject takes 9
th Avenue and arrives on time. 
Next, subjects are assumed to behave as if they compare the two subjective expected 
utilities and choose the one with the higher SEU.10   
                                                          
10 In the maximum likelihood estimation, the estimated belief of late arrival for 7th Avenue is zero and is implicit in 
(1).   
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This approach can easily be extended to Rank Dependent Utility (Quiggin (1982)).  To 
illustrate, assume a simple power weighting function.  The rank dependent utility of the risk-free 
route, 7th Avenue, is: 
 𝑅𝐷𝑈7 =  (
𝑚7(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                     (1’) 
The rank dependent utility of the risky route, 9th Avenue, is: 
 𝑅𝐷𝑈9 =  𝑝
𝛾  ∗ (
𝑚9𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 – 𝑝𝛾)  ∗ (
𝑚9𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)            (2’) 
where 𝛾 is the probability weighting parameter. 
Next, subjects are assumed to behave as if they compare the two rank dependent utilities 
and choose the one with the higher RDU.  This simple power weighting function can be given a 
nice behavioral interpretation.  If 𝛾 < 1, then 𝑝𝛾 > 𝑝 and the function is everywhere concave.  
This means that the subjects puts more weight on the likelihood of late arrival than what is 
otherwise implied by 𝑝, and the subjective belief is effectively pessimistic.  Vice versa, if 𝛾 > 1, 
then 𝑝𝛾 < 𝑝 and the function is everywhere convex.  This means that the subjects puts less weight 
on the likelihood of late arrival than what is otherwise implied by 𝑝, and the subjective belief is 
effectively optimistic.  
 
1.4.4 Binary Lottery Task 
Subjects are presented with four binary lottery tasks with known probabilities that elicit 
their risk attitudes.  In each task a decision is made between a relatively safe lottery and a 
relatively risky lottery.  Risk attitudes are estimated assuming Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
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and a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function.  The expected utility of the safe 
option (EUS) is:  
  𝐸𝑈𝑆 =  𝑝 ∗ (
𝑥𝐿
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 –  𝑝)  ∗ (
𝑥𝐻
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                                                                    (3) 
where p is the probability of a low prize, xL,  
(1-p) is the probability of a higher prize, xH, and  
𝑟 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.   
Similarly, the expected utility of the risky option is:  
  𝐸𝑈𝑅 =  𝑝 ∗ (
𝑦𝐿
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 –  𝑝)  ∗ (
𝑦𝐻
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                                  (4) 
where p, is the probability of a low prize, yL, and 
(1-p) is the probability of a high prize, yH.  
 
This approach can be extended to RDU.  If RDU is assumed for the route choice task, 
then the essentially same specification follows for the lottery task as with EUT.  The rank 
dependent utility of the safe option is:  
  𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑆 =  𝑝
𝛾  ∗ (
𝑥𝐿
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 – 𝑝𝛾)  ∗ (
𝑥𝐻
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                      (3’) 
where p is the probability of a low prize, xL,  
(1-p) is the probability of a higher prize, xH,  
𝑟 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and  
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𝛾 is the probability weighting parameter that weights the probability of the low prize.   
Similarly, the rank dependent utility of the risky option is:  
  𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑅 =  𝑝
𝛾  ∗ (
𝑦𝐿
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 – 𝑝𝛾)  ∗ (
𝑦𝐻
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)           (4’) 
with the same probability, p, for a low prizes, yL, and  
(1-p) for a high prize, yH. 
 
1.5 Empirical Analysis  
The SEU estimation uses (1) – (4), and the RDU estimation uses (1’) – (4’).  Behavioral 
differences would be captured by subjective beliefs and risk attitudes, i.e., the curvature of the 
probability weighting function and the utility function, respectively.  The full nonlinear 
estimation is performed using Maximum Likelihood techniques.  Before estimating these non-
linear models, a Probit model is estimated as a way of describing the data.  
 
1.5.1 Estimation Approach 
The estimation of beliefs uses data from the driving task pooling across subjects, and the 
estimation of risk attitudes uses data from the lottery task pooling across the same subjects.  
Subjective beliefs are estimated jointly with risk attitudes separately for each treatment, implying 
that any imprecision in the estimated risk attitudes are propagated into the estimation of beliefs.  
The joint estimation in the full structural SEU model below can be easily extended to RDU.   
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This joint estimation approach builds on previous work on structural estimation of risk 
attitudes by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008) and Harrison and Rutström (2008b).  
A detailed description of the methodology can be found in Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and 
Rutström (2014).   
 
Estimate Risk Attitudes from Lottery Tasks  
Risk attitudes and subjective beliefs are estimated jointly using both the lottery data and 
the driving simulator data.  For pedagogic reasons, the econometric model is shown separately 
for each model.  We first describe the econometric model for estimating risk attitudes using only 
the lottery data. 
Following (3) – (4), the index  
 ∆𝐸𝑈 = 𝐸𝑈𝑅 −  𝐸𝑈𝑆                 (5)   
is the difference in valuation between the risky lottery and the safe lottery.   
The index (5) is then linked to observed choices by using a “logit” likelihood function:   
 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = Λ(∆𝐸𝑈)                (6) 
The risky option is chosen when Λ(∆𝐸𝑈) > ½.   
 Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA 
specifications being true, depends on the estimated r given the above specification and the 
observed choices, c.  The log-likelihood is then  
  ln 𝐿 (𝑟; 𝑐) = Σ𝑖[ lnΛ(∇𝐸𝑈) × 𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 1) + ln(1 − Λ(𝛻𝐸𝑈)) ×  𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 0)]       (7) 
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where 𝐈(∙) is the indicator function and 𝑐𝑖= l (0) denotes the choice of the lottery option R (S) in 
risk aversion task i.   
 An important extension of the core model is to allow for subjects to make some 
behavioral error.  The latent index (5) then becomes 
 ∆𝐸𝑈 = [(𝐸𝑈𝑅 −  𝐸𝑈𝑆) /ν] /𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦              (5’) 
where 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 > 0 is a structural Fechner “noise parameter” used to allow some error when 
evaluating the difference in EU between the two lotteries.  ν is a contextual normalizing term for 
each lottery pair R and S, which is defined as the difference between the maximum and the 
minimum utility in each lottery pair.  This normalization is referred to as “contextual utility” and 
is due to Wilcox (2011).  
 One extends the likelihood specification to include the noise parameter 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 and 
maximizes ln 𝐿 (𝑟, 𝜇 ; 𝑐) by estimating r and 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 , given observations on c.  
 
Estimate Subjective Beliefs from Simulator Driving Tasks  
Together with the estimation of risk attitudes described in the previous section, the 
estimation of beliefs follows (1) and (2), and the latent index is 
 ∆S𝐸𝑈 =  (𝑆𝐸𝑈7 −  𝑆𝐸𝑈9)               (8)   
is the difference in valuation between 7th Avenue and 9th Avenue.   
The estimation is performed using Maximum Likelihood and includes both a contextual 
utility normalization and a noise parameter.  The noise parameter differs across the simulator 
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task and the lottery task.  Conditional on the SEU and the CRRA specifications being true, the 
maximized log-likelihood becomes, 
 ln 𝐿 ( ?̂?, 𝑟, 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦,𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒; 𝑐 ) = Σ𝑖[ln Λ(∇S𝐸𝑈) × 𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 0) + ln(1 − Λ(𝛻𝑆𝐸𝑈)) ×
 𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 1)]                                        (9) 
where 𝐈(∙) is the indicator function, 𝑐𝑖 = 0 (1) denotes that the subject choose 7
th Avenue (9th 
Avenue) in period i, and separate noise parameters are estimated for the lottery task (𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦) 
and the route choice task (𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒).  When Fechner errors are estimated separately by treatment, 
the results are essentially the same as when a common Fechner error is estimated across 
treatments.  Thus to save on degrees of freedom, a common Fechner error is assumed across 
treatments.   
 Beliefs are estimated including fixed effects for the time periods, which is a non-
parametric way of looking at belief formation.  
 
1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics  
The characteristics of the subject pool are described in Table A3.  The proportion of commuters 
from Atlanta and Orlando are about equal.  Each gender is evenly represented in the overall 
sample.  About 44% have household income of above $100,000, and are labeled high income; 
the rest have household income of $100,000 or below, and are labeled low income.  A significant 
majority hold a college education (78%).  Within each risk treatment, the breakdown by 
demographics generally follows a similar trend as the overall sample distribution.  An exception 
is in Treatment 0.8 where less than 10% are non-college graduates.   
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Travel Times and Frequency of Delay 
The distribution of travel times is shown in Figure A3.  On average, 7th Avenue takes the 
shortest time (115 seconds), next is 9th Avenue without a bus (134 seconds), and 9th Avenue with 
a bus takes the longest (201 seconds).  The standard deviations are 3.7, 7.3, and 17.7, 
respectively.  The increase in standard deviation is significantly different across the three 
scenarios (p-value < 0.001).11  Thus the longer it takes to complete the drive, the higher is the 
variance of the distribution of travel times.  
As expected, the average travel time is directly related to the frequency of delay.  On 
average, the frequency of delay on 7th Avenue is 4%, on 9th Avenue without a bus it is 12%, and 
on 9th Avenue with a bus it is 97%.12  Note that on 9th Avenue without a bus, the majority of 
delay happen to subjects who are assigned the lowest time thresholds (see Figure A4), and these 
subjects are late by 10 seconds or less, with many being late by only 2 or 3 seconds.  
Pooling across time periods, the frequency of delay on 9th Avenue with a bus is not 
significantly different across the last three risk treatments.  The same is true for the frequency of 
delay without a bus.  This provides support for the claim that the conditional probability of delay 
with or without a bus is similar across congestion risks.13  One exception is that the lowest risk 
treatment (i.e., Treatment 0.2) has significantly lower frequency of delay compare to other risk 
treatments.  One possible explanation is that subjects in the lowest risk treatment drive more 
                                                          
11 The test is performed using Levene’s robust test for the equality of variances between the three groups.  
12 It is uncommon to see cases where subjects arrive late on 7th Avenue, arrive late on 9th Avenue without a bus, or 
arrive on-time on 9th Avenue with a bus.  When the estimation is run dropping these uncommon cases, the main 
conclusion still holds. 
13 An estimation is performed dropping the cases where subjects are late on 9th Avenue without a bus, or are on time 
with a bus.  This makes the frequency of delay on 9th Avenue without a bus zero, and the frequency of delay on 9th 
Avenue with a bus one.  The results remain the same.  
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frequency on 9th Avenue and may therefore learn how to drive more efficiently, and this may 
help to shorten the travel time.14 
 
Randomized Incentives across Risk Treatments  
Recall that subjects are randomly assigned to a wage, and conditional on that wage they 
are randomly assigned to a late penalty and a toll.  The assignment of time threshold is also 
random.    The distribution of subjects who belong to each wage level as well as each level of 
penalties, tolls, and time thresholds are shown in Figures AA1, AA2, AA3, and AA4, 
respectively.  
Even though the mean and standard deviation of these distributions are very similar, these 
distributions are not the same (i.e., the shapes of the distributions are not the same), as is 
revealed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test when comparing the distributions between any two 
given treatments.  Given the small sample size in the experiment it is difficult to achieve perfect 
randomization that result in even representation of all possible values; the more values there are 
for a single parameter the more difficult it is to achieve an even representation for each value of 
the parameter.  This is particularly the case for the toll assignment, where there are a total of 36 
possible assignments.  Comparing any two risk treatments, the distributions of tolls are 
significantly different from each other within a 10% significance level based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.   The same is for the penalty assignment where there are 8 possible 
values to be assigned, and the same is for the time threshold assignment where there are 8 
                                                          
14 Here the possible implication is the perceived risk of travel delay on a particular route may be partly affected by 
how familiar the subjects are with driving on that route.  
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possible values to be assigned.  For the wage variable, however, there are only 2 possible values 
to be assigned, the distribution of subjects who are assigned to each level of wage are not 
significantly different across the risk treatments except for Treatment 0.2. 
 
Incentives and Choice of Route  
Do the difference in incentives affect the choice of route?  Since a higher toll may 
discourage driving on 7th Avenue, it is expected that the average subject who takes 9th Avenue 
has a higher toll than the average subject who takes 7th Avenue.  The distribution of tolls for the 
drives on 7th Avenue and 9th Avenue is shown in Figure A5.  The two distribution are 
significantly different based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov15  test, with the mean of the 
distribution being higher for 9th Avenue than 7th Avenue.  This provides preliminary evidence 
that subjects with a high toll are more likely to drive on 9th Avenue.    
Given that 9th Avenue on average takes longer to drive relative to 7th Avenue, subjects 
who are assigned a high penalty should be less likely to drive on 9th Avenue and more likely to 
drive on 7th Avenue.  The distributions of assigned penalties for the drives on 7th Avenue and 9th 
Avenue are shown in Figure A6.  The two distribution are significantly different, with the mean 
of the distribution being higher on 7th Avenue than on 9th Avenue.  This provides preliminary 
evidence that subjects with a high penalty are more likely to take 7th Avenue since it has a 
shorter travel time.   
                                                          
15 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test if performed to examine the null hypothesis that two distributions are equal.  
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Wage is not expected to affect the choice of route.  The distributions of assigned wages 
for the drives on 7th Avenue and 9th Avenue are not significantly different (p-value = 0.529). 
 
Proportions of Route Choice  
Prior to starting the driving task, the perception of congestion risk can be expected to 
reflect the prior bus card information.  Figure A7 shows that the number of bus cards drawn 
increases with the objective risk.  As the number of bus cards drawn increases with objective 
risk, the proportion of subjects who choose the risky route is expected to decrease.  This is the 
case in our experiment as is shown in Figure A8, which describes the raw proportion of subjects 
who choose the risky route across the ten periods by treatment.  It appears that subjects hold 
beliefs that are consistent with their prior bus card information.   
Comparing the proportion of route choices across risk treatments, there is a larger 
proportion of subjects taking the risky route in the two treatments with objective congestion 
probabilities below 0.5 than in the two treatments with objective congestion probabilities above 
0.5.  Pooling across periods, the proportion of route choice ranks in the order of objective risks: 
Treatment 0.2 has the highest proportion of subjects taking the risky route (79%), followed by 
Treatments 0.4 (71%), 0.6 (53%), and 0.8 (47%).  Most of the pairwise comparisons between 
treatments are significantly different, except between Treatments 0.2 and 0.4 (p-value 0.02) and 
between Treatments 0.6 and 0.8 (p-value 0.09).  Thus, there is some preliminary evidence that 
subjects can perceive differences between high and low probabilities, lending partial support to 
Hypothesis I.   
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Across the ten periods, in each treatment there is some evidence of change in the 
proportion of risky route choices (see Figure A8).  In particular there appears to be an increased 
proportion of risky choices following the first period, except in Treatment 0.4.  This pattern of 
behavior is consistent with subjects initially overestimating the risk of delay and subsequently 
adjusting their beliefs.  For example, in Treatment 0.2, the largest increase is 19% from period 1 
to 8 (p-value 0.054).  The next largest increase is 13% from period 1 to 5, but the change is not 
statistically significant.  In Treatment 0.6 there is an increase of 25% from period 1 to 7 (p-value 
0.045).  In Treatment 0.8 the largest increase is from period 1 to 3 by 18% but this is not 
significant (p-value 0.105).   
The number and proportion of subjects who switch routes between periods are shown in 
Table A4.  In Treatment 0.2, subjects who take 9th Avenue are less likely to experience 
congestion than subjects in the higher risk treatments, so one would expect them to be less likely 
to switch away from using 9th Avenue.  In fact, of the 22 subjects who initially selected 9th 
Avenue only 2 switched to 7th Avenue in period 2.  That corresponds to only 9% of the sample.  
On the other hand, of those who took 7th Avenue, 56% switched to 9th Avenue in period 2.  
Pooling across periods, in Treatment 0.2 the proportion who switched from 9th Avenue to 7th 
Avenue (8%) is smaller than the proportion who switched from 7th Avenue to 9th Avenue (32%).  
This is consistent with frequent experiences of no congestion on 9th Avenue in Treatment 0.2.  In 
Treatment 0.4 there is a similar but weaker pattern: 11% switched from 9th Avenue to 7th Avenue 
and 25% switched from 7th Avenue to 9th Avenue.  In the two high risk treatments the average 
proportion of subjects switch from 9th Avenue to 7th Avenue and from 7th Avenue to 9th are 
similar: 19% and 14%, respectively, in Treatment 0.6; and 15% and 14%, respectively, in 
Treatment 0.8.  However, in the later periods in Treatment 0.8, a higher proportion switched 
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from 9th Avenue to 7th Avenue than in the opposite direction.  This is a sign that, in Treatment 
0.8, once subjects select 9th Avenue they experience on average more congestion than their 
counterparts in the lower risk treatments.   
 Based on the route switching behavior, Table A5 displays the conditions under which 
subjects switch away from 9th Avenue.  It shows the proportion of subjects who switched from 
9th Avenue to 7th Avenue conditional on encountering congestion or not.  One would expect the 
proportion of subjects who switched in the former case to be at least as high as in the latter case.  
This is indeed the pattern observed in the three treatments with the highest congestion risk: 
Treatments 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8.   
 In summary, behavior appears consistent with subjects forming subjective beliefs that 
reflect the objective risks.  Analysis of the raw data provides preliminary evidence that subjects 
can perceive the difference across high-probability and low-probability and that subjective 
beliefs may be ranked in the order of the objective risk.  This lends partial support to Hypothesis 
I.  Across periods there is some adjustments that indicate that subjects may come to believe they 
initially overestimate the risks, at least in Treatments 0.2 and 0.6.  Given that the proportion of 
risky choices is higher in the low risk treatments than in the high risk treatments, subjects in the 
low risk treatments would obtain more information about the risky route than their counterparts 
in the high risk treatments.  This result would imply that the estimated belief in the low risk 
treatments will be more likely to converge on the true probabilities than in the high risk 
treatments, which would lend support to Hypothesis II.  
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1.5.3 Propensity of Route Choice 
In this section route choice is estimated controlling for variations in experimental 
parameters such as tolls and delay penalties, so to directly investigate whether changes in the 
tolls are less effective for subjects in the high risk treatments than in the low risk treatments, as 
suggested by the second hypothesis.  Table A6 shows the result of a Probit model controlling for 
variations in payoff incentives and period fixed effects.  The endogenous variable is the 
propensity to take the risky route and the independent variables are Wage, Toll, Late Penalty, the 
prior number of bus cards (Prior), and period fixed effects (i.e., Period 2, …, Period 10).   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2 × 𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽3 × 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽4 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 +  𝛽5
× 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 +  𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 3 +  𝛽7 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 4 +  𝛽8 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 5 +  𝛽9
× 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 6 +  𝛽10 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 7 +  𝛽11 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 8 + 𝛽12 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 9 + 𝛽13
× 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 10 
All coefficients are transformed to marginal probability effects computed using the delta 
method.16 
 
Effects of Payoff Incentives 
As expected from the descriptive data, Wage has no effect on the propensity to take the 
risky route.  Toll has the theoretically expected positive effect on the propensity to take the risky 
                                                          
16 The delta method takes a nonlinear transformation of an estimated parameter about its mean and its variance based 
on a Taylor approximation (Oehlert (1992)). 
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route, but the effect is only significant in the two low risk treatments.  Comparing the 
coefficients across treatments reveals that the marginal effect of Toll is significantly higher in 
Treatment 0.2 than the other treatments, and the latter have coefficients that are not significantly 
different from each other.  One explanation is that in the high risk treatments the alternate route 
has a higher risk of delay, and thus these subjects are reluctant to drive on the alternate route 
until a higher toll is set for the toll road.  This finding suggests that changes in the Toll are less 
effective for subjects in the high risk treatments than in the low risk treatments.  This is 
consistent with Hypothesis II: since subjects in the high risk treatments are more likely to start 
with a high belief of congestion for the risky route, they will be more likely to drive on the safe 
route, which means the effectiveness of Toll will be smaller for these subjects.  Because 
information for the risky route can only be obtained if one drives on it, this would suggest that 
less information will be obtained about the risky route, resulting in asymmetric information 
across the two routes.   
The variable Late Penalty has the theoretically expected negative sign but is only 
significant in Treatment 0.4.  Within each treatment, the number of prior bus cards subjects draw 
does not have a significant effect on the propensity of route choice.  Since the number of bus 
cards subjects draw does not vary much within each treatment, it is not surprising that the 
variable Prior is not significant within treatment.  However, when pooling the data across all 
treatments, there is a significant decrease in the propensity to take the risky route as the number 
of prior bus cards increases (p-value < 0.001), which is expected, as is shown in the final column 
of Table A6.  
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Period Effects 
 Across treatments, in period 1 (captured by the coefficient on Constant) the propensity to 
choose the risky route is significantly higher in the low risk treatments than in the high risk 
treatments.  However, the point estimates are not statistically significant except in Treatment 0.4.  
In all treatments, for subsequent periods the marginal propensity to take the risky route generally 
is higher, though the increase is not significant in most cases except in Treatment 0.2 in periods 5 
and 8.  Thus, results in the Probit model indicates that there is a higher propensity to take the 
risky route in the low risk treatments than in the high risk treatments, which suggests that 
subjects in the low risk treatments will obtain more information feedback about the risky route 
than their counterparts in the high risk treatments.    
 In summary, the conditional analysis of route choice in the Probit model tells a similar 
story to that of the unconditional descriptive analysis: the low risk treatments show a higher 
propensity to choose the risky route than the high risk treatments do.  In addition, the responses 
to Toll variations is stronger in the two low risk treatments, and the only significant adjustment 
in route choice over time is found in the lowest risk treatment.  The next sections analyze the 
subjective beliefs that are implied by this behavior, assuming SEU with a CRRA utility function.  
This allows for control for the influence of risk attitudes on inferred subjective beliefs.  
 
1.5.4 Subjective Expected Utility  
The estimation result of the SEU specification is shown in Table A7 assuming a CRRA 
utility function in equations (1) – (4).  Risk attitudes and subjective probabilities are jointly 
  
46 
 
 
estimated using both the lottery and the driving simulator data.  The coefficients are the marginal 
probabilities computed using the delta method.17  The top row of the table shows the estimated 
risk attitude for a representative agent.  The middle of the table shows the estimated subjective 
probabilities, and the variable Prior captures the effect on route choice of the number of bus 
cards with the word “bus” that subjects drew before starting the drive task.  The last part of the 
table shows the Fechner errors.   
 
Risk Attitudes 
 Risk attitudes and subjective probabilities are estimated jointly.  First the estimated risk 
attitudes are discussed, the next session discusses the estimated beliefs.  The estimated 
distribution of the EUT CRRA risk attitudes are shown in Figure A9, by treatment.  These 
CRRA estimates are from the model shown in Table A7 where we pool across all demographic 
subgroups.  Thus, these estimated risk attitudes reflect the variations of demographics in the 
subject pool.  Across the risk treatments there are considerable differences in risk attitudes.  All 
estimated CRRA-values fall in the range 0 – 1, and are thus consistent with the literature (e.g., 
Harrison and Rutström (2008b)).  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The estimates for the subjective probability p are obtained as follows: first we estimate the parameter κ which can 
vary between ±∞, next κ is converted to p using p = 1/(1+exp(κ)) and the resulting p is constrained to be in the unit 
interval.  The non-linear transformation from κ to p uses the delta method that correctly calculate standard errors 
(Oehlert (1992)).   
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SEU Probabilities  
 The first period subjective delay probabilities (captured by the coefficient on Constant) 
are ranked in the order of congestion risk and are significant at the 1% level in all risk 
treatments.  These joint ML results match those of the Probit model, showing how the propensity 
to choose the risky route decreases across risk treatments.  The initial subjective delay 
probabilities are estimated to be .632, .688, 1 and 1 in Treatments 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8, 
respectively.   
 Across the treatments, are subjects able to perceive that the treatment conditions are 
different?  For example, between Treatments 0.8 and 0.2 the congestion risks differ objectively 
by 0.6 percentage points: are subjects able to perceive a difference?  The same can be asked 
between Treatments 0.6 and 0.2 and between Treatments 0.8 and 0.4, which have congestion 
risks that differ objectively by 0.4 percentage points.  To answer these questions, pairwise 
comparisons are made between the coefficients across treatments.  In period 1, only two pairwise 
comparisons are significantly different: comparing Treatments 0.6 and 0.2 and Treatments 0.8 
and 0.2.  In subsequent periods, the difference between Treatments 0.6 and 0.2 are positive and 
significant, and the same is true between Treatments 0.8 and 0.2.  Thus subjects are on average 
able to perceive differences in congestion risks when they objectively differ by 0.6 percentage 
points, and perhaps when they differ by 0.4 percentage points (such as when comparing 0.6 and 
0.2).  The difference in perceived probabilities lends support to Hypothesis I: the estimated 
probabilities are ranked in the order of congestion risk.  
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Belief Adjustment 
 There is evidence of significant belief adjustment across periods only in the lowest risk 
treatment, but even there it is limited.  Although the marginal period effects are generally 
insignificant, the size of the marginal period effects ranks in the order of objective risk: 
Treatments 0.8 and 0.6 have the smallest marginal effect, next is Treatment 0.4, and treatment 
0.2 has the largest marginal effect.  This points toward there being less adjustments in the high 
risk treatments than in the low risk treatments.   
 In Treatment 0.2 the marginal effects in periods 5 and 8 are negative and significantly 
different from zero.  They are -0.289 and -0.465 with p-values of 0.097 and 0.003, respectively.  
The marginal effects in the other periods are not small, although they are insignificant.  These 
estimates have large 95% confidence intervals, and the large confidence intervals are likely a 
result of a great deal of heterogeneity in choices across subjects in this treatment.  The 
subsequent section provides a discussion on how this can be captured to some degree by 
controlling for demographics. 
 In Treatment 0.4, the marginal effects are not significant in any periods.  In Treatments 
0.6 and 0.8 subjects start with a subjective probability of 1, which is an extreme belief of delay.  
There is no significant adjustment of belief across any periods, with point estimates that are also 
small.   
 In summary, subjects are able to perceive the difference in objective risk across 
treatments as shown by the rank ordering of estimated probabilities across treatments.  In 
particular, the estimated probabilities reveal that they are able to distinguish probabilities that 
objectively differ by 0.6 percentage points, and sometimes when they differ by 0.4 percentage 
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points, such as when comparing congestion risks of 0.6 and 0.2.  Across periods, only subjects in 
the lowest risk treatment adjust their belief of delay, whereas in the high risk treatments they fail 
to adjust their beliefs.  This is consistent with Hypothesis II under endogenous information 
feedback, showing that when the subjective belief of delay is higher, the riskier route is 
perceived as riskier and this leads to little or no belief adjustment.   
Thus, results of the SEU model are similar to the unconditional descriptive analysis and 
the Probit model when comparing across treatments.  Across periods, the SEU model agrees 
with the Probit model, but the unconditional descriptive data shows more adjustments.  
Results in the SEU model for the lowest risk treatment are consistent with past 
experimental studies where subjective beliefs are elicited only once: Attneave (1953) reports that 
subjects overestimate low probabilities; Preston and Baratta (1949) and Andersen, Fountain, 
Harrison, Hole and Rutström (2011) report an equality point at 0.2 where subjects overestimate 
probabilities below 0.2.  A crucial element to keep in mind when comparing past and present 
studies is that subjects in this essay make decisions under an endogenous information 
environment, i.e., information on a route can only be obtained if one takes that route, and this 
leads to asymmetric information across the two routes.   
 
1.5.5 Demographics  
Tables A8 shows the SEU probabilities estimated controlling for period fixed effects and 
demographic effects.  The list of demographic variables include: Female, College Education, and 
High Income.  Subjects are grouped into two education levels: those who hold a college degree 
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are coded as College Education = 1 and those who do not are coded as College Education = 0.  
In terms of income, subjects with household income of above $100,000 are coded as High 
Income = 1 and those with household income of $100,000 or below are coded as High Income = 
0.   
 The Constant is now referencing a particular demographic group, and none of the 
demographic variables is significant.  The ideal model for studying demographics would include 
all possible demographic variables with a full set of interaction terms between demographic 
subgroups, but this would require a large data set.   
 Given the large confidence intervals in the main model it may be helpful to estimate 
subjective probabilities by demographic subgroups.  This can reveal if a particular demographic 
subgroup contributes the most to the adjustment of belief in the overall data or to its imprecision.  
 
Income  
 In Tables A9 and A10, subjective probabilities are shown separately for subjects with 
high income and low income, respectively.  In Treatments 0.2 and 0.4, the high income subjects 
have initial beliefs of 0.766 and 0.751, respectively, and are not significantly different from each 
other.  This shows that the high income subjects have a higher belief of delay than the average 
subject in Table A7.  In Treatments 0.6 and 0.8, the high income subjects have initial beliefs of 
1, which is the same estimate as the average subject.  Treatment 0.2 is (again) the only treatment 
showing significant belief adjustment.  Here, after dropping the low income subjects, significant 
adjustment is observed in periods 3, 6 and 10 in addition to periods 5 and 8.  The marginal 
effects in the other periods are not small, but they are not statistically significant.  In the higher 
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risk treatments the marginal effects are (again) small and no adjustment is observed.  Thus 
removing the low income subjects removes at least some of the noise in Table A7. 
 For the low income subjects, in Treatments 0.2 and 0.4 the initial beliefs are 0.278 and 
0.528 respectively, but the estimates are not significant.  Compared to the estimates shown in 
Table A7 that uses the aggregate data, the low income subjects have beliefs that are lower than 
the average subject.  Across the periods, the low income subjects exhibit no significant belief 
adjustment, which also shows that the belief adjustments observed in the aggregate data are 
largely driven by high income subjects.  Across high income and low income groups, the same 
pattern is observed in the high risk treatments: initial belief is 1 and subsequent periods show no 
belief adjustment.    
 
 Education 
 Next, subjective probabilities are estimated for college graduates and Table A11 shows 
the results.  The initial beliefs are 0.718, 0.753, 0.999 and 1 across the risk treatments.  After 
dropping the non-college subjects, Treatment 0.2 shows significant belief adjustment in periods 
2, 3 and 6 in addition to periods 5 and 8; the subsequent beliefs are adjusted downward and none 
are significantly different from 0.2.  In contrast, in Treatments 0.6 and 0.8 no belief adjustment is 
observed and subjective beliefs remain above the objective probabilities throughout.  This shows 
that the belief adjustment in the aggregate data is largely driven by college graduates, implying 
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that the non-college graduates may have contributed a considerable amount of noise to the 
aggregate data.18  
 
1.5.6 Rank Dependent Utility - Robustness Check 
The estimated probabilities for the RDU specification are shown in Table AA1.   The 
RDU probabilities are jointly estimated with the utility curvature parameter and the probability-
weighting parameter.  The results are estimated assuming the CRRA utility function and the 
power weighting function of equations (1’) – (4’).  When the weighting parameter 𝛾 takes on the 
value of 1, the RDU probabilities are identical to the SEU probabilities.  A value of 𝛾 above 
(below) 1 indicates an underweighting (overweighting) of probabilities, which means that the 
inferred probabilities are higher (lower) than under SEU.  The estimated weighting parameter 𝛾 
is not significantly different from 1 in any of the risk treatments, which means that subjects on 
average do not weigh probabilities in either direction.  Thus it is not surprising that the estimated 
probabilities are not significantly different across the SEU and RDU specifications.  The initial 
beliefs are 0.629, 0.630, 1 and 1 in Treatments 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8, respectively.  Across the 
periods, only in the lowest risk treatment is there significant belief adjustment, which occurs in 
period 8.  In period 5 the marginal effects are virtually identical across the SEU and RDU 
specifications (0.39 and 0.343, respectively) but the effect is not significant in the latter 
specification.   
                                                          
18 It is not possible to perform the estimation for the non-college subjects, since in treatment 0.8 only four subjects 
are non-college graduates.   
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The estimated RDU probabilities controlling for period fixed effects and demographic 
effects are shown in Table AA2.  Similar to the results in the SEU specification, none of the 
demographic variables is significant in the RDU specification. 
 
1.6 Conclusion  
The goal of this essay is to examine drivers’ perception of the risk of delay as one factor 
that influences route choice behavior in a simulated driving environment.  This experiment 
recruits commuters from the Atlanta and Orlando metropolitan areas and presents them with a 
route choice task in a driving simulator.  Subjects are required to make a binary choice between a 
route that has an uncertain level of congestion and an alternate route with no risk of congestion.  
Subjects are assigned monetary incentives for the value of making the drive, the discrete penalty 
for arriving late to the destination, and the toll charged on the non-congested route.  Apart from 
some prior information about frequency of congestion on the risky route, drivers only obtain 
additional information if they actually choose to drive it.  Information feedback is therefore 
endogenous and high risk scenarios can lead to less belief updating than low risk scenarios since 
drivers are more likely to avoid taking the risky route when it is riskier.  The experiment 
implements four risk treatments that differ in the objective risk of congestion across a range of 
probabilities.  This allows the examination of belief formation and adjustment across a range of 
probabilities.  
 Across risk treatments, the estimated beliefs of delay rank in the order of the objective 
congestion probabilities.  In subsequent periods only subjects in the lowest risk treatment 
experience significant belief adjustments.  In contrast, in the high risk treatments no belief 
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adjustment is made.  Behavior across treatments is as predicted under an endogenous information 
environment: subjects who start with a lower belief of delay are more inclined to take the route 
that has an uncertain level of congestion than those who start with a higher belief of delay, 
leading to subjects with a lower belief of delay obtaining more information than those with a 
higher belief of delay.  Thus, subjects who start with a lower belief of delay experience more 
belief adjustment than those who start with a higher belief of delay.  The results are consistent 
with past experimental findings in the low probabilities treatments but not in the high 
probabilities treatments.   
 Results of this essay show that when drivers hold a high initial belief of delay over a 
route they normally do not take, then they could be reluctant to try it out even when conditions 
on their usual route become less favorable.  The policy implication is that for drivers to be more 
inclined to use unfamiliar routes as alternatives when their usual routes experience construction, 
maintenance or tolls, clear and credible information about the congestion situation on the 
alternate route is required.  Furthermore, since the Probit model shows that the marginal effect of 
toll is lower for drivers in a high congestion risk scenario, this suggests that we will need to 
impose a higher toll on these subjects in order to incentivize them to switch to the alternate route.   
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 1 
Table A1: Tolls and Wages in the Simulator Task 
 Toll Range Late Penalty Time Threshold  
Wage=$2.50 $0.50-$2.00 $0.50-$2.00 2min 10 secs to 2m 45 secs  
 Wage=$5.00 $0.50-$4.00 $1.00-$4.00 
The range of toll cards was in 10-cent increments.                                                                                               
The range of penalty was in 50-cent increments.                                                                                                 
The range of time thresholds was in 5-second increments.  
 
 
 
Table A2: Prizes and Probabilities in Lottery Task 
Probability 
range 
Safe Lottery 
Low Prize 
Safe Lottery 
High Prize 
Risky Lottery 
Low Prize 
Risky Lottery 
High Prize 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $4 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $5 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $6 
0.1 – 0.9 $4 $6 $0.50 $10 
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Table A3: Demographic Sub-groups in Each Treatment  
 Treatment 
0.2 
Treatment 
0.4 
Treatment 
0.6 
Treatment 
0.8 
All  
 
Number of subjects 31 40 32 38 141 
 
Location  
   Orlando 41.75% 50% 37.50% 47.49% 45.06% 
   Atlanta 58.25% 50% 62.50% 52.51% 54.94% 
 
Gender  
    Male  54.12% 52.88% 56.36% 54.91% 52.21% 
    Female 45.88% 47.12% 43.64% 45.09% 47.79% 
 
Education  
    College  68% 74.82% 72.27% 90.17% 78.09% 
    Non-college 32% 25.18% 27.73% 9.83% 21.91% 
 
Income  
    High: above $100K 49.18% 42.09% 34.09% 38.92% 44.09% 
    Low: $100K or    
below 
50.82% 57.91% 65.91% 61.08% 55.91% 
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Table A4: Route Switches 
From 
one 
period 
to the 
next 
# of subj. 
who took 
7th Ave. in 
the first of 
the two 
periods 
# of subj. 
who took 
9th Ave. in 
the first of 
the two 
periods 
Proport
ion 
taking 
9th 
# of 
subj. 
switch 
from 
7th to 
9th  
# of 
subj. 
switch 
from 9th 
to 7th 
Conditional 
on taking 
7th Ave., the 
proportion 
that switch 
to 9th 
Conditional 
on taking 
9th Ave., the 
proportion 
that switch 
to 7th 
Difference 
Treatment 0.2 
1 to 2 9 22 71% 5 2 56% 9% 47% 
2 to 3  6 25 81% 1 2 17% 8% 9% 
3 to 4 7 24 77% 3 2 43% 8% 35% 
4 to 5  6 25 81% 3 2 50% 8% 42% 
5 to 6 5 26 84% 0 2 0% 8% -8% 
6 to 7 7 24 77% 1 2 14% 8% 6% 
7 to 8 8 23 74% 5 0 63% 0% 63% 
8 to 9 3 28 90% 0 5 0% 18% -18% 
9 to 10 8 23 74% 4 2 50% 9% 41% 
Average  -  - 79% -  - 32% 8% 24% 
Treatment 0.4 
1 to 2 12 28 70% 3 2 25% 7% 18% 
2 to 3  11 29 73% 0 5 0% 17% -17% 
3 to 4 16 24 60% 7 1 44% 4% 40% 
4 to 5  10 30 75% 1 3 10% 10% 0% 
5 to 6 12 28 70% 3 2 25% 7% 18% 
6 to 7 11 29 73% 3 4 27% 14% 13% 
7 to 8 12 28 70% 6 3 50% 11% 39% 
8 to 9 9 31 78% 3 3 33% 10% 23% 
9 to 10 9 31 78% 1 4 11% 16% -5% 
Average -  - 71% -  - 25% 11% 14% 
Treatment 0.6 
1 to 2 21 11 34% 5 2 24% 19% 5% 
2 to 3  18 14 44% 5 1 28% 7% 21% 
3 to 4 14 18 56% 3 3 21% 17% 4% 
4 to 5  14 18 56% 2 2 14% 11% 3% 
5 to 6 14 18 56% 3 2 21% 11% 10% 
6 to 7 13 19 59% 3 3 23% 16% 7% 
7 to 8 13 19 59% 0 2 0% 11% -11% 
8 to 9 15 17 53% 4 2 27% 12% 15% 
9 to 10 13 19 59% 2 4 15% 21% -6% 
Average -  - 53% -  - 19% 14% 5% 
Treatment 0.8 
1 to 2 25 13 34% 6 2 24% 15% 9% 
2 to 3  21 17 45% 6 3 29% 18% 11% 
3 to 4 18 20 52% 3 4 17% 20% -3% 
4 to 5  19 19 50% 2 1 11% 5% 6% 
5 to 6 18 19 51% 3 3 17% 16% 1% 
6 to 7 19 19 50% 2 4 11% 21% -10% 
7 to 8 21 17 45% 2 2 10% 12% 2% 
8 to 9 21 17 45% 3 1 14% 6% 8% 
9 to 10 19 19 50% 1 3 5% 16% 11% 
Average -  - 47% -  - 15% 14% 1% 
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Table A5: Congestion Experiences 
From one 
period to the 
next 
# of subjects 
who switch 
from 9th to 
7th 
Conditional on a 
bus card, # of 
subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th  
Conditional on 
no bus card, # 
of subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th 
Conditional on 
a bus card, % 
of subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th 
Conditional on 
no bus card, % 
of subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th 
Treatment 0.2      
1 to 2 2 0 2 0% 100% 
2 to 3  2 0 2 0% 100% 
3 to 4 2 0 2 0% 100% 
4 to 5  2 2 0 100% 0% 
5 to 6 2 2 0 100% 0% 
6 to 7 2 0 2 0% 100% 
7 to 8 0 - - - - 
8 to 9 5 2 3 40% 60% 
9 to 10 2 0 2 0% 100% 
Average  -- -- -- 30% 70% 
Treatment 0.4      
1 to 2 2 1 1 50% 50% 
2 to 3  5 3 2 60% 40% 
3 to 4 1 1 0 100% 0% 
4 to 5  3 0 3 0% 100% 
5 to 6 2 2 0 100% 0% 
6 to 7 4 2 2 50% 50% 
7 to 8 3 2 1 67% 33% 
8 to 9 3 2 1 67% 33% 
9 to 10 4 2 2 50% 50% 
Average  -- -- -- 60% 40% 
Treatment 0.6      
1 to 2 2 0 2 0% 100% 
2 to 3  1 1 0 100% 0% 
3 to 4 3 2 1 67% 33% 
4 to 5  2 1 1 50% 50% 
5 to 6 2 2 0 100% 0% 
6 to 7 3 2 1 67% 33% 
7 to 8 2 2 0 100% 0% 
8 to 9 2 0 2 0% 100% 
9 to 10 4 3 1 75% 25% 
Average  -- -- -- 62% 38% 
Treatment 0.8      
1 to 2 2 1 1 50% 50% 
2 to 3  3 2 1 67% 33% 
3 to 4 4 4 0 100% 0% 
4 to 5  1 0 1 0% 100% 
5 to 6 3 2 1 67% 33% 
6 to 7 4 4 0 100% 0% 
7 to 8 2 2 0 100% 0% 
8 to 9 1 1 0 100% 0% 
9 to 10 3 3 0 100% 0% 
Average  -- -- -- 76% 24% 
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Table A6: Propensity of Route Choice Estimated with a Probit Model  
 Treatment 
0.2 
N=31 
Treatment 
0.4 
N=40 
Treatment 
0.6 
N=32 
Treatment 
0.8 
N=38 
Pooled 
Across 
Treatments 
N=141 
Constant  0.232 
(0.192) 
0.394*** 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.470) 
0.003 
(0.637) 
0.511*** 
(<0.001) 
Wage -.059 
(0.263) 
0.022 
(0.619) 
-0.002 
(0.697) 
0.003 
(0.569) 
-.012 
(0.550) 
Toll 0.720*** 
(<0.001) 
0.410*** 
(<0.001) 
0.200 
(0.157) 
0.108 
(0.381) 
0., 
(<0.001) 
Late Penalty  -.059 
(0.451) 
-0.243*** 
(<0.001) 
-.011 
(0.462) 
-.003 
(0.636) 
-0.282*** 
(<0.001) 
Period 2 0.235 
(0.203) 
0.031 
(0.817) 
0.016 
(0.494) 
0.007 
(0.595) 
0.114* 
(0.099) 
Period 3 0.150 
(0.394) 
-0.144 
(0.241) 
0.066 
(0.295) 
0.023 
(0.526) 
0.127* 
(0.067) 
Period 4 0.224 
(0.211) 
0.087 
(0.535) 
0.085 
(0.257) 
0.016 
(0.553) 
0.201*** 
(0.003) 
Period 5 0.324* 
(0.080) 
0.003 
(0.984) 
0.067 
(0.289) 
0.019 
(0.545) 
0.187*** 
(0.006) 
Period 6 0.150 
(0.394) 
0.032 
(0.814) 
0.084 
(0.261) 
0.021 
(0.531) 
0.183*** 
(0.007) 
Period 7 0.077 
(0.639) 
0.011 
(0.936) 
0.105 
(0.230) 
0.007 
(0.604) 
0.153** 
(0.026) 
Period 8  0.498*** 
(0.004) 
0.129 
(0.365) 
0.052 
(0.322) 
0.008 
(0.600) 
0.194*** 
(0.004) 
Period 9 0.087 
(0.593) 
0.144 
(0.316) 
0.086 
(0.260) 
0.016 
(0.552) 
0.194*** 
(0.004) 
Period 10 0.239 
(0.190) 
-0.045 
(0.728) 
0.051 
(0.327) 
0.008 
(0.593) 
0.130* 
(0.060) 
Prior -0.081* 
(0.100) 
0.026 
(0.206) 
0.008 
(0.283) 
0.002 
(0.476) 
-0.044*** 
(<0.001) 
p-values are in parentheses. 
The coefficients are marginal propensities computed using the delta method that takes a nonlinear transformation of 
an estimated parameter about its mean and its variance based on a Taylor approximation.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A7: Subjective Expected Utility Estimates Across Periods  
 Treatment 0.2 
N=31 
Treatment 0.4 
N=40 
Treatment 0.6 
N=32 
Treatment 0.8 
N=38 
Risk Aversion: 
r .262* 
(0.074) 
.424*** 
(0.002) 
.554*** 
(0.001) 
.525*** 
(<0.001) 
Beliefs:  
Constant  .632*** 
(<0.001) 
.688*** 
(<0.001) 
1*** 
(<0.001) 
1 
(a) 
Period 2 -.232 
(0.178) 
-.045 
(0.661) 
-.0001 
(0.941) 
<.001 
(0.978) 
Period 3 -.159 
(0.330) 
.154 
(0.110) 
-.005 
(0.709) 
<.001 
 (0.970) 
Period 4 -.210 
(0.165) 
-.063 
(0.440) 
-.003 
(0.738) 
<.001 
 (0.974) 
Period 5 -.289* 
(0.097) 
.029 
(0.526) 
-.005 
(0.727) 
<.001 
 (0.977) 
Period 6 -.159 
(0.330) 
.0005 
(0.996) 
-.006 
(0.711) 
<.001 
 (0.974) 
Period 7 -.089 
(0.545) 
.035 
(0.748) 
-.005 
(0.734) 
<.001 
 (a) 
Period 8  -.465*** 
(0.003) 
-.092 
(0.317) 
-.001 
(0.842) 
<.001 
 (a) 
Period 9 -.089 
(0.618) 
-.094 
(0.283) 
-.006 
(0.720) 
<.001 
 (a) 
Period 10 -.198 
(0.219) 
.066 
(0.574) 
-.002 
(0.754) 
<.001 
 (a) 
Prior .009 
(0.859) 
-.026 
(0.489) 
-.0001 
(0.944) 
<.001 
 (0.826) 
 
μRA .177*** 
(<0.001) 
μBelief .231*** 
(<0.001) 
The results are obtained using a joint estimation of risk attitudes and beliefs from the lottery data and the driving 
simulator data.  
p-values are in parentheses.  The coefficients are marginal effects computed using the delta method.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
(a) implies that a standard error cannot be computed by the delta method due to numeric issues, because the 
estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
μRA is the Fechner error for the lottery data; μBelief is the Fechner error for the belief data. 
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Table A8: Subjective Expected Utility Estimates Across Periods and Demographic Effects  
 Treatment 0.2 
N=31 
Treatment 0.4 
N=40 
Treatment 0.6 
N=32 
Treatment 0.8 
N=38 
Risk Aversion: 
r .278* 
(0.053) 
.423*** 
(0.004) 
.474*** 
(0.003) 
.549*** 
(0.001) 
Beliefs:  
Constant  .844*** 
(<0.001) 
.595*** 
(<0.001) 
.976*** 
(<0.001) 
.689** 
(0.021) 
Period 2 -.266 
(0.112) 
-.050 
(0.655) 
-.038 
(0.733) 
.133 
(0.701) 
Period 3 -.176 
(0.195) 
.185* 
(0.096) 
-.101 
(0.497) 
-.125 
(0.781) 
Period 4 -.233 
(0.230) 
-.070 
(0.442) 
-.140 
(0.484) 
-.224 
(0.593) 
Period 5 -.303* 
(0.049) 
.031 
(0.558) 
-.128 
(0.380) 
-.389 
(0.477) 
Period 6 -.176 
(0.195) 
.001 
(0.994) 
-.047 
(0.678) 
.120 
(0.774) 
Period 7 -.107 
(0.344) 
.048 
(0.694) 
-.220 
(0.344) 
-.098 
(0.788) 
Period 8  -.555** 
(0.013) 
-.102 
(0.289) 
-.083 
(0.370) 
.141 
(0.692) 
Period 9 -.110 
(0.430) 
-.102 
(0.297) 
-.047 
(0.678) 
-.224 
(0.570) 
Period 10 -.211 
(0.130) 
.088 
(0.483) 
-.108 
(0.281) 
.137 
(0.710) 
Female  .067 
(0.321) 
.004 
(0.980) 
.024 
(0.808) 
-.503 
(0.654) 
College 
Education 
-.098 
(0.477) 
.031 
(0.862) 
-.059 
(0.733) 
.303 
(0.362) 
High income 
(above $100K) 
-.220 
(0.110) 
-.076 
(0.699) 
-.041 
(0.751) 
.311 
(a) 
μRA .177*** 
(<0.001) 
μBelief .231*** 
(<0.001) 
p-values values are in parentheses.  The coefficients are marginal effects.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
(a) implies that a standard error cannot be computed by the delta method due to numeric issues, because the 
estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
μRA is the Fechner error for the lottery data; μBelief is the Fechner error for the belief data. 
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Table A9: High Income Subject’ Subjective Expected Utility Estimates Across Periods 
 Treatment 0.2 
N=18  
Treatment 0.4 
N=20 
Treatment 0.6 
N=19 
Treatment 0.8 
N=25 
Risk Aversion: 
r .171 
(0.201) 
.533* 
(0.065) 
.550 
(0.605) 
.991 
(0.124) 
Beliefs:  
Period 1 .766*** 
(<0.001) 
.751*** 
(0.002) 
1 
(a) 
1 
(a) 
Period 2 -.205 
(0.172) 
<.001 
 (1.000) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 3 -.206* 
(0.063) 
.123 
(0.339) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 4 -.205 
(0.172) 
<.001 
 (1.000) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 5 -.353** 
(0.029) 
.070 
(0.423) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 6 -.206* 
(0.063) 
.031 
(0.719) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 7 -.205 
(0.172) 
.026 
(0.736) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 8  -.502*** 
(<0.001) 
-.049 
(0.730) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 9 -.206 
(0.203) 
-.051 
(0.550) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 10 -.501*** 
(<0.001) 
.026 
(0.736) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
Prior -.005 
(0.895) 
-.047 
(0.223) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
 
μRA .093*** 
(<0.001) 
.183*** 
(0.006) 
.729 
(0.387) 
.181** 
(0.024) 
μBelief .100*** 
(<0.001) 
.204* 
(0.067) 
.383*** 
(0.009) 
.287*** 
(0.010) 
p-values are in parentheses.  The coefficients are marginal effects.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
 (a) implies that a standard error cannot be computed by the delta method due to numeric issues, because the 
estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
μRA is the Fechner error for the lottery data; μBelief is the Fechner error for the belief data. 
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Table A10: Low Income Subjects’ Subjective Expected Utility Estimates Across Periods 
 Treatment 0.2  
N=13 
Treatment 0.4 
N=20 
Treatment 0.6 
N=13 
Treatment 0.8 
N=13 
Risk Aversion:  
r .302 
(0.196) 
.354** 
(0.011) 
.696*** 
(<0.001) 
.340* 
(0.098) 
Beliefs:  
Constant  .278 
(0.239) 
.528 
(0.134) 
1 
(a) 
1 
(a) 
Period 2 -.177 
(0.492) 
-.105 
(0.560) 
<.001 
(a) 
-.035 
(0.776) 
Period 3 -.043 
(0.900) 
.232 
(0.234) 
-.014 
(0.715) 
-.105 
(0.806) 
Period 4 -.133 
(0.533) 
-.142 
(0.459) 
-.004 
(0.745) 
-.074 
(0.782) 
Period 5 -.148 
(0.511) 
-.043 
(0.367) 
-.007 
(0.746) 
-.084 
(0.783) 
Period 6 -.043 
(0.900) 
-.034 
(0.883) 
-.011 
(0.708) 
-.067 
(0.825) 
Period 7 .141 
(0.673) 
.090 
(0.771) 
-.008 
(0.750) 
-.038 
(0.819) 
Period 8  -.220 
(0.210) 
-.142 
(0.210) 
-.008 
(0.750) 
-.010 
(0.854) 
Period 9 .141 
(0.735) 
-.147 
(0.438) 
-.022 
(0.703) 
-.065 
(0.829) 
Period 10 .210 
(0.244) 
.232 
(0.624) 
-.006 
(0.773) 
-.014 
(0.878) 
Prior .114 
(0.205) 
.030 
(0.683) 
<.001 
(a) 
<.001 
(a) 
 
μRA .188*** 
(0.001) 
.144*** 
(<0.001) 
.141** 
(0.031) 
.201*** 
(0.001) 
μBelief .305*** 
(0.001) 
.267*** 
(<0.001) 
.195*** 
(<0.001) 
.191*** 
(<0.001) 
p-values are in parentheses.  The coefficients are marginal effects.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
(a) implies that a standard error cannot be computed by the delta method due to numeric issues, because the 
estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
μRA is the Fechner error for the lottery data; μBelief is the Fechner error for the belief data. 
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Table A11: College Graduates’ Subjective Expected Utility Estimates Across Periods 
 Treatment 0.2  
N=21 
Treatment 0.4 
N=30 
Treatment 0.6 
N=23 
Treatment 0.8 
N=34 
Risk Aversion:  
r .169 
(0.231) 
.289* 
(0.092) 
.647*** 
(0.002) 
.494** 
(0.030) 
Beliefs:  
Period 1 .718*** 
(0.004) 
.753*** 
(<0.001) 
.999*** 
(<0.001) 
1 
(a) 
Period 2 -.319* 
(0.089) 
<.001 
(1.000) 
.001 
(a) 
<.001 
 (0.921) 
Period 3 -.316* 
(0.091) 
.113 
(0.172) 
-.006 
(0.708) 
<.001 
 (0.923) 
Period 4 -.094 
(0.602) 
-.046 
(0.336) 
-.006 
(0.720) 
<.001 
 (0.902) 
Period 5 -.452* 
(0.054) 
.043 
(0.335) 
-.011 
(0.709) 
<.001 
 (0.908) 
Period 6 -.316* 
(0.091) 
.040 
(0.598) 
-.014 
(0.680) 
<.001 
 (0.921) 
Period 7 -.094 
(0.384) 
.031 
(0.667) 
-.011 
(0.697) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 8  -.452* 
(0.054) 
-.046 
(0.567) 
-.005 
(0.746) 
<.001 
 (a) 
Period 9 -.199 
(0.361) 
-.007 
(0.910) 
-.003 
(0.752) 
<.001 
 (a) 
Period 10 -.180 
(0.259) 
.056 
(0.582) 
-.004 
(0.729) 
<.001 
 (a) 
Prior -.009 
(0.909) 
-.037 
(0.162) 
-.001 
(0.761) 
<.001 
 (a) 
 
μRA .158*** 
(<0.001) 
.158*** 
(<0.001) 
.164*** 
(0.001) 
.189*** 
(<0.001) 
μBelief .201*** 
(<0.001) 
.187*** 
(<0.001) 
.250*** 
(0.0001) 
.220*** 
(<0.001) 
p-values are in parentheses.  The coefficients are marginal effects.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
(a) implies that a standard error cannot be computed by the delta method due to numeric issues, because the 
estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
μRA is the Fechner error for the lottery data; μBelief is the Fechner error for the belief data. 
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Figure A1: Downtown Network With Bus on 9th Avenue 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Screen Shot For Lottery Practice Task 
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Figure A3: Distribution of Observed Travel Times 
   
Travel time on 7th Avenue has a mean of 115 and standard deviation of 3.7.                                         
Travel time on 9th Avenue without a bus has a mean of 134 and standard deviation of 7.3.                    
Travel time on 9th Avenue with a bus has a mean of 201 and standard deviation of 17.7.  
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Figure A4: Frequency of Delay by Time Threshold 
  
 
Figure A5: Distribution of Toll by Route 
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Figure A6: Distribution of Penalty by Route 
 
 
Figure A7: Number of Bus Cards Subjects See Before First Period 
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Figure A8: Proportion of Subjects who take 9th Avenue Across Periods 
 
Figure A9: Estimated Distributions of Risk Aversion Coefficients for the EUT CRRA Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: These are kernel densities representing the heterogeneity due to demographics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Estimating Subjective Beliefs in Naturalistic Tasks with Limited Information  
Under Variable Delay Penalty 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This essay examines drivers’ subjective beliefs of congestion as a way of explaining their 
route choices.  We examine subjective belief in a setting where the penalty for a late arrival is 
variable and is contingent on the extent of delay, such that a longer delay incurs additional 
penalty on the driver.  This continuous penalty setting complements the discrete penalty setting 
that is examined in Chapter 1.  This is consistent with route choice models that simply subtract 
the value of the travel time from the value of the trip (Small (1982); Jackson and Jucker (1982)).   
The primary research question in this essay is: if the penalty for a late arrival is a varying 
amount, does belief formation differ compared to when the penalty is a fixed amount?  Recall 
from Chapter 1, where the penalty is a fixed amount, that we observe belief adjustment only 
when the underlying congestion risk is low.  This behavior is said to be expected under an 
endogenous information environment, as it is in the context of driving, where information about 
a route can only be obtained if one drives on that route.  Thus, in a scenario where the underlying 
congestion risk is low and subjects start with a prior belief of low congestion, they are more 
likely to drive on the route and are able to obtain more information and result in more belief 
adjustment.  Here in the continuous penalty setting, will we observe the same pattern of 
behavior?  
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There are reasons to believe that the consequences of delay (here referred to as late 
penalties) affect which route an individual may select.  For example, an individual whose 
purpose of the trip is to attend a conference meeting faces a different delay consequence than 
another individual whose purpose of the trip is to catch a flight.  For the first individual, the 
consequence of delay is missing part of the meeting, where the longer the delay the more 
information is missed; for the second individual, the consequence of delay is missing the flight 
and the loss of the entire value of the trip.  The first scenario exemplifies a penalty that is 
continuous with longer delay incurring additional penalty, whereas the second scenario 
exemplifies a penalty that is discrete with a fixed amount.  Even if no appointment is being 
missed, fully or partially, the fact that more of the individual's valuable time is wasted sitting in 
traffic reduces the utility of the trip. 
To examine behavior in a setting where the late penalty is continuous calls for an 
experimental design that has variability in arrival times so that the extent of delay varies.  In the 
experiment subjects are asked to make route choices using a driving simulator, and the amount of 
time it takes to complete the drive varies depending on route selection, the congestion scenario 
on the uncertain route, and how the subjects drive on the simulator.  In this way, the arrival times 
along with late penalties are induced as continuous variables.   
Commuters from the Atlanta and Orlando metropolitan areas are recruited to participate 
in this experiment.  The field subjects are asked to make binary choices over two routes: one has 
an uncertain level of congestion risk, the other has no congestion risk.  We elicit subjects’ 
perceptions of the probability, p, that there is congestion on the uncertain route.  This probability 
is known to the experimenter, but not to the subjects.  Four levels of this probability are used: 
{0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}.  One of the congestion probabilities is randomly assigned to each subject and 
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stays constant throughout the session for that subject.  We also elicit each subject’s perceptions 
of the amount of time it takes to travel on the route that has an uncertain congestion risk when 
there is actually congestion vs. no congestion, and the amount of time it takes to travel on the 
route that has no congestion risk.  The route choices are made using driving simulators, and 
subject’s subjective probabilities of the uncertain risk of congestion, as well as their subjective 
probabilities of the travel time distributions, are inferred through the route choices they make.  
The latent subjective probabilities are estimated controlling for risk attitudes which are estimated 
from separate tasks with binary lottery choices.   
 In this continuous penalty setting, the results indicate that subjects are able to discern the 
difference between low-congestion and high-congestion risks, which is the same result as 
reported in a discrete penalty setting.  In terms of learning (or belief adjustment), however, we 
draw different conclusions from those in Chapter 1.  In the discrete penalty setting, we saw 
adjustments in beliefs over time in the lowest risk scenario.  In this essay we compare the 
standard deviations of the estimated travel time belief distributions as an indication of whether 
more is learnt in the low risk scenario than the high risk scenario.  We do not see a significant 
difference across treatments in these standard deviations.  
 
2.2 Experimental Design   
The field subjects are asked to make route choices over two routes: 9th Avenue which has 
an uncertain level of congestion risk, and 7th Avenue which has no congestion risk.  Subjects are 
assigned: a wage that serves as a monetary endowment for each drive, a time threshold after 
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which the variable penalty kicks in,19 a monetary penalty per-second beyond the threshold that 
they arrive, a toll charge when taking the congestion-free route (7th Avenue), and an unknown 
probability of congestion on the risky road (9th Avenue).  Table B1 shows the ranges of wage, 
toll, penalties and time thresholds.  These assignments are constant across the drives for a given 
subject.  On 9th Avenue congestion is induced using a school bus that makes frequent stops on 
the road, causing delay.   
Subjects make route choices in a setting where the late penalty is continuous, and 
presented as a per-second amount.  This is different from Chapter 1 where the late penalty is 
discrete, and presented as a fixed lump-sum.  All other aspects of the experimental design are the 
same as for the discrete penalty case.  The penalty is $0.03 per second for some subjects or $0.05 
per second for other subjects if the wage is $2.50, and is $0.05 per second for some subjects or 
$0.10 per second for other subjects if the wage is $5.00, thus there are only three possible 
assignments.  The time thresholds are lower than in Chapter 1 and range from 1 minute and 50 
seconds to 2 minutes and 30 seconds in 5-second increments.20  The purpose of assigning a time 
threshold for each trip is to induce a large value of time use at the margin so that any “extra 
time” that is above an assigned threshold incurs a larger marginal cost to the subject.  This is 
indeed the case.   
The rest of the design is a replica of the experiment described in Chapter 1.  We employ 
the same joint-task design: the driving simulator task is used to elicit subjective belief, and the 
lottery choice task is used to elicit risk attitudes.  The lottery choice task is exactly the same; see 
Table B2 for the range of prizes and probabilities that are used in the experiment.  We also 
                                                          
19 The time threshold is induced to make sure that the incentives at the margin (per second) are salient in relation to 
the overall payments for the drive.   
20 This is in contrast to Chapter 1 where the time thresholds range from 2 minutes and 10 seconds to 2 minutes and 
45 seconds in 5-second increments. 
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employ the same payment protocol.  The subjects are recruited in the same manner as the 
subjects described in Chapter 1.   
 
2.3 Theory 
This essay examines how field subjects perceive the risk of congestion in a setting where 
the penalty of delay is continuous.  To test if the same behavioral pattern can be observed in both 
continuous and discrete penalty settings, here we ask a similar set of questions as in Chapter 1. 
Are the field subjects able to form estimates of the risk of congestion that vary with the 
underlying objective probability?  Furthermore, under this endogenous information environment, 
do they adjust their beliefs in the direction of the underlying congestion probability?  Does 
learning differ depending on the underlying congestion probability?  
Since the penalty increases for each second that the subject is late relative to a time 
threshold, it is important to consider the beliefs over the distribution of travel times on each route 
as well as the belief of congestion on 9th Avenue.  Thus, the subjects are assumed to hold a belief 
distribution of possible travel times in addition to the belief of congestion.    
In this continuous penalty setting we test two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis I – Subjects are able to form estimates of the risk of congestion, and the perceived 
risk of congestion ranks in the order of the underlying congestion probabilities.  
Hypothesis II – Subjects who are in the low risk treatments are more likely to try out 9th Avenue 
than those who are in the high risk treatments.  With more experience driving on 9th Avenue, 
these subjects should be able to learn about its congestion condition and to form more accurate 
estimates of the underlying objective probability.  Hence, we should see a difference in learning 
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when compared across the risk treatments, such that there should be evidence of more learning in 
the low risk treatment than in the high risk treatment.   
Across the treatments the difference in learning is measured in two ways.  First, it would 
be reflected by a more precise estimate of the subjective probabilities of congestion, thus we 
would expect a smaller standard error for the estimated subjective probability of congestion in 
the low risk treatments than in the high risk treatments.21  Second, with more experience driving 
on 9th Avenue, these subjects should be able to form a more precise estimate of the time it takes 
to drive on each route.  A more precise belief estimate over travel times would be reflected by a 
smaller standard deviation in the subjective probability distribution of travel times, as a sign of 
learning.  Thus, we would expect the standard deviation of the estimated travel time distribution 
for 9th Avenue to be smaller in the low risk treatments than the high risk treatments.  Thus, the 
difference in learning across the treatments are measured in terms of the estimated subjective 
probabilities of congestion and/or the estimated subjective probability distributions of travel 
times.   
Lastly, we will compare the results obtained from the continuous penalty setting to the 
results from the discrete penalty setting in Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 This implication, and the next implication, tacitly assumes an underlying Bayesian model of learning in which the 
individual starts off with a relatively diffuse prior.  If the individual started off with a relatively precise prior that 
was biased, then this implication does not follow.  We see no reason a priori to expect the prior belief to differ 
across discrete environment of Chapter 1 and the continuous environment examined here.  
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2.3.1 Simulator Route Choice Task 
Recall that 7th Avenue is a risk-free route with no congestion and 9th Avenue is a risky 
route with an unknown probability of congestion.  Subjects’ route choices are modeled using 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) and a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
function.  We view each subject as making the decision to take 7th Avenue or 9th Avenue by 
evaluating the SEU of each route.22   
For 7th Avenue the subject holds a subjective belief 𝑝7𝑡 about the time, 𝑡, that a trip will 
take.  We assume that this distribution is normally distributed with mean 𝜇7 and standard 
deviation 𝜎7, and that it is a distribution over 𝑛 discrete values of time 𝑡 defined as seconds.  For 
each time taken, 𝑡, we know the earnings that the subject would make, which we denote 𝑚7𝑡.  
Specifically,  
𝑚7𝑡 = 𝑤 − 𝑓                  (1) 
if the time 𝑡 taken is less than the time threshold 𝑡∗ allowed, where 𝑤 is an exogenous wage and 
𝑓 is the toll fee on 7th Avenue, and  
𝑚7𝑡 = 𝑤 − 𝑓 −𝑙𝑡 × (𝑡 − 𝑡
∗)                     (2) 
if the time taken 𝑡 exceeds the time threshold 𝑡∗, where 𝑙𝑡 is the penalty for late arrival associated 
with time 𝑡.  If 𝑚7𝑡 is negative, it is set to zero.  
We can then define the lottery entailed by taking 7th Avenue in terms of the combination of 
probability 𝑝7𝑡 and payoffs 𝑚7𝑡, using the CRRA utility function        
                                                          
22 In principle this approach could be extended to consider alternatives to SEU.  
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             𝑢(𝑚7𝑡) = (
𝑚7𝑡
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                                                                                                                                                       
to evaluate the utility of payoffs.  Assuming a lower and upper time to the distribution of travel 
times on 7th Avenue, the SEU for 7th Avenue is then  
𝑆𝐸𝑈7 = ∑ 𝑝7𝑡 ×
𝑡=300
𝑡=50 𝑢7𝑡                             
The lower and upper bounds of the distribution are selected based on the range of travel times we 
have observed in the experiment (shown in Figure B1).  We choose increments between 𝑡 and 𝑡 
to obtain good convergence properties; the later empirical analysis uses increments of 1 second.  
As the parameters 𝜇7 and 𝜎7 vary, the value of 𝑝7𝑡 changes for each 𝑡, and hence the SEU of 7
th 
Avenue changes.  
 The evaluation for 9th Avenue follows essentially the same logic, apart from the fact that 
the distribution of travel times on 9th Avenue is conditional on whether or not there is a bus on 
that route.  Hence we view the subject as having some probability, 𝜋, that there will be a bus (on 
9th Avenue) and as having two conditional distributions of travel times for the trips on 9th 
Avenue.  One conditional distribution assumes no bus, and is again assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean 𝜇9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠 and standard deviation 𝜎9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠.  Another conditional distribution 
assumes there is a bus, and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 𝜇9
𝑏𝑢𝑠 and standard 
deviation 𝜎9
𝑏𝑢𝑠.  Given values of 𝜇9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠 and 𝜎9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠 we can generate 𝑛 discrete probabilities 
𝑝9𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠
𝑡
, and given values of 𝜇9
𝑏𝑢𝑠 and 𝜎9
𝑏𝑢𝑠 we can generate 𝑛 discrete probabilities 𝑝9𝑏𝑢𝑠
𝑡
.  
We know that payoffs on 9th Avenue are given by 
𝑚9𝑡 = 𝑤                 (4) 
if the time 𝑡 taken is less than the time threshold 𝑡∗ allowed, and  
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𝑚9𝑡 = 𝑤 − 𝑙𝑡 × (𝑡 − 𝑡
∗)                             (5) 
if the time taken 𝑡 exceeds the time threshold 𝑡∗.  Again, if 𝑚9𝑡 is negative, it is set to zero.  
 We can then define the SEU for 9th Avenue respecting the fact that there is a compound 
risk of there being a bus and a distribution of times conditional on the presence of the bus.  
Hence we have 
             𝑆𝐸𝑈9 = ∑ {𝜋 (𝑝9𝑏𝑢𝑠
𝑡
 × 𝑢9𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡) + (1 −  𝜋)(𝑝9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠
𝑡
 × 𝑢9𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡)}
𝑡=300
𝑡=50
 
We use the same lower and upper bounds as in (3).  Subjects are assumed to behave as if they 
compare the two SEUs and choose the one with the higher SEU.   
 
2.3.2 Binary Lottery Task 
Subjects are asked to complete four binary lottery tasks with known probabilities that 
allow us to elicit their risk attitudes.  In each lottery task a decision is made between a relatively 
safe lottery and a relatively risky lottery.  Risk attitudes are estimated assuming Expected Utility 
Theory (EUT) and a CRRA utility function.  The expected utility of the safe option (EUS) is:  
 𝐸𝑈𝑆 =  𝑝 × (
𝑥𝐿
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 –  𝑝) × (
𝑥𝐻
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)             (7) 
where p is the probability of a low prize, xL, (1-p) is the probability of a higher prize, xH, and  
𝑟 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Similarly, the expected utility of the risky option is:  
 𝐸𝑈𝑅 =  𝑝 × (
𝑦𝐿
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 –  𝑝) × (
𝑦𝐻
(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)                                              (8)   
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where p is the probability of a low prize, yL, and (1-p) is the probability of a high prize, yH.  
 
2.4 Empirical Analysis   
The non-linear structural estimation of the SEU model is performed using Maximum 
Likelihood techniques.  Before estimating the SEU structural model, a Probit model is estimated 
as a way of describing the data. 
 
2.4.1 Estimation Approach 
 Following the same estimation procedure as in Chapter 1 we jointly estimate risk 
attitudes and subjective beliefs.  Instead of estimating the probability of delay, here we estimate 
the joint probability of congestion and travel time.  We estimate subjective beliefs using the data 
from the driving task pooling across subjects, and we estimate risk attitudes using the data from 
the lottery tasks pooling across the same subjects.  Subjective beliefs about travel times are 
estimated conditional on risk treatment dummies, and jointly with risk attitudes.23 
In a setting where the late penalty is continuous and where the extent of delay matters, 
subjects hold a belief as to how long the trip will take, i.e., a belief of all the possible travel 
times.  Subjects also hold a belief as to the probability of congestion (or a bus) on the risky route.  
Therefore, in the estimation we derive separate estimates for each belief.  
 
                                                          
23 This joint estimation approach builds on previous work on structural estimation of risk attitudes by Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008) and Harrison and Rutström (2008b).  A detailed description of the methodology 
can be found in Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström (2014).   
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Estimate Risk Attitudes from Lottery Tasks  
First we describe the estimation of risk attitudes.  The estimation of risk attitudes uses 
only the lottery data, and the equations shown here are the same as equations (5) – (7) in Chapter 
1.  For purpose of completeness we present a similar set of equations so that one can see how the 
econometrics follow from the theories stated in Section 3.  
Following (7) – (8), the index  
 ∇𝐸𝑈 = 𝐸𝑈𝑅 −  𝐸𝑈𝑆                 (9) 
is the difference in valuation between the risky lottery and the safe lottery.   
The index in (9) is then linked to observed choices by using a “logit” likelihood function:  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = Λ(∇𝐸𝑈)              (10) 
The risky option is assumed to be chosen when Λ(∇𝐸𝑈) > ½.   
 Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA 
specifications being true, depends on the estimated r given the above specification and the 
observed choices, c.  The log-likelihood is then  
  ln 𝐿 (𝑟; 𝑐) = Σ𝑖[ lnΛ(∇𝐸𝑈) × 𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 1) + ln(1 − Λ(𝛻𝐸𝑈)) ×  𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 0)]        (11) 
where 𝐈(∙) is the indicator function and 𝑐𝑖= l (0) denotes the choice of the lottery option R (S) in 
lottery task i.   
 We allow for behavioral errors in the core model, and the latent index (9) then becomes 
 ∇𝐸𝑈 = [(𝐸𝑈𝑅 −  𝐸𝑈𝑆) /ν] /𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦             (9’) 
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where 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 > 0 is a structural Fechner “noise parameter” used to allow some error when 
evaluating the difference in EU between the two lotteries.  The constant ν is a contextual 
normalizing term for each lottery pair R and S, and is defined as the difference between the 
maximum and the minimum utility in each lottery pair.  This normalization is referred to as 
“contextual utility” and is due to Wilcox (2011).  
 One can extend the likelihood specification in (11) to include the noise parameter 
𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 and maximize ln𝐿 (𝑟, 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 ; 𝑐) by estimating r and 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 , given observations on c.  
 
Estimate Subjective Beliefs from Simulator Driving Tasks  
Recall that for 7th Avenue, the subject holds a distribution of subjective beliefs 𝑝7𝑡 about 
the time 𝑡 that a trip will take.  We assume that this distribution is normally distributed with 
mean 𝜇7 and standard deviation 𝜎7, and that it is a distribution over time t defined as seconds.  
Given this distribution, we model the subject as evaluating a discrete lottery that evaluates this 
continuous distribution at 𝜏 equally-spaced intervals of 𝑡 between some lower time 𝑡 and upper 
time 𝑡.  We set 𝑡 = 50 and 𝑡 = 300 at 𝜏 = 250 equally-spaced intervals.24  We select 𝑡, 𝑡 and 𝜏 
solely for numerical purposes, and as we increase 𝜏 for a given 𝑡 and 𝑡 we can obtain a better 
discrete approximation of the underlying continuous distribution.  Once these 𝜏 evaluations are 
taken, the 𝜏 densities are normalized to sum to 1.  The approach for 9th Avenue follows the same 
logic for the distribution of travel time when there is a bus (with mean 𝜇9
𝑏𝑢𝑠 and standard 
deviation 𝜎9
𝑏𝑢𝑠) and when there is no bus (with mean 𝜇9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠 and standard deviation 𝜎9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠).  
                                                          
24 Even though we evaluate these lotteries with 𝜏 equally-spaced intervals of time 𝑡, the density of each interval is 
generally a different value.  
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 For numerical reasons we initially constrain the numerical values of the parameters of the 
travel time distributions (i.e., 𝜇7, 𝜎7, 𝜇9
𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜎9
𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜇9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠 and 𝜎9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠) to be equal to the 
distributions of travel times shown in Figure B1, and to estimate only the subjective probability 
of a bus, 𝜋.  We do allow 𝜋 to vary with the exogenous treatments in which there is a true 
probability of the bus of 20%, 40%, and 60%.25  Normalizing on Treatment 0.2 (where the true 
probability of a bus is 20%), and defining binary variables 𝑇40 and 𝑇60 for those treatments, we 
estimate  
𝜋 =  𝜋20 +  𝜋40  × 𝑇40 +  𝜋60 ×  𝑇60           (12) 
and constrain 𝜋 to lie in the unit interval.  Once we obtain estimates of 𝜋20, 𝜋40, and 𝜋60, we 
selectively relax the rational expectation constraints for the parameters of the travel time 
distributions (i.e., 𝜇7, 𝜎7, 𝜇9
𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜎9
𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜇9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠 and 𝜎9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠).  
Together with the estimation of risk attitudes, the estimation of beliefs follows (3) and 
(6), and the latent index is 
 ∇S𝐸𝑈 =  (𝑆𝐸𝑈7 −  𝑆𝐸𝑈9)                        (13)   
where ∇S𝐸𝑈 is the difference in valuation between 7th Avenue and 9th Avenue.   
The estimation is performed using Maximum Likelihood.  One parameter was estimated 
using the “profile likelihood” method,26 due to local numerical flatness of the likelihood 
                                                          
25 The likelihood function was flat with respect to the data from Treatment 0.8, so data from that sub-sample was 
dropped.  The local flatness of the likelihood with respect to these data is not surprising, given the discussion from 
Chapter 1 about this treatment and the lack of behavioral variation it generated in comparison to the other 
treatments. 
26 The profile likelihood method assumes a grid of values for one of the model parameters, and solves for the 
conditional maximum likelihood, allowing all other parameters to vary as the constrained parameter is varied over 
that grid.  The conditional ML estimates are then used as constrained estimates.  The parameter evaluated in this 
manner is the mean of the distribution of subjective beliefs of travel times on the 9th Avenue with a bus, 𝜇9
𝑏𝑢𝑠. 
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function.  Conditional on the SEU and the CRRA specifications being true, the maximized log-
likelihood becomes 
 ln 𝐿 (𝜋20, 𝜋40, 𝜋60, 𝜇9
𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜎9
𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜇9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜎9
𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠, 𝜇7, 𝜎7, 𝑟, 𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 , 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦 ; 𝑐 ) =
Σ𝑖[ln Λ(∇S𝐸𝑈) × 𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 0) + ln(1 − Λ(𝛻𝑆𝐸𝑈)) ×  𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 1)]         (14) 
where 𝐈(∙) is the indicator function, 𝑐𝑖 = 0 (1) denotes that the subject choose 7
th Avenue (9th 
Avenue) in drive task i, and separate noise parameters are estimated for the simulator driving 
task (𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒) and the lottery task (𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦).  A common noise parameter is assumed across risk 
treatments.27 
 
 Estimate Unconditional Travel Time Distribution for 9th Avenue  
 We also estimate an unconditional travel time distribution for 9th Avenue by taking the 
weighted average of the two conditional distributions, and using the estimated bus probability as 
the weight.   
We allow the two parameters 𝜇9 and 𝜎9 to vary with the exogenous probability of a bus 
being 20%, 40%, and 60%.  Normalizing on Treatment 0.2, and defining binary variables 𝑇40 
and 𝑇60 for those treatments, we estimate  
𝜇9 =  𝜇9_𝑇20 +  𝜇9_𝑇40  × 𝑇40 +  𝜇9_𝑇60 ×  𝑇60 , and         (15) 
𝜎9 =  𝜎9_𝑇20 +  𝜎9_𝑇40  × 𝑇40 +  𝜎9_𝑇60 ×  𝑇60             (16)     
                                                          
27 Note that (13) and (14) in this essay is the same as equations (8) and (9) in Chapter 1. 
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Following the same approach as in the estimation of (14), the maximized log-likelihood 
now becomes 
 ln 𝐿 (𝜇9, 𝜎9, 𝜇7, 𝜎7, 𝑟, 𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 , 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟; 𝑐 ) = Σ𝑖[ln Λ(∇S𝐸𝑈) × 𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 0) +
ln(1 − Λ(𝛻𝑆𝐸𝑈)) ×  𝐈(𝑐𝑖 = 1)]                   (17) 
Note that the unconditional travel time distribution for 9th Avenue does not distinguish between a 
bus or no bus, thus we do not estimate the subjective probability of a bus, i.e., 𝜋 is not in the 
model.  
 
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
The characteristics of the subject pool are described in Table B3.28  The proportion of 
commuters from Atlanta and Orlando are about the same.  Each gender is evenly represented in 
the overall sample.  About 49% have household income of above $100,000.  A significant 
majority hold a college education (82%).  Within each risk treatment, the breakdown by 
demographics generally follows a similar trend as the overall sample distribution.  
In addition to being randomly assigned to a congestion risk on 9th Avenue, subjects are 
randomly assigned to a toll, late penalty, and a wage.  Since all the experimental parameters are 
randomly assigned to subjects and stay constant throughout the drives, the distribution of 
subjects who belong to each level of toll (or each level of late penalty, or wage) should be similar 
across the four congestion risk treatments.  However, given the relatively small sample size in 
the experiment it is difficult to achieve perfect randomization that result in even representation of 
                                                          
28 These are not the same subjects as those we observed in Chapter 1, although they are recruited from the same 
population.  Here the sample size is 141 subjects.     
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all possible values.  Because of this it is important to control for all of the parameters in the 
analysis.  This is particularly the case for the toll assignment, where there are a total of 36 
possible assignments.  Comparing any two risk treatments, the distributions of tolls are 
significantly different from each other within a 10% significance level based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov29  test.30  In contrast, for the penalty assignment, where there are only 3 
possible values to be assigned, the distribution of subjects who are assigned to each level of 
penalty are not significantly different from each other in half of the pairwise treatment 
comparisons (within a 10% significance level).  For the wage variable, where there are only 2 
possible values to be assigned, the distribution of subjects who are assigned to each level of 
wage are not significantly different across the four risk treatments, with the exception of only 
two pairwise comparisons (i.e., when comparing Treatments 0.4 and 0.6 with p-value = 0.001, 
and when comparing Treatments 0.6 and 0.8 with p-value = 0.010).   
 
Travel Times and Realized Penalties  
The distribution of travel times pooling over all subjects and treatments is shown in 
Figure B1.  On average 7th Avenue takes the shortest time (114 seconds), next is 9th Avenue 
without a bus (133 seconds), and 9th Avenue with a bus takes the longest (195 seconds).  The 
standard deviations are 5.5, 10.1 and 17.4 seconds, respectively.  The increase in standard 
deviation across the three scenarios is significant (p-value < 0.001).31  This shows that the longer 
it takes to complete the drive, the higher is the variance of the distribution of travel times.  
                                                          
29 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test whether two distributions are equal.  
30 On average, Treatments 0.4 and 0.6 have the larger tolls ($1.84 and $1.80, respectively).  However, the averages 
in these two treatments are not much different than the averages in Treatments 0.2 and 0.8 ($1.73 and $1.68, 
respectively).  Other features of the distributions differ across these treatments.  
31 This test is performed using Levene’s robust test for the equality of variances between the groups. 
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Overall, the descriptive data in Figure B1 shows that subjects perceive a travel time difference 
across routes and congestion scenarios.   
On average as travel time increases, we should expect late penalties to increase.  The 
distribution of the resulting penalties (or realized penalties) pooling over all subjects and 
treatments is shown in Table B4.  On average 7th Avenue incurs the lowest penalty ($0.05), next 
is 9th Avenue without a bus ($0.36), and 9th Avenue with a bus incurs the highest penalty ($3.06).  
The standard deviations are $0.15, $0.62 and $1.45, respectively.  The increase in standard 
deviation across the three scenarios is significant (p-value < 0.001).  Thus, the distributions of 
realized penalties follow the ranking of the distributions of travel times: the longer it takes to 
complete the trip, the higher is the realized penalty.    
 
Proportions of Route Choice  
Given that subjects are randomly assigned to a toll, a late penalty and a wage, route 
choice is predicted to depend on many of these parameters, in addition to the main congestion 
treatments.  We expect that subjects who are assigned a higher toll are more likely to drive on 9th 
Avenue than subjects who are assigned a lower toll.  Figure B2 shows the distribution of toll 
across drivers who chose to drive on 7th and 9th Avenue, respectively.  The two distributions are 
significantly different at the 1% level.  The drivers who chose to drive on 9th Avenue have on 
average a toll assignment of $2.10, whereas those who chose to drive on 7th Avenue have on 
average a toll assignment of $1.50.  This provides preliminary evidence that subjects with a high 
toll are more likely to drive on 9th Avenue.   
We expect that subjects who are assigned a higher late penalty are more likely to select 
the faster route.  There are only three assignments for penalties: $0.03, $0.05 and $0.10 per 
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second.  The  distributions of late penalties do not differ significantly across subjects who took 
7th and 9th Avenue (p-value = 0.109).  However, this test is unconditional, not controlling for 
variations in any of the other variables.  We will look at a conditional test below in a Probit 
model.  
 
Proportion of Route Choice by Risk Treatment 
Prior to starting the driving task, the only information that subjects have for forming a 
prior belief about congestion are the drawings of the ten bus cards before starting the drives.  
Figure B3 shows that the number of bus cards drawn increases with the objective risk.  As the 
number of bus cards drawn increases with objective risk, in the first period the proportion of 
subjects who chose the risky route decreases.  This is shown in Figure B4 (in the first period).  It 
appears that subjects hold initial beliefs of congestion that are consistent with their prior bus card 
information.   
Comparing the proportion of route choice across risk treatments, we see that a larger 
proportion of subjects taking the risky route in the two treatments with objective congestion 
probabilities below 0.5 than in the two treatments with objective congestion probabilities above 
0.5.  Pooling across periods, the proportion of route choice rank in the order of objective risks: 
Treatment 0.2 has the highest proportion of subjects taking the risky route (62%), follow by 
Treatment 0.4 (52%), 0.6 (38%), and 0.8 (33%).  Most of the pairwise comparisons between 
treatments are significantly different (at the 1% level), except between Treatments 0.6 and 0.8 
(p-value = 0.18).  Thus, there is some preliminary evidence that subjects on average can perceive 
differences between high and low probabilities.  
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Across the periods, there is no significant change in the proportion of route choice 
following the first period.  This is true for all risk treatments.  Even though Figure B4 shows 
some differences in the proportion of route choice across the periods, none of the between-period 
pairwise comparisons are significant.   
The number and proportions of subjects who switched routes between periods are shown 
in Table B5.  Recall that 9th Avenue is the risky route with an uncertain risk of congestion and 7th 
Avenue is the safe route with no risk of congestion.  In Treatment 0.2, subjects who take 9th 
Avenue are less likely to experience congestion than subjects in the higher risk treatments, so 
one would expect them to be less likely to switch away from using 9th Avenue.  In fact, of the 25 
subjects who initially selected 9th Avenue only 7 (OR 28%) switched to 7th Avenue in period 2.  
On the other hand, of those who took 7th Avenue, 47% switched to 9th in period 2.  Pooling 
across periods, in Treatment 0.2 the proportion who switched from 9th Avenue to 7th Avenue 
(16%) is smaller than the proportion who switched from 7th Avenue to 9th Avenue (24%).  This is 
consistent with frequent experiences of no congestion on 9th Avenue in Treatment 0.2.  In 
Treatment 0.4, there is a similar but weaker pattern: 19% switched from 9th Avenue to 7th 
Avenue and 21% switched from 7th Avenue to 9th Avenue.   
In the two high risk treatments, the pattern is reversed: there is a higher proportion of 
subjects that switched from 9th Avenue to 7th Avenue than from 7th Avenue to 9th Avenue.  In 
Treatment 0.6, 39% switched from 9th Avenue to 7th Avenue and 22% switched from 7th Avenue 
to 9th Avenue; in Treatment 0.8, 29% switched from 9th Avenue to 7th Avenue and 14% switched 
from 7th Avenue to 9th Avenue.  This is a sign that in the high risk treatments, once subjects 
selected 9th Avenue, they experienced on average more congestion than their counterparts did in 
the lower risk treatments.   
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 Based on the route switching behavior, Table B6 displays the conditions under which 
subjects switched out of 9th Avenue.  It shows the proportion of subjects who switched from 9th 
Avenue to 7th Avenue conditional on encountering congestion or not.  One would expect the 
proportion of subjects who switched in the former case to be at least as high as in the latter case.  
This is indeed the pattern observed in the three treatments with the highest congestion risk: 
Treatments 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8.   
In summary, behavior appear consistent with subjects forming subjective beliefs of 
congestion that reflect its underlying objective probability.  Analysis of the raw data provides 
preliminary evidence that subjects can perceive the difference across high-probabilities and low-
probabilities and that subjective beliefs of congestion rank in the order of the objective risk of 
congestion.  This lends partial support to Hypothesis I and confirms the results obtained in 
Chapter 1.  
Given that the proportion of risky choices is higher in the low risk treatments than in the 
high risk treatments, subjects in the low risk treatments would obtain more information about the 
risky route and display more adjustments in route choices compared to their counterparts in the 
high risk treatments.  However, the route proportions data revealed that across the periods the 
proportion of risky choices stay virtually the same with no significant adjustments.  This is true 
for all risk treatments.   
 
2.4.3 Propensity of Route Choice 
Before discussing the results of the full structural model estimation, in this section route 
choice is estimated controlling for variations in experimental parameters such as tolls and late 
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penalties, so to directly investigate whether, under this endogenous information environment, the 
changes in the tolls are less effective for subjects in the high risk treatments than in the low risk 
treatments, as suggested by the second hypothesis.  Table B7 shows the result of a Probit model 
controlling for variations in payoff incentives and period fixed effects.  The endogenous variable 
is the propensity to take the risky route and the independent variables are Toll, Late Penalty Per 
Second, Wage, the prior number of bus cards (Prior), and period fixed effects (i.e., Period 2, …, 
Period 10)..   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2 × 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3 × 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4
× 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 +  𝛽5 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 +  𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 3 +  𝛽7 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 4 +  𝛽8
× 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 5 +  𝛽9 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 6 +  𝛽10 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 7 +  𝛽11 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 8 +  𝛽12
× 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 9 +  𝛽13 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 10 
As in Chapter 1, all coefficients are transformed to marginal probability effects computed using 
the delta method. 
 
Effects of Payoff Incentives 
Toll has the expected positive effect on the propensity to take the risky route.  The 
coefficients are significantly different from zero in all risk treatments.  Comparing any two 
treatments the coefficients are significantly different from each other except between Treatments 
0.2 and 0.6 (p-value = 0.145).  The influence of Toll increases across Treatments 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. 
Late Penalty Per Second has the theoretically expected negative effect on the propensity 
to take the risky route in the last three treatments, but only in Treatments 0.4 and 0.8 where the 
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coefficients are significantly different from zero.  Wage is predicted to have no effect on the 
propensity of route choice.  This is true for all risk treatments except the lowest risk treatment, 
and even there the coefficient is very small, at -0.080 (p-value = 0.026).   
Within each treatment (except in Treatment 0.8) the number of prior bus cards subjects 
draw does not have a significant effect on the propensity of route choice.  Since the number of 
bus cards subjects drew does not vary much within each treatment, it is not surprising that the 
variable Prior is not significant within treatment.  However, when pooling the data across all 
treatments, there is a significant decrease in the propensity to take the risky route as the number 
of prior bus cards increases (p-value < 0.001), which is expected and shown in the final column 
of Table B7.  
 
Period Effects 
 In period 1 (captured by the coefficient on Constant) the propensity to take the risky 
route is not rank-ordered across the four treatments.  The pairwise comparisons across treatments 
do not show significant differences except between Treatments 0.2 and 0.4 and between 
Treatments 0.4 and 0.6, and the latter is in the opposite direction from what we expect.  In 
subsequent periods, there is no significant change in the propensity to take the risky route, and 
this is true for all four treatments.   
 In summary, the conditional analysis of route choice using a Probit model tells a slightly 
different story compared to the unconditional descriptive analysis: the low risk treatments 
generally do not show a significantly higher propensity to choose the risky route than the high 
risk treatments.  Across the periods the proportion of risky choices (or the propensity for the 
risky route) stay virtually the same with no significant adjustments, and this is true for all risk 
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treatments.  The next section estimates the subjective beliefs that are implied by this behavior, 
assuming SEU with a CRRA utility function.   
 
2.4.4 Subjective Expected Utility   
We estimate the conditional travel time model in (14) using maximum likelihood.  The 
estimation results of the SEU model are shown in Table B8.  The subjective belief distributions 
over travel times are estimated for 7th Avenue, 9th Avenue without a bus, and 9th Avenue with a 
bus.  The subjective beliefs of congestion are estimated conditional on treatment dummies for the 
objective risk of congestion.  The likelihood function was flat with respect to the data from 
Treatment 0.8, so data from that sub-sample was dropped.   
Figure B5 displays the estimated distribution of actual travel times, assuming that the 
actual data are normally distributed.  This is similar to Figure B1, but imposes the parametric 
assumption that each distribution is Gaussian.  This is the assumption under which the model is 
estimated, so Figure B5 is easier to compare to the estimated subjective belief distributions.  
Figure B6 displays the estimated subjective belief distributions for the travel times on 7th 
Avenue, with the actual distribution (from Figure B5) shown in a dashed line.  We see that the 
estimated subjective belief distribution for 7th Avenue has virtually no dispersion compared to 
the actual distribution.  Although less extreme, we will see this pattern with respect to beliefs 
about travel times on 9th Avenue as well. 
Figure B7 displays the conditional distributions of subjective beliefs about travel times on 
9th Avenue, depending on whether there is a bus or not.  As expected a priori, but without any 
constraints on the estimates, we see that the bus does lead to subjective beliefs of time delay.  
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Moreover, the dispersion of the subjective distribution with a bus is significantly larger than the 
dispersion of the subjective distribution with no bus.  Figure B8 compares these estimated 
subjective belief distributions with the actual distributions, and again we see a tendency for the 
beliefs to be less dispersed than the actual.   
In general we see that the averages of the subjective beliefs about travel times are close to 
the true average.  But we see that these subjective beliefs are much more precise in terms of their 
standard deviation, with the subjects behaving as if they had more confidence in these estimated 
average travel times than the data would justify.  Of course, the subjects are actively learning 
about these distributions in real-time, so these implied subjective beliefs may reflect that partial 
adaptation to the data they are seeing.   
By sharp contrast, the estimated subjective probabilities of a bus in Table B8 are 
apparently very imprecise.  The estimated probability of the bus in Treatment 0.2 is 13.3% but it 
is not significantly different from zero given its large standard error (p-value = 0.627).  In terms 
of the 95% confidence interval, Treatment 0.2 has a wide 95% confidence interval between -40% 
and 67%.  The estimated probability of the bus in Treatment 0.4 is 51.9%, again with a wide 
95% confidence interval between 16% and 87%.  The estimated probability of the bus in 
Treatment 0.6 is 58.0%, also with a wide 95% confidence interval between 24% and 92%.   
One implication of these results is to suggest, for future research, an identifying 
restriction in which the probability of a bus is set to 0 for Treatment 0.2 and set to 1 for 
Treatment 0.8.  This does not reduce the agent’s decision problem here to one of certainty, 
because there are still conditional distributions of travel times for 9th Avenue whether or not a 
bus is assumed to be present or not.  In other words, if the subjective probability of a bus is 0, 
then the agent still has a risky choice between 7th Avenue (which is never affected by the bus) 
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and 9th Avenue with no bus.  The latter route still has a subjective distribution of travel times.  
Similarly, if the subjective probability of a bus is 1, then the agent still has a risky choice 
between 7th Avenue and 9th Avenue with a bus; again, the latter route still has a subjective 
distribution of travel times.  In this compound risk setting, it could be that the imprecision in the 
estimated first-stage risks (the risk of a bus) in Treatments 0.4 and 0.6 lead to an 
“overcompensation” by reducing the uncertainty in the estimated second-stage risks (the 
distribution of travel times, conditional on a route and/or bus).  On the other hand, given the 
uncertainty over the probabilities of a bus in Treatments 0.4 and 0.6, it may be cognitively easier 
for the subjects to behave as if the probabilities are at their extremes of 0 and 1 in Treatments 0.2 
and 0.8, respectively. 
From these estimates we can infer some estimates for 9th Avenue that might be more 
natural to interpret in terms of behavior and the hypotheses of interest.  Consider the 
unconditional travel time distribution for 9th Avenue.  In this case we need to take a weighted 
average of the distribution conditional on there being a bus and the distribution conditional on 
there being no bus, where the weights are the (estimated) probability of a bus and the (estimated) 
probability of no bus.  The weighted average of the mean of the two conditional distributions is 
just the weighted average of the means.  But the weighted average of the variance of the two 
conditional distributions is not just the weighted average of the variances unless the covariance is 
zero.  In fact, there is a non-zero covariance, since these reflect estimated subjective belief 
distributions.  A subject who holds beliefs that travel times without a bus are high compared to 
the beliefs of other subjects is also likely to hold beliefs that travel times with a bus are high 
compared to other subjects.  Hence we expect there to be a positive correlation (and hence 
covariance) between the two estimated distributions, and the parameters characterizing them.  In 
turn, this correlation might be naturally generated by subjects that have different efficiencies of 
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driving, or have different degrees of optimism or pessimism with respect to travel time.  When 
we allow for this non-zero covariance, the weighted variance is the weighted average of the two 
variances plus a term that is 2 times the two weights times the correlation.32  Once we know the 
weighted variance we immediately have the weighted standard deviation as the square root of the 
weighted variance.  Since we have estimated the model using Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood we can recover all of these terms correctly accounting for the non-linearity between 
them and inferring their correct standard errors.  Table B9 shows the estimates that result for 9th 
Avenue.  
We see that the unconditional travel time distributions for 9th Avenue have means (151, 
170 and 173) that are higher than for 7th Avenue (116).  We also see that the ranking of the mean 
travel times matches the ranking of the objective bus probability across treatments, although the 
differences are small apart from Treatment 0.2.  It is easy to check with a t-test that Treatment 
0.2’s distribution is significantly different from either of the other two, at a 1% level.  We do not 
see a lower standard deviation for the lower risk treatments than for the higher risk treatments. 
 
Hypotheses 
What do these estimates of the structural model tell us about the hypotheses? 
Hypothesis I states that subjects are able to discern the differences in congestion risk 
across treatments.  The evidence from estimates of the subjective probabilities of a bus does not 
provide support for this hypothesis, even though the point estimates are in the predicted 
direction.  The reason is that they are just so imprecisely estimated.  However, when we combine 
                                                          
32 This is a basic property of statistics when evaluating the weighted sum of variances. 
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these estimates with the conditional distributions of travel time, we can discern a clear difference 
between Treatment 0.2 and Treatments 0.4 and 0.6, even though Treatments 0.4 and 0.6 are not 
distinguishable (Figure B9).  We are able to make such a claim because the subjective beliefs 
about the conditional travel time distributions are estimated so precisely (Figure B8), offsetting 
the imprecision of the subjective probabilities that are used to condition those distributions, to 
arrive at the unconditional distributions for each treatment.   
Hypothesis II states that under an endogenous information environment, we should see a 
difference in learning comparing across the risk treatments, such that there should be evidence of 
more learning in the low congestion risk treatments than in the high congestion risk treatments .  
Across the treatments, the difference in learning is measured by comparing the estimated 
subjective probabilities of congestion or the subjective probability distributions of travel times.  
The estimates of the subjective probability of congestion do not provide any support for the 
hypothesis, since the standard error is larger, not smaller, in Treatment 0.2 compared to the 
higher risk treatments.  The estimates of the subjective probability distribution of travel times 
also do not provide support for the hypothesis, since the standard deviations for the three 
distributions are not significantly different from each other: they are 10.992, 10.298, and 10.524, 
respectively (Figure B9).  Thus, neither the subjective probability of congestion nor the 
subjective probability distribution of travel times provide support for Hypothesis II.  The results 
of the structural estimation are consistent with the results of the descriptive data and Probit 
model in showing a lack of support for Hypothesis II: in the descriptive data, there is no 
significant changes in the proportion of risky choices in any of the treatments; in the Probit 
model, there is no significant changes in the propensity to take the risky route in any of the 
treatments.  
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Subjects have an expectation as to how long it will take to complete the drive on 9th 
Avenue, but how accurate is their expectation?  In other words, does their expectation match the 
actual travel time that it took them to complete the drive?  Here, another way to examine learning 
is perhaps by comparing the expected outcome to the realized outcome.  If subjects hold a fairly 
accurate expectation of the travel times on 9th Avenue, then the estimated belief of travel time 
distribution should be close to the actual realized travel time distribution.  Hence we compare the 
mean and standard deviation of the estimated subjective distribution to the mean and standard 
deviation of the actual distribution.  In that case there is some slight evidence that the estimated 
distribution in Treatment 0.2 is closer to its corresponding actual distribution than the other 
treatments.  However, this “evidence” is not statistically significant. Overall, we do not have 
significant results to support Hypothesis II regardless of what we describe as learning.33   
 Overall, results of the structural model are consistent with results of the Probit model, 
showing support for Hypothesis I but not Hypothesis II.  Both models are consistent in showing 
that subjects are able to discern the difference between low congestion risk and high congestion 
risk.  In terms of learning, however, we do not observe a difference in learning across the 
treatments from either model.  In the Probit model, there is no significant changes in the 
propensity of route choice in any of the treatments, thus we do not observe a difference in 
learning across the treatments.  In the structural model, there is also no evidence of a difference 
in learning across the risk treatments, as it is measured by the estimated probabilities of 
                                                          
33 The usual Bayesian approach might expect that subjects start with a diffuse prior, and refine that as sample data 
are observed.  This would suggest that the posterior distribution (i.e., the estimated travel time distribution) would 
initially be more diffuse than the sample (i.e., the actual distribution), and converge towards the sample standard 
deviation over time, which would seem to be inconsistent with what we infer (Figure B8).  However, the Bayesian 
logic does not require that one start with a diffuse prior, and the evidence that these subjects do not have a subjective 
belief distribution that is more diffuse than the data does not violate Bayesian logic.  To test the Bayesian version of 
Hypothesis II we would need to have independent estimates of the prior distributions that subjects had at the 
beginning of the experiment with respect to the travel times on 9th Avenue conditional on a bus or no bus. 
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congestion and the estimated travel time distributions.  The standard error of the estimated 
probability of congestion is not smaller (in fact, it is larger) in the lowest risk treatment than the 
high risk treatments, and the standard deviation of the estimated travel time distribution is also 
not smaller (or significantly different) in the lowest risk treatment than the high risk treatments.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
The goal of this essay is to examine belief formation and learning under a continuous 
penalty setting, so that we can compare it to results from Chapter 1 that examines behavior under 
a discrete penalty setting.  Under an endogenous information environment, we examine if 
learning differs depending on the underlying congestion probability under different penalty 
settings.  Recall in the discrete penalty setting, the results show there is more learning in the low 
risk treatment than in the higher risk treatments.  The difference in learning across the risk 
treatments is expected under an endogenous information environment, since in a low risk 
treatment subjects are more likely to start with a prior belief of low congestion, and are therefore 
more likely to drive on the risky route, and subsequently obtain more information to revise their 
prior belief compared to their counterparts who starts with a prior belief of high congestion.  This 
same pattern of behavior would still be expected to be taking place when the penalty is induced 
in a continuous rather than discrete manner; however, here we do not report evidence that 
learning differs across the risk treatments.  What could explain this difference? 
Recall that in the Probit model, in the continuous penalty setting the marginal effect of 
Toll is significant in the propensity to choose the risky route and this is true in all risk treatments.  
In contrast, in the discrete penalty setting the marginal effect of Toll is only significant in the low 
risk treatments but not in the high risk treatments.  Thus, depending on the penalty setting the 
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marginal effect of toll may or may not be significant on the propensity to choose the risky route.  
Further, given that information about the risky route can only be obtained if one chooses to drive 
on it, the difference in the marginal effect of Toll on route propensities may contribute to the 
difference in learning across the penalty settings.  
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 2 
Table B1: Tolls and Wages in the Simulator Task 
 Toll Range Late Penalty Time Threshold  
Wage=$2.50 $0.50-$2.00 $0.03 or $0.05 per sec 1min 50 secs to 2m 30 secs  
 Wage=$5.00 $0.50-$4.00 $0.05 or $0.10 per sec 
The range of toll cards was in 10-cent increment.                                                                                               
The range of time thresholds was in 5-second increment.  
 
 
 
Table B2: Prizes and Probabilities in Lottery Task 
Probability 
range 
Safe Lottery 
Low Prize 
Safe Lottery 
High Prize 
Risky Lottery 
Low Prize 
Risky Lottery 
High Prize 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $4 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $5 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $6 
0.1 – 0.9 $4 $6 $0.50 $10 
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Table B3: Demographic Sub-groups in Each Treatment 
 Treatment 
0.2 
Treatment 
0.4 
Treatment 
0.6 
Treatment 
0.8 
All  
 
Number of subjects 40 33 30 36 139 
 
Location  
   Orlando 30% 39% 50% 56% 56% 
   Atlanta 70% 61% 50% 44% 44% 
 
Gender  
    Male  55% 52% 54% 54% 53% 
    Female 45% 48% 46% 46% 47% 
 
Education  
    College  85% 82% 81% 78% 82% 
    Non-college 15% 18% 19% 22% 18% 
 
Income  
    High: above $100K 42% 57% 47% 50% 49% 
    Low: $100K or     
below 
58% 43% 53% 50% 51% 
 
Table B4: Distribution of Realized Penalties  
 
Realized Penalties 7th Avenue 9th Avenue without bus 9th Avenue with bus 
0 90.46% 61.52% 1.57% 
0.5 4.90% 20.76% 0.39% 
1 0.68% 6.33% 1.18% 
1.5 0% 4.81% 11.37% 
2 0.14% 2.78% 16.08% 
2.5 1.50% 3.29% 30.98% 
3 0% 0% 3.53% 
3.5 0% 0% 7.06% 
4 0% 0.25% 6.67% 
4.5 0% 0.00% 1.96% 
5 2.32% 0.25% 19.22% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Pooling over all subjects and treatments.  Number of observations is 1,347.                                                                                                  
Realized penalty on 7th Avenue has a mean of $0.05 and standard deviation 0.15.                                                                                                           
Realized penalty on 9th Avenue without a bus has a mean of $0.36 and standard deviation 0.62.                                                        
Realized penalty on 9th Avenue with a bus has a mean of $3.06 and standard deviation 1.45.  
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Table B5: Route Switches  
From one 
period to the 
next 
# of 
subjects 
who took 
7th Ave. in 
the first of 
the two 
periods 
# of 
subjects 
who took 
9th Ave. in 
the first of 
the two 
periods 
Proportion 
taking 9th 
Avenue  
# of 
subjects 
who switch 
from 7th to 
9th  
# of 
subjects 
who switch 
from 9th to 
7th 
For those 
who take 
7th Ave., 
proportion 
that switch 
to 9th 
For those 
who take 
9th Ave., 
proportion 
that switch 
to 7th 
Difference   
Treatment 0.2 
1 to 2 15 25 62.5% 7 7 47% 28% 19% 
2 to 3  15 25 62.5% 4 3 27% 12% 15% 
3 to 4 14 26 65% 3 4 21% 15% 6% 
4 to 5  15 25 62.5% 4 3 27% 12% 15% 
5 to 6 14 26 65% 2 4 14% 15% -1% 
6 to 7 16 24 60% 4 2 25% 8% 17% 
7 to 8 14 26 65% 4 5 29% 19% 9% 
8 to 9 15 25 62.5% 0 3 0% 12% -12% 
9 to 10 19 21 52.5% 5 3 26% 14% 12% 
Average  -  -   61.94% -  -  24% 16% 8% 
Treatment 0.4 
1 to 2 16 17 51.52% 5 4 31% 24% 8% 
2 to 3  15 18 54.55% 2 1 13% 6% 8% 
3 to 4 14 19 57.58% 3 5 21% 26% -5% 
4 to 5  16 17 51.52% 4 4 25% 24% 1% 
5 to 6 16 17 51.52% 3 3 19% 18% 1% 
6 to 7 16 17 51.52% 7 3 44% 18% 26% 
7 to 8 12 21 63.64% 1 6 8% 29% -20% 
8 to 9 17 16 48.48% 4 2 24% 13% 11% 
9 to 10 15 18 54.55% 1 3 7% 17% -10% 
Average -  -  53.88% -   21% 19% 2% 
Treatment 0.6 
1 to 2 16 14 46.67% 4 3 25% 21% 4% 
2 to 3  15 15 50% 4 8 27% 53% -27% 
3 to 4 19 11 36.67% 4 5 21% 45% -24% 
4 to 5  20 10 33.33% 7 4 35% 40% -5% 
5 to 6 17 13 43.33% 4 3 24% 23% 0% 
6 to 7 16 14 46.67% 5 7 31% 50% -19% 
7 to 8 18 12 40% 1 4 6% 33% -28% 
8 to 9 21 9 30% 4 4 19% 44% -25% 
9 to 10 21 8 27.59% 3 3 14% 38% -23% 
Average -  -  39.36% -   22% 39% -16% 
Treatment 0.8 
1 to 2 24 12 33.33% 4 1 17% 8% 8% 
2 to 3  21 15 41.67% 1 5 5% 33% -29% 
3 to 4 25 11 30.56% 7 4 28% 36% -8% 
4 to 5  22 14 38.89% 3 4 14% 29% -15% 
5 to 6 23 13 36.11% 3 5 13% 38% -25% 
6 to 7 26 10 27.78% 5 5 19% 50% -31% 
7 to 8 26 10 27.78% 3 3 12% 30% -18% 
8 to 9 26 10 27.78% 3 2 12% 20% -8% 
9 to 10 25 11 30.56% 3 1 12% 9% 3% 
Average -  -  32.72% -   14% 29% -15% 
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Table B6: Congestion Experiences  
From one 
period to the 
next 
# of subjects 
who switch 
from 9th to 
7th 
Conditional on a 
bus card, # of 
subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th  
Conditional on 
no bus card, # 
of subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th 
Conditional on 
a bus card, % 
of subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th 
Conditional on 
no bus card, % 
of subjects who 
switch from 9th 
to 7th 
Treatment 0.2 
1 to 2 7 2 5 29% 71% 
2 to 3  3 0 3 0% 100% 
3 to 4 4 0 4 0% 100% 
4 to 5  3 1 2 33% 67% 
5 to 6 4 0 4 0% 100% 
6 to 7 2 2 0 100% 0% 
7 to 8 5 3 2 60% 40% 
8 to 9 3 1 2 33% 67% 
9 to 10 3 1 2 33% 67% 
Average  -- -- -- 32% 68% 
Treatment 0.4 
1 to 2 4 4 0 100% 0% 
2 to 3  1 0 1 0% 100% 
3 to 4 5 2 3 40% 60% 
4 to 5  4 2 2 50% 50% 
5 to 6 3 3 0 100% 0% 
6 to 7 3 2 1 67% 33% 
7 to 8 6 4 2 67% 33% 
8 to 9 2 1 1 50% 50% 
9 to 10 3 3 0 100% 0% 
Average  -- -- -- 64% 36% 
Treatment 0.6 
1 to 2 3 3 0 100% 0% 
2 to 3  8 8 0 100% 0% 
3 to 4 5 1 4 20% 80% 
4 to 5  4 3 1 75% 25% 
5 to 6 3 1 2 33% 67% 
6 to 7 7 5 2 71% 29% 
7 to 8 4 3 1 75% 25% 
8 to 9 4 3 1 75% 25% 
9 to 10 3 2 1 67% 33% 
Average  -- -- -- 68% 32% 
Treatment 0.8 
1 to 2 1 1 0 100% 0% 
2 to 3  5 3 2 60% 40% 
3 to 4 4 4 0 100% 0% 
4 to 5  4 4 0 100% 0% 
5 to 6 5 3 2 60% 40% 
6 to 7 5 5 0 100% 0% 
7 to 8 3 3 0 100% 0% 
8 to 9 2 1 1 50% 50% 
9 to 10 1 1 0 100% 0% 
Average  -- -- -- 86% 14% 
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Table B7: Propensity of Route Choice Estimated with a Probit Model 
 Treatment 0.2 
N=40 
Treatment 0.4 
N=33 
Treatment 0.6 
N=30 
Treatment 0.8 
N=36 
Pooled 
Across 
Treatments  
N=139 
Constant  .397*** 
(0.001) 
.791*** 
(<0.001) 
.232 
(0.159) 
.596** 
(0.037) 
.619*** 
(<0.001) 
Toll .301*** 
(<0.001) 
.069** 
(0.040) 
.200*** 
(0.002) 
.351* 
(0.087) 
.194*** 
(<0.001) 
Late Penalty  
Per Second 
.453 
(0.599) 
-.791*** 
(<0.001) 
-.232 
(0.159) 
-.596** 
(0.037) 
-.619*** 
(<0.001) 
Wage -.080** 
(0.026) 
.027 
(0.312) 
.028 
(0.305) 
.057 
(0.190) 
-.013 
(0.407) 
Period 2 -.001 
(0.997) 
.030 
(0.741) 
.025 
(0.819) 
.114 
(0.385) 
.030 
(0.622) 
Period 3 .031 
(0.795) 
.052 
(0.561) 
-.080 
(0.424) 
-.047 
(0.741) 
-.009 
(0.882) 
Period 4 .002 
(0.984) 
-.001 
(0.991) 
-.103 
(0.308) 
.088 
(0.505) 
-.015 
(0.803) 
Period 5 .029 
(0.809) 
.005 
(0.958) 
-.029 
(0.776) 
.0382 
(0.778) 
.009 
(0.883) 
Period 6 -.029 
(0.800) 
-.003 
(0.978) 
-.005 
(0.963) 
-.104 
(0.471) 
-.025 
(0.682) 
Period 7 .028 
(0.810) 
.094 
(0.282) 
-.057 
(0.567) 
-.140 
(0.331) 
.006 
(0.920) 
Period 8  .0002 
(0.999) 
-.028 
(0.777) 
-.122 
(0.242) 
-.096 
(0.501) 
-.066 
(0.293) 
Period 9 -.106 
(0.337) 
.030 
(0.745) 
-.145 
(0.191) 
-.059 
(0.678) 
-.081 
(0.202) 
Period 10 -.053 
(0.638) 
-.031 
(0.762) 
-.115 
(0.262) 
.032 
(0.814) 
-.057 
(0.366) 
Prior .008 
(0.738) 
-.018 
(0.159) 
.018 
(0.200) 
-.069*** 
(0.001) 
-.051*** 
(<0.001) 
The p-values are in parentheses, testing if the coefficient is different from zero.  
The coefficients are marginal effects computed using the delta method.  
*** means the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
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Table B8: Subjective Expected Utility Beliefs  
Risk attitudes:  
𝒓 
.367*** 
(<0.001) 
{0.203, 0.532} 
Belief of travel time on 9th Avenue with bus:  
𝝁𝟗
𝒃𝒖𝒔 
194.952 
(a) 
{a} 
𝝈𝟗
𝒃𝒖𝒔 
5.385 
(0.111) 
{-1.241, 12.020} 
Belief of travel time on 9th Avenue without bus:  
𝝁𝟗
𝒏𝒐 𝒃𝒖𝒔 
143.966*** 
(<0.001) 
{140.946, 146.99} 
𝝈𝟗
𝒏𝒐 𝒃𝒖𝒔 
1.034 
(0.407) 
{-1.410, 3.478} 
Belief of travel time on 7th Avenue:  
𝝁𝟕 
115.642*** 
(<0.001) 
{115.499, 115.785} 
𝝈𝟕 
.365* 
(0.083) 
{-0.048, 0.778} 
Belief of congestion (or bus) on 9th Avenue: 
𝝅𝟐𝟎 
.133 
(0.627) 
{-0.405, 0.672} 
𝝅𝟒𝟎 
.519*** 
(0.004) 
{0.164, 0.874} 
𝝅𝟔𝟎 
.580*** 
(0.001) 
{0237, 0.923} 
The p-values are in parentheses, testing if the coefficient is different from zero.   
The 95% confidence intervals are in brackets. 
*** means the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means the coefficient is significant at the 10% level.   
(a) implies that a standard error or confidence interval cannot be computed by the delta method due 
to numeric issues, because the estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
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Table B9: Unconditional Estimated Travel Time Distributions 
 Treatment 0.2 Treatment 0.4 Treatment 0.6 
Belief of travel time on 9th Avenue: 
𝝁𝟗 
150.781*** 
(<0.001) 
{125.400, 176.161} 
170.437*** 
(<0.001) 
{153.109, 187.765} 
173.560*** 
(<0.001) 
{156.718, 190.402} 
𝝈𝟗 
10.996*** 
(<0.001) 
{7.532, 14.460} 
10.298*** 
(0<0.001) 
{9.268, 11.329} 
10.524*** 
(<0.001) 
{9.030, 12.017} 
Belief of travel time on 7th Avenue: 
𝝁𝟕 
115.642*** 
(<0.001) 
{115.499, 115.785} 
𝝈𝟕 
.365* 
(0.083) 
{-0.048, 0.778} 
The p-values are in parentheses, testing if the coefficient is different from zero.  
The 95% confidence intervals are in brackets 
*** means the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure B1: Distribution of Observed Travel Times 
  
Pooling over all subjects and treatments.                                                                                                  
Travel time on 7th Avenue has a mean of 114 and standard deviation of 5.5.                                                                                                           
Travel time on 9th Avenue without a bus has a mean of 133 and standard deviation of 10.1.                                                       
Travel time on 9th Avenue with a bus has a mean of 195 and standard deviation of 17.4.  
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Figure B2: Distribution of Toll by Route  
 
 
 
Figure B3: Number of Bus Cards Subjects See Before First Period  
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Figure B4: Proportion of Subjects who Take 9th Avenue Across Periods
 
Figure B5: Distribution of Observed Travel Times, Assume Normal Distribution 
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Figure B6: Subjective Travel Time Beliefs for 7th Avenue 
 
Figure B7: Subjective Travel Time Beliefs for 9th Avenue 
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Figure B8: Subjective Travel Time Beliefs for 9th Avenue Compared to Actual Distributions of 
Travel Time 
 
Figure B9: Subjective Travel Time Beliefs for 9th Avenue Depending on the Exogenous Chance 
of a Bus 
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CHAPTER 3 
Estimating Uncertainty Aversion Using the Source Method in Stylized Tasks 
With Varying Degrees of Uncertainty 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This essay examines uncertainty aversion34 using the source method introduced in 
Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido and Wakker (2011), hereafter ABPW.  The source method assumes 
that different types of events imply potentially different sources of uncertainty; for example, an 
event with an unknown probability is a different source of uncertainty from an event with a 
known probability.  For each type of event a probability weighting function can be estimated in a 
rank-dependent model.  The probability weighting function estimated from each source of 
uncertainty is referred to as the source function.  The source function transforms the probabilities 
into decision weights and the transformation partially reflects preferences and partially 
perceptions.  Attitudes toward uncertainty can be examined by comparing source functions.  
Note that a source function is essentially a probability weighting function, and since our analysis 
is performed using the source method, we use the term source function (instead of probability 
weighting function) hereafter.  
                                                          
34 The terms uncertainty and ambiguity both refer to events that have unknown probabilities, but they differ in that 
uncertainty refers to events that the individual has some information about the probability distribution, whereas 
ambiguity refers to a complete lack of information about the probabilities.  To put it differently, both uncertainty and 
ambiguity refer to an underlying nondegenerate distribution (i.e., not assuming the Reduction of Compound 
Lotteries), however, ambiguity differs from uncertainty in that in the former the individual does not even have 
enough information to form any subjective belief distribution, degenerate or non-degenerate.   
In our lottery task experiment, subjects are provided with partial information about the unknown probabilities 
instead of a complete lack of information.  Thus in the analysis we use the term uncertainty aversion instead of 
ambiguity aversion.   
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The primary research question in this essay is: if an event with an unknown probability is 
presented to subjects under two scenarios that vary in degrees of uncertainty (i.e., in one scenario 
the event is presented with little uncertainty about its probabilities, whereas in another scenario 
the same event is presented with more uncertainty about its probabilities), will this result in 
variations in behavior?  If we estimate a source function for each scenario, will the estimated 
source functions shift in a way that is consistent with these variations in uncertainty?  In other 
words, does behavior vary in a systematic manner going from the least uncertain scenario to the 
most uncertain scenario?  The experiment described in this essay uses a within-subjects design 
where each subject completes three types of lottery tasks that are ranked in order of increasing 
uncertainty.  Each task involves making a pairwise comparison between a relatively safe lottery 
and a relatively risky lottery.  In the first task the probabilities of the outcomes are known, in the 
second and third tasks the probabilities are unknown and are presented under varying degrees of 
uncertainty.   
Using a revealed preference approach, a source function is estimated for each of the three 
types of tasks based on the choices observed.  The estimation is performed using maximum 
likelihood assuming the two-parameter Prelec (Prelec (1998)), Tversky-Kahneman (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)), hereafter TK, and Power probability weighting specifications assuming a 
rank ordering of outcomes consistent with Rank Dependent Utility Theory (Quggin (1982)).  
Next, the resulting source functions are compared using the two indices of uncertainty aversion 
from the source method: the index of pessimism and the index of likelihood insensitivity.  
Pessimism is a tendency to place a lower decision weight for the best outcome relative its 
underlying objective probability (i.e., w(p) < p).  It reflects a source function that is convex, 
globally or locally, such that on the unit interval a subject displays pessimism only for a 
  
114 
 
particular range of probabilities.  A concave region would similarly be interpreted as optimism.  
Likelihood insensitivity is a tendency to overweigh low probabilities and underweigh high 
probabilities: for an event that has a low probability of occurring, subjects weigh the event higher 
than its underlying objective probability (i.e., w(p) > p), and for an event that has a high 
probability of occurring, subjects weigh the event lower than its underlying objective probability 
(i.e., w(p) < p).  Likelihood insensitivity reflects an inverse-S shaped source function, but notice 
that likelihood insensitivity could also reflect a change in subjective probabilities in the direction 
of uniformity, as posited under the principle of insufficient reason.35   
The index of pessimism and the index of likelihood insensitivity can be estimated, for 
example, using the two-parameter Prelec probability weighting specification.36  Given the 
choices that subjects make in the three types of lottery tasks, we estimate a source function for 
each type of task assuming the Prelec specification.  Next, across the three estimated source 
functions we compare the pessimism indices, and the difference of the pessimism indices is 
interpreted as uncertainty aversion, as is defined by the source method.  Likewise, we compare 
the likelihood insensitivity indices across the three source functions, and the difference of the 
likelihood insensitivity indices is interpreted as another characteristic property of uncertainty 
aversion.  We undertake a similar estimation for the TK and Power probability weighting 
specifications.   
                                                          
35 The “principle of insufficient reason” or the “principle of indifference” states that if one is ignorant of the ways an 
event can occur, the event will occur equally likely in any way (first enunciated by Jakob Bernoulli).   
36 The Rieger and Wang weighting function is another relatively flexible probability weighting specification with 
two parameters (Rieger and Wang (2006)).  Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2009) estimate probability 
weighting using both Prelec (1998) and Rieger and Wang (2006) specifications and report only small differences in 
results between the two specifications. 
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Based on an experiment that presents simply stylized lottery tasks to adult non-student 
participants in Atlanta and Orlando, we find that the results obtained using the source method are 
consistent with past studies that do not use the source method in showing that behavior differs 
under events with known vs. unknown probabilities (i.e., Cubitt, Kuilen and Mukerji (2012) and 
Attanasi, Gollier, Montesano and Pace (2014)).  Furthermore, the estimated source functions 
show that, compare to events with known probabilities subjects display more likelihood 
insensitivity for events with unknown probabilities, which is consistent with the findings by 
ABPW.  We also find that the behavioral difference under unknown probabilities is better 
captured by the Prelec specification than the TK or Power specification.  Results from the Prelec 
specification suggest that, as the degree of uncertainty increases, subjects display increased 
pessimism; in contrast, the TK and the Power specifications detect no such difference.  Thus, the 
conclusion regarding uncertainty aversion are contingent on which probability weighting 
specification is assumed for the source function. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Models of uncertainty or ambiguity can be categorized into two general types.37  One 
type is models with multiple-priors.  Multiple-priors models consider a set of priors or a set of 
probability distributions over the outcomes, not just one distribution.  Examples are the smooth 
model (Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005)) and the 𝛼-MEU model (Ghirardato et al. 
                                                          
37 Models of uncertainty or ambiguity describe events that have probabilities not known to the subject.  The 
parameter p refers to subject’s subjective probability and is an unknown parameter in the decision model.  In 
contrast, models of risk describe events that have known probabilities, thus p, the objective probability, is a known 
parameter in the decision model.   
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(2004)).  The smooth model considers a set of priors for the possible outcomes,38 plus separate 
utility parameters to capture attitudes toward risk and attitudes toward uncertainty.39  In 
evaluating any two-stage lotteries, the smooth model takes the Expected Utility (EU) of each 
one-stage lottery within each prior and then takes the Expected Value of all EUs across the 
priors.  The α-MEU model also considers a set of priors or scenarios. The parameter, α, weighs 
the worst scenario, and (1- α) weighs the best scenario, thus α serves as the index of uncertainty 
aversion.  Another type is rank-dependent models such as Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) 
(Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989)) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)).  These models use decision weights to model preferences toward risk and 
uncertainty; they rank outcomes in the order of attractiveness and attach decision weights to each 
ranked outcome.  When testing which model has better descriptive and predictive power for the 
observed choices, Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model (Savage (1971)) typically 
serves as a baseline comparison to the more complex uncertainty models.40 
This literature review focuses on studies that model preferences toward uncertainty using 
decision weights.  Decision weights have been elicited using methods such as the indifference 
approach (Mangelsdorff and Webber (1994)), the Quadratic Scoring Rule (Offerman, Sonneman, 
Kuilen and Wakker (2009), Andersen, Fountain, Hole, and Rutström (2014) and Harrison 
(2014)), or lottery pairs in a list format (ABPW (2011), Abdellaoui, Vossman and Weber 
                                                          
38 Events that have a set of priors may be viewed as having elements of a compound risk.  One should note that the 
smooth model assumes that compound risk is not reducible to a single probability, i.e., the model does not assume 
the axiom of Reduction of Compound Lotteries (ROCL).  
39 For example, the Constant Relative Ambiguity Aversion (CRAA) parameter serving as the index of uncertainty 
aversion under uncertainty is analogues to the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) parameter serving as the 
index of risk aversion under risk.   
40 One important distinction between Savage’s subjective risk model and a more complex uncertainty model is that 
the former assumes ROCL and the latter doesn’t.  In a subjective risk model, any probability distribution is reducible 
to a single (degenerate) probability, i.e., to the mean of its distribution.  In contrast, in an uncertainty model a 
probability distribution is not reducible to a single probability estimate.  
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(2005)).  The common finding across these methods is that, under uncertainty subjects tend to 
overweigh low probabilities and underweigh high probabilities, displaying a tendency to place 
equal decision weights on all possible outcomes.   
The rank-dependent models CEU and CPT can both be generalized to non-additive 
decision weights.  CPT is different from CEU in that the former estimates separate weighting 
functions W+ and W- for gains and losses, respectively.  The experimental literature on 
uncertainty aversion considered CEU to be rank-dependent and similar to Rank Dependent 
Utility (RDU) under risk.  As Hey and Pace (2014) puts it: “CEU is the same as RDU (which is 
not regarded by all as a theory of behavior under uncertainty because it uses objective 
probabilities but also uses a weighting function, mapping objective probabilities into subjective 
probabilities) under an appropriate interpretation of that latter theory.”  In the estimation of CEU, 
Hey and Pace (2014) rank-order the outcomes and assume non-additive capacities.  The 
capacities are estimated non-parametrically, such that each of the capacities is a parameter to be 
estimated, as are the pairwise unions.  The same estimation approach is used in Conte and Hey 
(2013) and Hey, Lotito and Maffioletti (2010).  A recent approach is to assume that the 
capacities add up to 1 and estimate them parametrically assuming a probability weighting 
function, as it is shown in Kothiyal, Spinu and Wakker (2014).  In this way, the CEU capacities 
are essentially RDU decision weights.  
The following review first discusses studies that examine uncertainty aversion using the 
source method.  In these studies decision weights are elicited over the full range of objective 
probabilities, and then these elicited values are compared to their respective underlying objective 
probabilities using two indices of uncertainty aversion defined below.  The next set of studies 
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discusses different approaches to elicit decision weights or to correct the reported probabilities 
for risk and/or uncertainty premium.  
 
3.2.1 Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido and Wakker (2011), ABPW 
In this study different types of events are presumed to constitute different sources of 
uncertainty, and that the decisions made can be examined using the source method.  The source 
method employs a class of uncertainty models that are rank-dependent: RDU/CEU or CPT.41  
These models rank the possible outcomes according to the level of attractiveness, then estimate 
decision weights assuming a probability weighting function.  The probability weighting function 
estimated from each source of uncertainty is referred to as the source function that maps the 
probabilities, p, into decision weights, w(p).  A source function can be estimated from events 
with known or unknown probabilities.  Each source function reflects interactions between beliefs 
and preferences, and by comparing two source functions attitudes toward uncertainty that reflect 
a combination of beliefs and preferences are revealed.  Note that a source function is presumed 
to reflect a combination of beliefs and preferences; it does not separate the two.  It is the 
difference in two source functions that is said to reveal uncertainty aversion.  Here, the term 
uncertainty aversion reflects the differences of beliefs across events as well as differences of 
preferences across events.42 
                                                          
41 ABPW (2011) perform the estimation under the name Rank Dependent Utility, whereas Kothiyal, Spinu and 
Wakker (2014) perform the same estimation under the name Choquet Expected Utility.  Both studies use the source 
method.  
42 In the context of the source method, the term “uncertainty aversion” reflects beliefs as well as preferences.  We 
are aware that this way of defining uncertainty aversion may cause confusion with many uncertainty models that 
separate beliefs from preferences.  Nevertheless, we use the source method for our analysis for the purpose of 
examining uncertainty aversion using decision weights.  
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Attitudes toward uncertainty and the degree of perceived uncertainty can be defined in a 
tractable manner using two indices of uncertainty: pessimism and likelihood insensitivity.  As 
mentioned previously, the index of pessimism reflects the concavity or convexity of a source 
function, and the difference in concavity or convexity across the graphs of the source functions is 
interpreted as uncertainty aversion by ABPW.  Likelihood insensitivity reflects a source function 
that is inverse-S shaped, i.e., for an event that has a low probability of occurring, subjects weigh 
the event higher than its underlying objective probability (i.e., w(p) > p), and for an event that 
has a high probability of occurring, subjects weigh the event lower than its underlying objective 
probability (i.e., w(p) < p), displaying a tendency to place equal decision weights on all possible 
outcomes.  The difference in insensitivity across the graphs of the source functions is interpreted 
as another characteristic property of uncertainty aversion by ABPW.43  In the study these two 
indices are captured using the two-parameter Prelec weighting function (Prelec (1998)).  
The source method does not propose a new theoretical model of uncertainty.  Instead, it 
proposes a way to analyze behavior under uncertainty using a class of theoretical models that 
already exist in the literature: rank-dependent models.  The novelty here is to define uncertainty 
preferences by means of two indices based on the decision weights.  
The ABPW study is based on two experimental tasks.  The first task is the classic 
Ellsberg urn experiment and the second involves natural uncertainties such as the weather and a 
stock index in an obscure country.  In the Ellsberg task subjects are presented with two urns each 
containing eight balls.  The known urn K contains eight balls of different colors: red, blue, 
yellow, black, green, purple, brown, and cyan.  The unknown urn U contains eight balls with the 
                                                          
43 One should note that likelihood insensitivity, by itself, may solely reflect diffuse perceptions and may not reflect 
any preferences toward uncertainty at all.  It is the difference in insensitivities between two source functions that is 
considered a characteristic property of uncertainty preferences in the source method.  
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same set of colors but the composition is unknown to the subjects in the sense that some colors 
might appear several times and others might be absent.  Using a list format, subjects are 
presented with a series of choices, each between a prospect and an ascending range of a sure 
payment, with the switching point taken as the certainty equivalent.  One of the choices on the 
list is selected for payment.  The second task involves natural uncertainties, such as the French 
stock index CAC40, temperature in Paris (the home city where the experiment is conducted), and 
temperature in a foreign city.  The elicitation method is again a list varying the amount of the 
certain option.  One of the choices is randomly selected for payment.44  
To control for risk preferences, utilities are elicited using lotteries with known 
probabilities that are presented in a list format similar to that used for the uncertainty tasks, with 
the switching values taken as the certainty equivalent.  The lotteries always have an objective 
probability of 0.5.  Utilities are estimated assuming a power utility function using nonlinear 
least-squares methods.   
In the uncertainty task ABPW calculate, rather than estimate, decision weights, after 
which they fit these weights to a two-parameter Prelec function by minimizing quadratic 
distance.  The Ellsberg task compares the certainty equivalents for risk and for uncertainty.  The 
source functions for urns K and U significantly deviate from linearity (i.e., decision weights 
deviate from the underlying objective probabilities), and display significant likelihood 
insensitivity, with significantly more insensitivity in the urn U than in the urn K.  In particular, 
                                                          
44 In the Ellsberg task, ABPW (2011) implement a random incentive payment procedure where one of the choices is 
randomly selected for real payment.  In the task that involves natural uncertainties, ABPW implement two 
treatments of payment procedures.  In one treatment subjects receive a flat payment and the choices are hypothetical, 
thus the choices are not incentivized.  In the other treatment one of the choices is randomly selected for real 
payment.  The money that the subjects earned is collected about three months from the date of the experiment, after 
the uncertainty is resolved.   
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for large probabilities (p > 0.5) there is more underweighting of probabilities for urn U than for 
urn K; for small probabilities (p ≤ 0.5) there is no significant difference.  The pessimism index is 
not significantly different from zero in either urn.  Pessimism in urn U, however, significantly 
exceeds that in urn K.  The ABPW interpret the underweighting or overweighting of the 
subjective probabilities as indicative of willingness to bet,45 and report that there is more 
willingness to bet for risk than is for uncertainty in the high probabilities (p > 0.5), and that the 
willingness to bet is the same for both in the low probabilities (p ≤ 0.5).   
The second task makes observations on the certainty equivalents for natural uncertainties.  
All source functions display a common inverse-S shaped with low probabilities overweighted 
and high probabilities underweighted.  The insensitivity and pessimism indices are significantly 
different from zero but are not significantly different across the sources of natural uncertainties.  
Furthermore, the source functions for natural uncertainties are not significantly different from the 
one for the uncertain urn in the Ellsberg task.  These findings suggest that events with unknown 
probabilities are perceived to be similar, but they are perceived differently from events with 
known probabilities.   
 
3.2.2 Kothiyal, Spinu and Wakker (2014), KSW 
This study compares the predictive power of the source method to that of popular 
alternatives.  The list of models examined include CEU using the source method, CPT using the 
source method, and multiple-priors models such as maxmin EU and maxmax EU.   
                                                          
45 ABPW elicit subject’s certainty equivalent for each event.  It appears that ABPW equate the difference in 
certainty equivalents across events to difference in willingness to bet across events.  
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In the experiment uncertainty is implemented using a bingo blower that contains balls of 
three different colors in 0.2, 0.3, 0.5 proportions.  There are three treatments with the total 
number of balls being 10, 20, to 40 balls.  They find that the more balls there are in the bingo 
blower, the harder it is for subjects to guess the proportion of each color, i.e., the harder it is for 
them to figure out the underlying objective probability of each color.  In this way, the treatments 
are ranked in order of increasing uncertainty, with the 10-ball bingo blower being the least 
uncertain treatment and the 40-ball bingo blower being the most uncertain treatment.  The 
outcomes include both gains and losses, and one of the choices is randomly selected for 
payment.46   
Some of the observed choices are used for model fitting, and the remaining choices are 
used as a prediction set.  The estimation uses maximum likelihood and the comparison between 
models is based on the predicted log-likelihood of the test set.  The study reports that CPT using 
the source method outperforms alternative theories for predicting decisions under uncertainty.  
Furthermore, when estimating CPT using different specifications of the source function (i.e., 
Prelec (1998), Tversky-Kahneman (1992), Goldstein and Einhorn (1987), and Neo-additive 
(2007)), CPT still outperforms alternative theories. Hence, the conclusion that CPT best predicts 
choices under uncertainty is not sensitive to the particular parameterization chosen.  The study 
does not report the shape of the estimated source functions.47 48   
 
                                                          
46 KSW (2014) do not mention how they would handle a situation where the subject’s realized outcome turns out to 
be a loss.   
47 KSW (2014) estimate separate source function parameters for gains and losses and report that the weighting 
parameters for gains are significantly different than for losses.   
48 Recall that some events involve possible gains and losses, to avoid taking the utility of a negative payment, KSW 
“normalize” the utilities such that the utility of the best outcome is 1 and the utility of the worst outcome is 0.   
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3.2.3 Abdellaoui, Vossmann and Weber (2005), AVW 
AVW uses an approach that is essentially the source method without referring to it as 
such.  The experiment aims to decompose decision weights into a decision attitude component 
and a belief component.  To do so they use three different types of tasks to elicit certainty 
equivalents for utility, choice-based probabilities (beliefs) and decision weights, respectively.  In 
each type of task subjects go through a series of binary choice questions in a list format.  In the 
“utility” task subjects choose between two risky prospects; in the “choice-based probability” task 
they choose between a risky prospect and an uncertain prospect; in the “decision weight” task 
they choose between an uncertain prospect and a sure amount.  Subjects are paid a flat fee for 
participating in the experiment and the lottery outcomes are hypothetical, thus subjects’ choices 
are not incentivized in a salient manner.  
Decision weights are estimated from the inferred choice-based probabilities using a 
linear-in-log-odds function.  The linear-in-log-odds function has two parameters that can be 
interpreted along the lines as the two indices of uncertainty described in ABPW (2011): one 
parameter controls the concavity or convexity of the source function and the other parameter 
reflects a source function that is inverse-S shaped.  AVW report that SEU is violated, since the 
estimated source function is non-linear.  This is consistent with the findings reported in ABPW 
(2011). However, the AVW study does not report the shape of the estimated weighting 
functions.49  
 
                                                          
49 The AVW (2005) experiment has outcomes for both gains and losses, and behavior is modeled using CPT.  They 
report violation of SEU in both gains and losses domains.  
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3.2.4 Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2015), DKW 
Based on the source method, this study measures uncertainty attitudes using matching 
probabilities, which involves eliciting a probability that would make subjects indifferent between 
choosing a risky option and an uncertain option.  The matching probabilities approach is claimed 
to directly capture uncertainty attitudes without the need to measure utility or probability 
weighting. 
In the experiment, subjects go through a series of choice tasks that are designed in a list 
format, and each task is shown separately one at a time on the computer screen.  Subjects are 
asked to choose between Choice K that could result in a gain of €15 or €0 with known 
probabilities, and Choice U that could result in a gain of €15 or €0 with unknown probabilities.  
If subjects are indifferent between the choices, then they could select Indifferent.  If the subject 
selects Choice K in the current task, then Choice K is made less attractive in the next task by 
lowering the probability of the winning prize.  If, instead, the subject selects Choice U, then 
Choice K is made more attractive in the next task by increasing the probability of the winning 
prize.  This iterative process continues until the subject selects Indifferent, when this happens a 
matching probability is found.50  Alternatively, the subject could reach the maximum number of 
six iterations without selecting Indifferent, in which case the experimenter infers the average of 
the remaining upper and lower bound.  One of the decision tasks is randomly selected for 
payment.   
                                                          
50 This iterative process for eliciting preferences, i.e., chaining “old responses” into new lotteries, may not be 
incentive compatible since any strategic misrepresentation of preferences in the current round (or any decision error 
for that matter) have consequences into the following rounds, producing a different final outcome than otherwise.  
See Harrison and Rutström (2008b) for a discussion of the Trade-Off elicitation procedure.  
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For each probability on the unit interval, the authors derive the local uncertainty attitude 
by mapping the underlying objective probability, p, to the elicited matching probability, m(p).  
The function that maps p to m(p) has two parameters that have similar interpretations as the 
pessimism and likelihood sensitivity indices in ABPW (2011).  DKW report that behavior 
display uncertainty-generated likelihood insensitivity, which is a tendency to treat subjective 
likelihood as a 50-50 probability.  This is consistent with an inverse-S weighting function 
reported in ABPW (2011).  
 
3.2.5 Mangelsdorff and Webber (1994), MW 
Mangelsdoff and Webber (1994) introduce the indifference approach to eliciting 
preferences under uncertainty.  The approach is based on asking what change that is needed in 
one lottery in order to make subjects indifferent between it and another lottery.  There are two 
different aspects of the lottery that could be changed: the money outcome, or the probability.  
The first indifference approach is demonstrated in ABPW (2011) through eliciting certainty 
equivalents; the latter is demonstrated in DKW (2016) through eliciting matching probabilities.  
MW use both of these approaches to elicit Choquet capacities.51  MW did not estimate a 
(parametric) function that maps probabilities into decision weights.  In the experiment, subjects 
are asked to choose between two lottery options: an ambiguous lottery that has two possible 
outcomes with unknown probabilities, and a risky lottery that has two possible outcomes with 
known probabilities.  Subjects are asked to specify what changes had to be made to the lotteries 
                                                          
51 Studies that use the source method treat RDU the same as CEU, thus for purpose of discussing these studies the 
two terms are used interchangeably.   
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in order for them to be indifferent between the lotteries, thus the name of the elicitation method: 
indifference approach.  The first approach to elicitation is by changing the amount to be won.  
To implement the version where the money outcome is changed, subjects are asked to specify 
what changes in the amount of winning have to be made in order for them to be indifferent 
between the lotteries.  For example, if the subjects prefer the risky lottery (over the uncertainty 
lottery), then how much does the winning amount in the risky lottery have to be reduced 
(increased) in order for them to be indifferent between the two lotteries?  The second approach to 
elicitation is by changing the probability of winning.  After each lottery comparison subjects are 
asked what changes to the probabilities have to be made in order for them to be indifferent 
between the lotteries.  For example, if the subjects prefer the risky lottery (over the uncertain 
lottery), then what changes have to be made to the probabilities in the risky lottery in order for 
them to be indifferent between the two lotteries.  Subjects are paid a flat fee for participating in 
the experiment and the money in the lotteries is not paid out, thus subjects’ choices are not 
incentivized.   
MW use a simple approach to categorize behavior based on whether the subjects select 
the option with known probabilities or the option with unknown probabilities.  MW report that in 
the group of subjects who are categorized as having non-neutral attitudes toward uncertainty, 
CEU predicts behavior better than EU when EU is assumed the “principle of insufficient 
reason”.52  For the uncertain option, the underlying objective probabilities do not vary across the 
full range of probabilities, thus no probability function could be estimated and no conclusion is 
drawn regarding the shape of the function.   
                                                          
52 EU plus the assumption of the “principle of insufficient reason” is essentially SEU that assumes subjective 
probabilities for all possible outcomes are equal.  
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3.2.6 Offerman, Sonneman, Kuilen and Wakker (2009), OSKW 
This study introduces a calibration method in which elicited probabilities (from the 
Quadratic Scoring Rule) are calibrated to correct for possible effects of risk premium (for events 
with known probabilities) or uncertainty premium (for events with unknown probabilities).  For 
choices made under unknown probabilities, the corrected probabilities may be viewed as 
nonparametric decision weights.  
Subjects are presented with statements of events that have known probabilities.  They are 
asked to choose a probability (i.e., 1%, 2%, …, 100%) that the statement is true or false.  
Depending on the probability they choose, referred to as the reported probability, the subject 
receives one score if the statement is true and another score if the statement is false; the scores 
are determined by the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR).  The reported probabilities and their 
corresponding scores are presented on a list shown on a computer screen.  After subjects select a 
reported probability, any awarded points are converted to money using an exchange rate.  OSKW 
obtain measurements for the reported probabilities over the full range of objective probabilities.  
Subjects are assigned to one of the two payment treatments: pay all tasks,53 or pay one task 
randomly.54 
The probability that is reported by the subject is confounded by their utility and 
probability weighting curvatures.  The goal is to estimate the reported probability as a function of 
                                                          
53 In the pay-all task treatment OSKW actualize the earnings for all tasks at the end of the experiment; note that the 
earnings are not actualized after each task.  
54 Many of the experiments reviewed above employ a pay-one-randomly payment protocol and model behavior 
using non-EU models such as RDU and CPT.  Theoretically this causes incentive compatibility issues.  The pay-
one-randomly (POR) protocol implicitly assumes that subjects view each outcome in each binary choice 
independently of each other, such that their behavior is in accordance with the Compound Independence Axiom 
(CIA).  This payment protocol is incentive compatible under EUT (see Harrison and Swarthout (2014) and Cox, 
Sadiraj and Schmidt (2015)).  However, it is incompatible with non-EUT models that are not based on the CIA, 
including RDU and CPT.   
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utility and probability weighting, so that this function can serve as a correction function to 
correct the reported probability for curvatures of the utility and probability weighting.  Based on 
the choices subjects make,  OSKW calibrate the parameters of the utility and probability 
weighting functions assuming power utility and Prelec probability weighting.  Estimation is 
performed using maximum likelihood.   
The results show that correcting for utility curvature significantly increases the likelihood 
compared to the model without correction, and correcting for probability weighting curvature 
also significantly increases the likelihood compared to the model without correction, though less 
so than correcting for utility curvature does.  Next, the reported probability can be compared to 
the corrected probability, and the difference between the two can be interpreted as a risk 
premium.   
This correction method can be extended to events with unknown probabilities, and the 
difference between the reported and the corrected probabilities can be interpreted as uncertainty 
premium.  While OSKW refer to the corrected probability as reflecting “beliefs,” referring to 
them as nonparametric decision weights would also be valid.55  
 
3.3 Experimental Design 
The experiment reported here uses real money incentives.  Each subject is presented with 
four lotteries that have known probabilities, hereafter pure risk lotteries (Figure C1), and two 
                                                          
55 OSKW implement a separate task that uses similar events but with unknown probabilities, and they use the data 
from that task to test if the corrected probabilities (which they refer to as “subjective beliefs”) are additive.  OSKW 
report that the correction method reduces the violations of additivity in subjective beliefs.  For this task with 
unknown probabilities there was no variation over the full range of objective probabilities and OSKW did not 
estimate the uncertainty premium.   
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lotteries that have unknown probabilities, hereafter uncertainty lotteries.  The two uncertainty 
lotteries are presented in varying degrees of uncertainty: the uncertainty lottery that is less 
uncertain is referred to as the scrambled lottery (Figures C2.1 and C2.2), and the uncertainty 
lottery that is the most uncertain is referred to as the blackened lottery (Figures C3.1 and C3.2).  
Thus three types of lottery tasks are administered: pure risk, scrambled, and blackened.  This 
section describes the design of each lottery task followed by the recruitment and experimental 
procedures.   
 
3.3.1 Binary Lottery Tasks 
In each lottery task subjects choose between a relatively safe option and a relatively risky 
option.  Each option has two possible prizes.  The set of prizes and probabilities used for the pure 
risk lotteries is listed in Table C1.  Each subject completes four pure risk lottery tasks.  In each 
task, the probability of obtaining the higher prize is the same in each option, thus the only 
difference between the two options are the prizes.  The set of prizes and probabilities used for the 
uncertainty lotteries is listed in Table C2.  Each subject completes one scrambled lottery task and 
one blackened lottery task.  The set of possible parameter values is the same for both types of 
uncertainty lotteries, but a subject may be assigned a scrambled lottery that has different 
underlying probabilities than the blackened lottery.  
The lotteries are presented using pie chart images.  Each pie has two colors (dark blue 
and light blue) and each color represents a prize.  The proportion of the pie that is dark blue 
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represents the probability of getting the high prize, and the proportion that is light blue represents 
the probability of getting the low prize.56  
In the pure risk lottery task subjects know the probabilities of the outcomes.  Figure C1 
shows a screenshot of the practice round before starting the round for real payment.  In the pie 
chart the colors that represent the probabilities are divided into two distinct sections, making it 
easy to see the proportions.  In addition the subjects are explicitly told which numbers on a ten-
sided die correspond to which prize.  It is safe to assume that there is no uncertainty, only risk, in 
this task.   
In the scrambled lottery task (Figures C2.1 and C2.2), subjects are not told the 
probabilities, and the colors that represent the probabilities are divided into small segments that 
scrambled across the pie, thus making it difficult to see the proportion that each color occupies.  
This likely generates some degree of uncertainty on the probabilities.57   
The most uncertain task is likely the blackened lottery task (Figures C3.1 and C3.2).  It 
builds on the scrambled lottery and adds an additional layer of uncertainty by hiding parts of the 
pie with a black field so that subjects are not able to see the colors.  For both the scrambled and 
the blackened lotteries there is a time limit (of 15 seconds) on how long subjects can view the pie 
chart images.  
 
                                                          
56 In the black-and-white version of this text, the dark blue appears as dark gray and the light blue appears as light 
gray.  
57 We acknowledge that the uncertainty surrounding how the colors are scrambled across the pie chart images may 
be perceived as an additional risk by the subjects.  In other words, the uncertainty lotteries could be perceived as 
having a compound risk.  In that case the analysis may be viewed as examining the difference in behavior under one 
compound risk (the scrambled lottery) vs. another compound risk (the blackened lottery). 
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3.3.2 Recruitment and Experimental Procedure 
The experimental tasks analyzed here are part of a larger experiment described in 
Rutström et al. (2011).  The subjects who are described here are selected from United States 
Postal Service (USPS) mailing lists and are recruited by invitation letters.  The invitation letters 
direct them to a web page where they are instructed to create an anonymous Gmail account to 
use exclusively for the experiment to ensure strict privacy.  Admission to participate in the 
experiment is contingent on being at least 18 years of age, holding a valid driver’s license, and 
using a vehicle with a valid vehicle insurance.   
The larger experiment consists of four meetings separated by approximately two weeks 
each.  Subjects participate in an experiment that takes place over four sessions with many other 
tasks than those analyzed here.  They complete two pure risk tasks in session 1, another two in 
session 2, and one scrambled and one blackened task in session 3.  Subjects are paid for all tasks, 
and earnings are actualized immediately following each task, so to avoid issues that arise with 
the random payment protocols.58  Earnings in each task, along with cumulative earnings, are 
tracked in a clear and transparent manner.  The subjects are commuters from the Atlanta and 
                                                          
58 As mentioned previously, the pay-one-randomly (POR) protocol implicitly assumes that subjects view each 
outcome in each binary choice independently of each other, such that their behavior is in accordance with the 
Compound Independence Axiom (CIA).  This payment protocol is incentive compatible under EUT (see Harrison 
and Swarthout (2014) and Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt (2015)).  However, it is incompatible with non-EUT models 
that are not based on the CIA, including Rank Dependent Utility (RDU).  
This essay models choices over risky lotteries using RDU, which necessitates the use of a payment protocol that is 
incentive compatible with RDU.  The Pay-All-Sequentially (PAS) protocol does not rely on the CIA and is thus 
incentive compatible with RDU.  However, PAS is not problem-free since it may induce a cumulative wealth effect.  
Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt (2015) report that the PAS protocol did not induce a significant wealth effect; the same 
result is reported in Cox and Epstein (1989) and Cox and Grether (1996) who also use the PAS protocol.  In 
contrast, Dixit, Harb, Martinez and Rutström (2015), who use the PAS protocol in a driving simulator task with 
exogenous delay probabilities, report that cumulative wealth significantly reduces risk aversion (p-value <1%).  
Here the cumulative wealth effect is assumed to be negligible on the probability weighting estimates.  
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Orlando metropolitan areas, and a total of 270 subjects are included for the purpose of this 
analysis. 
 
3.4 Theory 
We assume that all uncertainty preferences are captured by probability weighting, and the 
perceptions of the likelihoods are measured using two indices: the index of pessimism and the 
index of likelihood insensitivity.  Each of the three types of lotteries are presumed to constitute a 
different source of uncertainty, and we assume that utility is constant across uncertainty sources.  
The latter assumption is supported by the findings of ABPW (2011) and Abdellaoui, L’Haridon 
and Paraschiv (2009); both studies report no difference in utility estimates when measuring 
utilities for risk and uncertainty tasks.59 60  Risk attitudes are controlled through curvature of the 
utility function and the estimation is performed assuming RDU.61     
This essay examines decision weights using three probability weighting specifications: a 
two-parameter Prelec function (Prelec (1998)), a one-parameter Tversky-Kahneman function 
(Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), and a one-parameter Power function.  The first two can 
measure both of the desired indices, but the last can only measure pessimism, not likelihood 
                                                          
59 Despite the findings of ABPW (2011) and Abdellaoui, L’Haridon and Paraschiv (2009), we acknowledge the 
limitations of this assumption.  The assumption that utility curvature is constant across sources implicitly assumes 
that utility curvature may be constant across risk domains, which may not be consistent with empirical findings.   
60 As a response to ABPW (2011)’s findings, Harrison (2011) undertake a maximum likelihood evaluation of 
ABPW’s data and report no evidence of source dependence in either the utility function or the power weighting 
function. 
61 Using the source method, ABPW (2011) estimate a probability weighting function under the name RDU, whereas 
KSW (2014) perform the same estimation but under the name CEU.  In contrast to KSW (2014), Hey and Pace 
(2014) and Conte and Hey (2013) use a different approach to estimate CEU (i.e., they estimate CEU capacities non-
parametrically and do not assume a probability weighting function).  Since CEU has been estimated under different 
approaches, to avoid confusion the name RDU is used here.  
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insensitivity.  It is included here only because it is a popular function in the literature on choice 
under risk.   
 
3.4.1 Prelec Weighting  
 The Prelec weighting function (Prelec (1998)) has parameters 𝜂 and 𝜑:  
            𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜂(−𝑙𝑛𝑝)𝜑)                                                                       (1) 
where 𝑝 is the objective probability of the event, and 𝜂 and 𝜑 are the parameters that weigh the 
probability.  This function is defined for 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1, 𝜂 > 0 and 𝜑 > 0.62 63  In Appendix D, Figures 
BB1.1 – BB1.5 provide examples of how an agent with a Prelec weighting function weighs the 
probabilities under different values of 𝜂 and 𝜑.  These two parameters represent the two indices 
of uncertainty: pessimism and likelihood insensitivity.  The index of pessimism is captured by 𝜂 
which controls the concavity or convexity of the function.  The difference in pessimism across 
the lotteries reflects uncertainty aversion under the maintained assumption of ABPW.  The index 
of likelihood insensitivity is captured by 𝜑 which give an S-shaped or inverse-S shaped to the 
function.  The inverse-S shaped in probability weighting suggests a tendency to overweigh low 
probabilities and underweigh high probabilities (i.e., in the direction of 50-50) and a lack of 
                                                          
62 Holding η =1 and letting ϕ vary, the function takes on an S-shaped or inverse-S shaped.  Holding ϕ =1 and letting 
η vary, the function takes on a convex or concave shape.   
63 In our estimation ϕ is constrained to be nonnegative, but not to the unit interval.  Constraining ϕ to the unit 
interval implies that subjects exhibit an inverse-S weighting function, which would be contrary to many received 
evidence that shows otherwise.  In particular, Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2015) report that constraining 
ϕ to the unit interval incorrectly leads to evidence of no probability weighting for their average subjects.  Thus, we 
do not impose such assumption and let the data speak for itself.   
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sensitivity to variation in the objective probabilities.  If 𝜂 and 𝜑 are both equal to one in the pure 
risk lottery the subject is an EU maximizer.   
Four hypotheses are tested with respect to the Prelec function:  
Hypothesis I – For both uncertainty lotteries, the index of pessimism, 𝜂, differs significantly 
from 1, controlling for utility curvature.            
   𝜂𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1; 𝜂𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1                                                                                                             
Hypothesis II – For both uncertainty lotteries, the index of likelihood insensitivity, 𝜑, differs 
significantly from 1, controlling for utility curvature.        
𝜑𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1; 𝜑𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1 
Hypothesis III – As the level of uncertainty increases, going from the pure risky lottery to the 
uncertainty lotteries, the index of pessimism decreases.  This suggests that pessimism for the 
uncertainty lotteries exceeds that for the pure risk lottery, such that the weighting functions for 
the uncertainty lotteries are more convex than the one for the pure risk lottery.                                                                                                                                    
𝜂𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 𝜂𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑;  𝜂𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 𝜂𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 
Hypothesis IV – As the level of uncertainty increases going from the pure risky lottery to the 
uncertainty lotteries, the index of likelihood insensitivity decreases.  This suggests that subjects 
are increasingly more likelihood insensitive: the weighting functions for the uncertainty lotteries 
are “flatter” than the one for the pure risk lottery.          
𝜑𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 𝜑𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑;  𝜑𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 𝜑𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 
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3.4.2 Tversky – Kahneman Weighting  
The TK weighting function (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) has only one parameter, γ: 
            𝑤(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛾
[𝑝𝛾+(1−𝑝)𝛾]
1
𝛾
                   (2) 
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.  This function exhibits inverse-S probability weighting (i.e., optimism for small 
p, and pessimism for large p) for 0 < γ < 1, and S-shaped probability weighting (i.e., pessimism 
for small p, and optimism for large p) for 1 < γ < 2.  A review by Gonzalez and Wu (1999) 
indicates that the commonly reported weighting function is an inverse-S function; in contrast, 
Wilcox (2015) reports that a concave weighting function (i.e., optimism for the best outcome) is 
the most prevalent weighting function in his subjects.  
Within the range 0 < γ < 1, as γ moves closer to 1 the crossover point where w(p) = p 
moves toward p = 0.5 such that the concave and convex regions are about equal; as γ moves 
closer to 0 the crossover point moves toward p = 0 such that the convex region becomes larger 
than the concave region.  See Figures BB2.5 – BB2.7 for comparisons.  Within the range 1 < γ < 
2, as γ moves closer to 1 the crossover point moves toward p = 0.5 such that the concave and 
convex regions are about equal; as γ moves closer to 2 the crossover point moves toward p = 1 
such that the convex region is larger than the concave region.  See Figures BB2.2 – BB2.4 for 
comparisons.  At γ > 2, the function is everywhere convex, and as γ increases the convexity 
increases.  This function is undefined at γ = 0 and non-monotonic for really small γ.  For more 
examples of how an agent would weigh the probabilities under different values of γ, see Figures 
BB2.1 – BB2.8 in the Appendix. 
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The TK specification does not allow independent specification of location and curvature, 
therefore it is less flexible than the two-parameter Prelec.  For γ = 1 in the pure risk lottery the 
subject is an EU maximizer.  Comparing γ between the pure risk and uncertainty lotteries reveals 
possible uncertainty aversion.   
Two hypotheses are tested with respect to the TK function:  
Hypothesis I – For both uncertainty lotteries, 𝛾 differs significantly from 1, controlling for utility 
curvature.                    
𝛾𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1; 𝛾𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1 
Hypothesis II – Subjects display uncertainty aversion for the uncertainty lotteries relative to the 
pure risk lotteries.                     
𝛾𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 𝛾𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑;  𝛾𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 𝛾𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 
 
3.4.3 Power Weighting  
The Power weighting function has parameter γ: 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝𝛾                       (3)      
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.  For γ >1 this function is everywhere convex and subjects underweigh the 
probabilities; for γ < 1 the function is everywhere concave and subjects overweigh the 
probabilities.64  For γ = 1 in the pure risk lottery, the subject is an EU maximizer.  In Appendix D 
                                                          
64 In the Power weighting function γ = 0 raises issues because it would imply that the agent places a probability of 1 
for an event regardless of its objective probability.  We do not encounter this issue in the estimation, though one 
could still constrain γ > 0.  
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Figures BB3.1 – BB3.3 provide examples of what the weighting function would look like under 
different values of γ and its implied decision weights.  
The Power function has the least flexible functional form compared to the Prelec or TK 
function, given that the former can only accommodate the index of pessimism, not likelihood 
insensitivity.  Comparing γ between the pure risk and uncertainty lotteries reveals possible 
uncertainty aversion that is due to difference in pessimism.   
  
Two hypotheses are tested with respect to the Power function:  
Hypothesis I – For the uncertainty lotteries, 𝛾 differs significantly from 1, controlling for utility 
curvature.      
𝛾𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1; 𝛾𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑  ≠ 1 
Hypothesis II – Pessimism for the uncertainty lottery exceeds that for the pure risk lotteries, such 
that the weighting function for the uncertainty lotteries is more convex than the one for the pure 
risk lottery.         
𝛾𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 < 𝛾𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑; 𝛾𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 < 𝛾𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑             
 
3.5 Empirical Analysis 
The weighting functions are jointly estimated with risk attitudes assuming RDU with 
CRRA utility functions.  This joint estimation approach builds on previous work on structural 
estimation of risk attitudes by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008), Harrison and 
Rutström (2008b) and Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström (2014).   
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3.5.1 Estimation Approach  
Data are pooled across the three types of lotteries.  The main assumption is: different 
sources of uncertainty generate different source functions but not different utility functions.  
Therefore, we estimate a common CRRA utility function but allow the weighting parameters to 
vary with type of lotteries.  The reference lottery is the pure risk lottery, and the covariates are 
the scrambled and blackened lotteries.  The econometric approach is illustrated using the Prelec 
weighting function shown in (1).  This approach can be easily extended to the TK and Power 
weighting functions.   
Recall the Prelec weighting function in (1):  
 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜂(−𝑙𝑛𝑝)𝜑)    
where 𝑤(. ) is the function that transforms p into decision weight, 𝑤(𝑝), and                                                    
𝑤(. ) weighs the best option and (1 −  𝑤(. )) weighs the worst option. 
The parameters, 𝜂 and 𝜑, are allowed to vary with the exogenous treatments for type of 
lotteries.  With the pure risk lottery as the reference, both 𝜂 and 𝜑 are estimated conditional on 
dummy covariates Scrambled and Blackened:  
𝜂 = 𝜂𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 +  𝜂𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑  × 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑 +  𝜂𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 × 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑         (4) 
𝜑 = 𝜑𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝜑𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑  × 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝜑𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑 × 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑑         (5) 
with 𝜂 and 𝜑 each constrained to be non-negative.  
In the full structural model, the evaluation of the risky option is:   
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  𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜂(−𝑙𝑛𝑝)
𝜑) ∗ (
𝑥𝐻
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 –  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜂(−𝑙𝑛𝑝)𝜑))  ∗ (
𝑥𝐿
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) (6) 
where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, xH is the high prize, xL is the low prize, and  
p is the objective probability of the high prize, xH.  Similarly, the evaluation for the safe option 
is:  
    𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜂(−𝑙𝑛𝑝)
𝜑) ∗ (
𝑥𝐻
𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
) +  (1 –  𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜂(−𝑙𝑛𝑝)𝜑))  ∗ (
𝑥𝐿
𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒(1−𝑟)
(1−𝑟)
)  (7) 
The latent preferences for evaluating each option, or the RDU for each lottery pair, is 
calculated for the candidate estimates of  𝑟, 𝜂 and 𝜑.  Following (6) and (7), the index  
 ∆𝑅𝐷𝑈 = 𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 − 𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒                            (8)   
is the difference in valuation between the risky option and the safe option.  The index is then linked 
to observed choices by using a “logit” likelihood function that is denoted as Λ(∆𝐸):   
 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = Λ(∆𝑅𝐷𝑈)             (7) 
The risky option is assumed to be chosen when Λ(∆𝑅𝐷𝑈) > ½.   
 Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the RDU specification, 
CRRA utility function and the Prelec probability weighting function specifications being true, 
depends on the estimated parameters 𝑟, 𝜂 and 𝜑 given the above stochastic specification and the 
observed choices, y.  The log-likelihood is then  
        ln 𝐿 ( 𝑟, 𝜂, 𝜑; 𝑦) = Σ[ lnΛ(∇𝑅𝐷𝑈) × 𝐈(𝑦 = 1) + ln(1 − Λ(𝛻𝑅𝐷𝑈)) ×  𝐈(𝑦 = 0)]       (9) 
where 𝐈(∙) is the indicator function and y = l (0) denotes the choice of the risky (safe) option. 
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 An important extension of the core model is to apply contextual utility, due to Wilcox 
(2011), and to allow for subjects to make some behavioral errors.  The latent index in (8) then 
becomes:  
 ∆𝑅𝐷𝑈 = [(𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 −  𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒) /ν] /𝜇                                               (8-) 
where ν is a normalizing term defined as the difference between the maximum and the minimum 
utility in each lottery pair.  The parameter 𝜇 > 0 is a structural Fechner “noise parameter” used 
to allow some error when evaluating the difference in RDU between the two options.  A 
common Fechner error is assumed for the three types of lotteries.  
 We extend the likelihood specification to include the noise parameter, 𝜇, and maximize 
ln 𝐿 (𝑟, 𝜂, 𝜑, 𝜇 ; 𝑦) by estimating r, 𝜂, 𝜑 and 𝜇, given observations on y.  The estimation is 
performed using maximum likelihood.  
 
3.5.2 Descriptive Statistics  
The characteristics of the subject pool are described in Table C3.  Each gender is about 
evenly represented in the overall sample.  Income is divided into two groups: 40% have 
household income above $100,000 and the rest have household income of $100,000 or below.  
Age is divided into two groups: 56% are between the ages of 18 and 40 and the rest between the 
ages of 41 and 75.  A majority hold a college education (80%).   
The underlying objective probabilities (i.e., 0.1, …, 0.9) are randomly assigned to 
subjects.  If subjects are evenly distributed across the 9 objective probabilities, then the 
proportion of subjects in each probability should make up around 11% of the sample size.  This 
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is true for the pure risk lottery tasks where each subject completes four tasks; Table C4 shows 
that the proportion of subjects in each objective probability is about 11%.  This is also true for 
many of the probabilities in the uncertainty lottery tasks.  However, since each subject only 
completes one scrambled and one blackened lottery task, the sample set there is smaller, and 
thus, it is harder to achieve an even representation of subjects for all probability assignments.  A 
few of the probability assignments have proportions that are as low as 6% or as high as 19% of 
the sample size (relative to the ideal 11%).  
  The proportion of safe choices made by subjects is illustrated in Figure C4.1; the solid, 
dash and dotted curves represent the pure risk, scrambled and blackened lotteries, respectively.  
For the pure risk lotteries, as the probability of getting the high prize increases, the proportion of 
safe choices decreases, as shown by the downward-sloping solid curve.  This behavior is 
expected since subjects know the probabilities of all possible outcomes.  In contrast, the curves 
for the uncertainty lotteries are flatter, which suggests that behavior is similar across the range of 
underlying probabilities.  The same general pattern is observed across demographic sub-samples.  
Thus, there is preliminary evidence that in the uncertainty lotteries subjects tend to overweigh 
low likelihood events and underweigh high likelihood events, displaying likelihood insensitivity.   
 Comparing across the three curves, in the low probabilities the pure risk curve is below 
the uncertainty curves, whereas in the high probabilities the pure risk curve is above the 
uncertainty curves.  To examine if the three curves are significantly different from one another, a 
proportions test is performed to examine if the proportions of safe choices are significantly 
different across the three types of lotteries.65  When comparing between the uncertainty lotteries,  
                                                          
65 The proportions test, by the Stata command prtesti, tests whether the same proportion from two classes are 
significantly different.  
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behavior is not significantly different.  When comparing between the uncertainty and the pure 
risk lotteries, behavior is significantly different.  This is shown in Figure C4.2, where the “black 
dot” denotes if a given uncertainty lottery has proportion of safe choices that is significantly 
different from the pure risk lotteries.  Overall there is preliminary evidence showing that subjects 
behave differently in scenarios with known vs. unknown risk.   
 
3.5.3 Results of Structural Estimation 
Recall the assumption from ABPW that different sources of uncertainty generate 
different source functions but not different utility functions, hence the structural estimation pools 
across the three types of lotteries to estimate one common CRRA utility function.  The weighting 
parameters are estimated conditional on the type of lotteries.  The reference lottery is the pure 
risk lottery and the covariates are the scrambled and blackened lotteries.  The dummy variable 
Scrambled takes the value of 1 for the scrambled lottery, and the dummy Blackened takes the 
value of 1 for the blackened lottery.  The results are presented in Table C5 for each probability 
weighting specification.  
 
A. Constant Relative Risk Aversion  
The estimated CRRA coefficients are significantly different from zero; they are 0.508 (p-
value < 0.001), 0.205 (p-value = 0.034), and 0.636 (p-value = 0.008), respectively for the three 
probability weighting specifications.  Being in the range of 0 – 1, they are consistent with the 
experimental literature reviewed by Harrison and Rutström (2008b).   
  
143 
 
B. RDU - Prelec Probability Weighting  
Results from the Prelec specification are shown in column (b) in Table C5.  In the pure 
risk lottery 𝜂 nor 𝜑 differ significantly from 1; EU is therefore not rejected in the pure risk 
lottery.  Hypotheses I states that the index of pessimism, 𝜂, should differ significantly from 1 for 
both uncertainty lotteries; however, a χ 2 test shows that 𝜂 differs significantly from 1 for the 
blackened lottery (p-value = 0.036) but not for the scrambled lottery (p-value = 0.727), thus 
lacking full support for Hypothesis I.   
Hypothesis II states that the index of likelihood insensitivity, 𝜑, should differ 
significantly from 1 for both uncertainty lotteries.  This is confirmed by a χ 2 test with a p-value 
<0.001 for both uncertainty lotteries, thus providing support for Hypothesis II.   
According to assumptions of the source method, the three types of lotteries each 
constitute a different source of uncertainty.  One should then expect behavior under the 
uncertainty lotteries to differ from the pure risk lotteries, and the index of pessimism and the 
index of likelihood insensitivity should capture this behavioral difference, as is suggested in 
Hypotheses III and IV.  
As uncertainty increases, going from pure risk to scrambled to blackened lotteries, the 
estimate of 𝜂 decreases (see Table C6), showing more pessimism.  Comparing each of the 
estimates for the uncertainty lotteries to the estimates for the pure risk lotteries, pessimism is 
significantly higher for the former compared to the latter, by 0.457 (p-value = 0.020) and 0.227 
(p-value = 0.228), respectively.  Furthermore, comparing the uncertainty lotteries, pessimism is 
higher for the blackened lottery than the scrambled lottery (p-value = 0.071), showing that for 
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events with unknown probabilities that vary in the degrees of uncertainty subjects display 
different degrees of pessimism.   
As for the index of likelihood insensitivity, likelihood insensitivity is significantly higher 
when comparing each of the uncertainty lottery to the pure risk lottery, by 1.418 (p-value < 
0.001) and 1.297 (p-value = 0.001), respectively.  However, when comparing the uncertainty 
lotteries, there is no significant difference in likelihood insensitivity (p-value = 0.322).  This 
shows that for events with unknown probabilities that vary in the degrees of uncertainty subjects 
display a similar degree of likelihood insensitivity.  
For each of the three types of lotteries a graph of the weighting function is constructed 
based on its estimates of 𝜂 and 𝜑; see Figures C5.1, C5.2 and C5.3 for the three respective 
lotteries.  The graphs are constructed based on a lottery with two outcomes.  The left panel 
shows how the subjects weigh the probability of the best outcome given a range of objective 
probabilities; the right panel shows a specific example where the probabilities of the worst and 
best outcomes are equal (p = ½) and their respective decision weights.  A pattern emerges going 
from the pure risk to the scrambled to the blackened lotteries: the weighting function becomes 
increasingly flatter, showing that subjects display increasing tendency to place equal weights for 
all underlying probabilities.66 
Results from the Prelec specification are consistent with results from the descriptive 
analysis.  Subjects display increasing pessimism and likelihood insensitivity going from events 
                                                          
66 Comparing the uncertainty lotteries, the blackened lottery has a crossover point (i.e., w(p) = p) at 0.5 and the 
scrambled lottery has a crossover point at below 0.5 (see Figures C5.2 and C5.3).  The weighting function for the 
blackened lottery has roughly the same area for pessimism and optimism, whereas for the scrambled lottery there is 
disproportionately a bigger area for pessimism than optimism.  Note that this difference in crossover points is 
consistent with the difference in estimates for the index of pessimism, 𝜂.                                                                                                       
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with known probabilities to events with unknown probabilities.  This result is consistent with past 
studies that examine uncertainty aversion with or without using the source method (ABPW 
(2011), DKW (2015), Hey and Pace (2014), Attanasi, Gollier, Montesano and Pace (2014)).  
Furthermore, when comparing behavior under events with unknown probabilities that 
vary in the degree of uncertainty, results from the Prelec specification suggest that this 
behavioral difference is attributed to difference in pessimism, not likelihood insensitivity.   
 
C. RDU – Tversky – Kahneman Probability Weighting  
Results from the TK specification are shown in column (c) in Table C5.  The estimated γ 
for the pure risk lottery is 1.846 and is significantly different from 1 (p-value < 0.001), thus EU 
is rejected.   Figure C6.1 shows that in the pure risk lottery subjects significantly underweigh the 
low probabilities (i.e., w(p) < p), but not the high probabilities, where w(p) = p.  This is in 
contrast to the results from the Prelec specification where the decisions weights are not 
significantly different from the underlying objective probabilities over the full range of 
probaiblities.  
For the uncertainty lotteries the γ estimates are 0.672 (p-value < 0.001) and 0.683 (p-
value < 0.001), respectively, and they are significantly different from 1, which lend support to 
Hypothesis I.  Comparing each of the estimates for the uncertainty lotteries to the estimate for 
the pure risk lottery, γ in the former is significantly lower than the latter, by 1.174 (p-value < 
0.001) and 1.163 (p-value < 0.001), respectively.  This suggests that subjects behave differently 
under events with known vs. unknown probabilities.  Furthermore, this behavioral difference is 
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in the direction of likelihood insensitivity: Figures C6.2 and C6.3 show that behavior displays 
likelihood insensitivity for the uncertainty lotteries, providing support for Hypothesis II.  
However, when comparing the two uncertainties lotteries there is no significant 
difference (p-value = 0.592).  This is in contrast to the results from the Prelec specification, 
which show that the blackened lottery displays significantly more pessimism than the scrambled 
lottery.  These results suggest that when comparing behavior under events that have unknown 
probabilities, the flexible Prelec specification is better at capturing the behavioral difference due 
to varying degrees of uncertainty.  
 
D. RDU - Power Probability Weighting  
 The Power weighting function is the least flexible specification compared to the Prelec or 
TK specification, and can only accommodate the index of pessimism.  Perhaps due to its 
inability to accommodate data that is of an inverse-S or S shape, when the data of the blackened 
lottery is included the estimation experiences numerical problems.  Thus we undertake the 
estimation without the blackened lottery data, and the results that are shown in column (d) of 
Table C5 are only based on the data from the pure risk and scrambled lotteries.  Here the 
hypothesis testing is performed only for the pure risk and scrambled lotteries.   
 For the pure risk lottery γ is not significantly different from 1 with coefficient 0.811 (p-
value = 0.484); Figure C7.1 shows the weighting function for the pure risk lottery.  EU is 
therefore not rejected for the pure risk lottery.  For the scrambled lottery γ is significantly 
different from 1 with coefficient 0.789 (p-value = 0.088), which provides support for Hypothesis 
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I.  However, subjects display optimism for the best outcome (as is shown in Figure C7.2), instead 
of pessimism that the index of pessimism would predict for behavior under uncertainty.  
Comparing the scrambled lottery to the pure risk lottery, the γ estimates are not 
significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.891): 0.811 vs. 0.789 (see Figure C7.1 vs. 
C7.2), hence lending no support for Hypothesis II.  This is in contrast to the results from the 
Prelec and TK specifications, where both specifications detect a behavioral difference between 
events with known vs. unknown probabilities.  Overall, results from using the Power 
specification do not display behavior that is consistent with results from the Prelec and TK 
specifications, or from past studies at large.  
 In summary, for both the Prelec and TK specifications, the results suggest that subjects 
behave differently under events with known vs. unknown probabilities.  Relative to events whose 
probabilities are known, subjects behave in the direction of likelihood insensitivity when 
probabilities are not known, such that they overweigh low probabilities and underweigh high 
probabilities.  One should note that likelihood insensitivity, by itself, may be solely a reflection 
of diffuse perceptions and may not reflect any preferences toward uncertainty at all.  In the 
source method, it is the difference in insensitivities between two source functions that is 
considered a characteristic property of uncertainty preferences.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The goal of this essay is to examine uncertainty aversion between events that have the 
same underlying objective probability but are presented differently under varying degrees of 
uncertainty.  Using a within-subject design subjects are asked to complete three lottery tasks that 
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are ranked in order of increasing uncertainty.  Two presentations of uncertainty are used, one 
presumably more uncertain for the decision maker than the other.  
Based on the choices subjects make, a source function is estimated for each lottery task 
using three different specifications of the source function.  The source functions are compared 
using two uncertainty indices: pessimism and likelihood insensitivity.  Overall, the results are 
consistent with past studies that do not use the source method, in showing that behavior differs 
under events with known vs. unknown probabilities.  We report that the source function for 
events with known probabilities differ significantly from the source function for events with 
unknown probabilities.  In particular, when probabilities are not known subjects behave in the 
direction of likelihood insensitivity, such that they overweigh low probabilities and underweigh 
high probabilities. 
However, when comparing the difference in behavior between events that both have 
unknown probabilities but vary in the degree of uncertainty, the behavioral difference is better 
captured by the Prelec specification than the TK or Power specification.  Results from the Prelec 
specification suggest that as the degree of uncertainty increases, subjects display increased 
pessimism, whereas the TK and the Power specifications show no such difference.  Thus, the 
conclusion regarding uncertainty aversion are contingent on which specification is assumed for 
the source function. 
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 
Table C1: Prizes and Probabilities for Pure Risk Lottery 
Probability 
range 
Safe Lottery 
Low Prize 
Safe Lottery 
High Prize 
Risky Lottery 
Low Prize 
Risky Lottery 
High Prize 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $4 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $5 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $6 
0.1 – 0.9 $4 $6 $0.50 $10 
 
 
Table C2: Prizes and Probabilities for the Uncertainty Lotteries 
Probability 
range 
Safe Lottery 
Low Prize 
Safe Lottery 
High Prize 
Risky Lottery 
Low Prize 
Risky Lottery 
High Prize 
0.1 – 0.9 $2 $3 $0.25 $5 
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Table C3: Demographic Subsample by Lottery Type 
N = 270 Pure Risk Scrambled Blackened 
Pool all 
lotteries 
  
Female  47% 46% 46% 47% 
Male 53% 54% 54% 53% 
 
College  80% 80% 80% 80% 
Non-college 20% 20% 20% 20% 
 
Income >  $100K 40% 41% 40% 40% 
Income ≤ $100K 60% 60% 60% 60% 
 
Ages 18-40 55% 56% 56% 56% 
Ages 41-75 45% 44% 44% 44% 
 
Each subject completes 6 lottery tasks: 4 pure risk, 1 scrambled and 1 blackened.  
 
 
 
Table C4: Proportion of Subjects Assigned to Each Objective Probability 
Objective 
probability 
of the 
higher prize 
p = 0.1 p = 0.2 p = 0.3 p = 0.4 p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9 
Pure Risk 
Lottery 
11% 13% 12% 12% 11% 11% 10% 11% 12% 
Scrambled  
Lottery 
12% 17% 10% 13% 8% 7% 9% 9% 15% 
Blackened 
Lottery 
13% 13% 12% 6% 7% 8% 8% 14% 19% 
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Table C5: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility Probability Weighting 
 
Column (a) Column (b) Column (c) Column (d) 
 RDU Prelec RDU TK RDU Power 
r 
.508*** 
(<0.001) 
.205** 
(0.034) 
.636*** 
(0.008) 
                γ  
_cons ---  
1.846***  
(<0.001) 
.811*** 
(0.003) 
Scrambled --- 
-1.174*** 
(<0.001) 
-.021 
(0.891) 
Blackened --- 
-1.163*** 
(<0.001) 
--- 
                 𝜼 
_cons 
1.171***  
(<0.001) 
---  ---  
Scrambled 
-.227  
(0.228) 
--- --- 
Blackened 
-.457** 
(0.020) 
--- --- 
                  𝝋 
_cons 
1.585*** 
(<0.001) 
---  ---  
Scrambled 
-1.297*** 
(0.002) 
--- --- 
Blackened 
-1.418*** 
(0.001) 
--- --- 
 
                μ 
.180*** 
(<0.001) 
.208*** 
(<0.001) 
.136** 
(0.041) 
 
Pure Risk Lottery is the reference lottery; Scrambled = 1 for the scrambled lottery; Blackened =1 for 
the blackened lottery.  
 
Perhaps due to the Power function’s inability to accommodate data that is of an inverse-S shaped, when 
the data of the blackened lottery is included the estimation experiences numerical issues.  Thus we 
perform the estimation without the blackened lottery data, and the results that are shown in column (d) 
of Table 5 is based on only the data from the pure risk and scrambled lotteries. 
 
The coefficients are marginal effects, computed using the delta method that takes a nonlinear 
transformation of an estimated parameter about its mean and its variance based on a Taylor 
approximation.   The p-values are in parentheses.  
*** means that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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Table C6: Rank Dependent Utility Weighting Parameters in Total Effects 
 Pure Risk  Scrambled  Blackened  
Prelec  
 𝜼  
1.171 
(0.978) 
0.943 
(0.727) 
0.713** 
(0.036) 
 𝝋 
1.585 
(0.346) 
0.288* 
(<0.001) 
0.167*** 
(<0.001) 
TK 
γ 
1.846*** 
(<0.001) 
0.672*** 
(<0.001) 
0.683*** 
(<0.001) 
Power  
γ 
0.811 
(0.484) 
0.79* 
(0.088) 
-- 
 
The values are in total effects. 
 
*** means that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significantly different from 1 at the 10% level. 
The p-values are in parentheses.  
 
Perhaps due to the Power function’s inability to accommodate data that is of an inverse-S shaped, when 
the data of the blackened lottery is included the estimation experiences numerical issues.  Thus we 
perform the estimation without the blackened lottery data, and the results that are shown in column (d) 
of Table 5 is based on only the data from the pure risk and scrambled lotteries. 
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Figure C1: Screen Shot For Pure Risk Lottery Practice Task 
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Figure C2.1: Screen Shot For Scrambled Lottery, p = 0.1 
 
In the above figure, the objective probability of the higher prize (in dark blue) is 0.1. 
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Figure C2.2: Screen Shot For Scrambled Lottery, p = 0.7 
 
In the above figure, the objective probability of the higher prize (in dark blue) is 0.7. 
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Figure C3.1: Screen Shot For Blackened Lottery Practice Task 
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Figure C3.2: Screen Shot For Blackened Lottery Practice Task 
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Figure C4.1: Proportion of Safe Choices 
 
Figure C4.2: Difference in the Proportion of Safe Choices 
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Figure C5.1: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting for Pure Risk Lottery 
 
 
Figure C5.2: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting for Scrambled Lottery 
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Figure C5.3: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting for Blackened Lottery 
 
Figure C6.1: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting for Pure Risk Lottery 
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Figure C6.2: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting for Scrambled Lottery 
 
Figure C6.3: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting for Blackened Lottery 
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Figure C7.1: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility Power Weighting for Pure Risk Lottery 
 
Figure C7.2: Estimate Rank Dependent Utility Power Weighting for Scrambled Lottery  
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CONCLUSION 
The goal of Chapters 1 and 2 was to examine drivers’ perception of the risk of delay as 
one factor that influences route choice behavior in a simulated driving environment.  Both 
experiments recruited commuters from the Atlanta and Orlando metropolitan areas and present 
them with a route choice task in a driving simulator.  Subjects were required to make a binary 
choice between a route that has an uncertain level of congestion and an alternate route with no 
risk of congestion.  The task is repeated over ten periods.  Apart from some prior information 
about the frequency of congestion on the uncertain route, drivers only obtained additional 
information if they actually chose to drive on it.  Information feedback is therefore endogenous 
and high risk scenarios can lead to less belief updating than low risk scenarios, since drivers are 
more likely to avoid taking the uncertain route when it is riskier.  The experiment implements 
four risk treatments that differ in the objective risk of congestion across a range of probabilities.  
This allows the examination of belief formation and adjustment across these treatments.  
Chapter 1 examines belief formation under a discrete penalty setting, whereas Chapter 2 
examines belief formation under a continuous penalty setting.  In Chapter 1 the belief estimate 
refers to the belief of delay, and does not distinguish between the belief of congestion and the 
belief of delay with and without congestion.  Assuming the Subjective Expected Utility model, 
this belief of delay is estimated conditional on period fixed effects for the ten driving periods in 
the experiment.  In Chapter 2 separate belief estimates are derived for congestion and the 
distribution of travel times for each route and congestion scenario.  The estimation is performed 
by pooling across all driving periods.  
 Across the risk treatments, subjects appear to be able to discern the difference between 
low-congestion risk vs. high-congestion risk.  This is true for both continuous and discrete 
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penalties.  For Chapter 1, subjects in the lowest risk treatment experience significant belief 
adjustments in later periods only, whereas in the high risk treatments no belief adjustment is 
observed.  This behavior is expected: in a low risk treatment subjects are more likely to start with 
a prior belief of low congestion, and are therefore more likely to drive on the uncertain route.  
This should allow them to obtain more information about the uncertain route so to revise their 
prior belief.  
In Chapter 2, where data is pooled across periods, differences in learning is inferred by 
comparing the standard deviation of the inferred travel time distributions across risk treatments.  
We find no significant difference and conclude that there is no evidence for differences in 
learning.   
Do subjects react to changes in the toll differently across the two penalty settings?  In 
Chapter 1 in the Probit regression, the coefficient Toll has the theoretically expected positive 
effect but is only significant in the two low risk treatments, which suggests subjects in the high 
risk treatments is less responsiveness to the variations in Toll than subjects in the lowest risk 
treatments.  This difference in the responsiveness to Toll across the risk treatments is consistent 
with behavior under an endogenous information environment: subjects in the high risk treatments 
are more likely to start with a high belief of congestion for the uncertain route, so they will be 
more likely to drive on the safe route (i.e., the toll road), which means that the effectiveness of 
Toll will be smaller for these subjects.  In contrast, in Chapter 2 the effect of Toll is significant in 
all risk treatments.   
Given that subjects behave differently under these two penalty settings, what is implied 
for transportation policies?  The discrete and continuous penalty settings naturally apply to 
different types of travelers who face different penalties for late arrivals, and each type is reported 
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to have different responsiveness to variations in the toll.  This suggests that if one is able to 
identify travelers by the type of penalties they face, then one may be able to better evaluate how 
different types of travelers would react to the change in a congestion pricing policy.  
Congestion pricing policies typically employ variations in the toll as a way to redirect and 
optimize traffic flow.  When travelers have limited response to changes in the toll, it would 
render the policy ineffective in redirecting traffic flow.  In addition, if travelers are able to learn 
the underlying objective probability of different traveling outcomes and make decisions 
optimally, then it would help optimize traffic flow and improve welfare (even in the event that 
they are not responsive to changes in the toll by a congestion pricing policy).  The most 
problematic case that is identified by our experiments is when the travelers are not responsive to 
changes in the toll nor are they able to learn the underlying probabilities of different traveling 
outcomes, which would imply that policy makers will need to employ other measures to redirect 
traffic flow (e.g., by actively providing credible traffic information).  This is especially the case 
for the group of subjects who face a discrete late penalty (Chapter 1) and who are in a scenario 
where the underlying objective probability of congestion is high.  For this group of subjects, we 
observe a lack of learning across driving periods as well as a lack of responsiveness to variations 
in the toll.  On the other hand, for the group of subjects who face a continuous penalty (Chapter 
2) whichever risk scenario they are in, even though these subjects do not display learning, they 
do display a significant response to variations in the toll.  This suggests that congestion pricing 
policy will be more effective in redirecting traffic flow for this latter group of subjects than for 
the previous group. 
Following a similar line of research as in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 also examines risk 
perception for events with unknown probabilities.  Furthermore, it examines how subjects 
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perceive uncertainty between events that have the same underlying objective probability but are 
presented differently under varying degrees of uncertainty.  Using a within-subject design 
subjects are asked to complete three lottery tasks that are ranked in order of increasing 
uncertainty.  Their choices are analyzed using the “source method”.  Based on the choices 
subjects make, a source function is estimated for each lottery task using three different 
specifications of the source function.  Overall, the results are consistent with past studies that do 
not use the source method, in showing that behavior differs under events with known vs. 
unknown probabilities.  In particular, when probabilities are not known subjects behave in the 
direction of likelihood insensitivity, in the sense that they overweigh low probabilities and 
underweigh high probabilities.  The source method assumes that all behavioral differences for 
alternative sources is characterized by differences in probability weighting, and hence in the 
form and parametric values of different probability weighting functions.  
However, when comparing the difference in behavior between events that both have 
unknown probabilities but vary in the degree of uncertainty, the behavioral difference is better 
captured by a Prelec specification of the probability weighting function than the Tversky-
Kahneman (1992) or Power probability weighting function.  Results from the Prelec 
specification suggest that as the degree of uncertainty increases, subjects display increased 
pessimism, whereas the Tversky-Kahneman (1992) and the Power specifications show no such 
difference.  The implication of this result is that conclusions regarding uncertainty aversion are 
contingent on which specification is assumed for the source function (i.e., the probability 
weighting function). 
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One general conclusion regarding behavior under uncertainty is that subjects are not very 
good at learning the true probability of the uncertain events, and that under uncertainty they have 
a tendency to place equal decision weights on all possible outcomes.   
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Appendix AA: More Tables for Chapter 1 
Table AA1: Rank Dependent Utility Estimates Across Periods  
 Treatment 0.2 
N=31 
Treatment 0.4 
N=40 
Treatment 0.6 
N=32 
Treatment 0.8 
N=38 
Risk Aversion: 
r .265 
(0.333) 
.241 
(0.574) 
.975* 
(0.078) 
.643 
(0.469) 
γ 1.003*** 
(<0.001) 
.767** 
(0.040) 
1.72* 
(0.068) 
1.173 
(0.354) 
Beliefs:  
Constant  
 
.629*** 
(<0.001) 
.630*** 
(<0.001) 
1*** 
(<0.001) 
1 
(a) 
Period 2 -.233 
(0.181) 
-.052 
(0.651) 
-.00005 
(0.949) 
<.001 
(0.979) 
Period 3 -.160 
(0.331) 
.184 
(0.107) 
-.003 
(0.706) 
<.001 
(0.971) 
Period 4 -.211 
(0.169) 
-.073 
(0.418) 
-.002 
(0.738) 
<.001 
(0.975) 
Period 5 -.290 
(0.102) 
.033 
(0.540) 
-.003 
(0.728) 
<.001 
(0.977) 
Period 6 -.160 
(0.331) 
-.0004 
(0.997) 
-.004 
(0.714) 
<.001 
(0.975) 
Period 7 -.090 
(0.541) 
.040 
(0.750) 
-.003 
(0.734) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 8  -.467*** 
(0.000) 
-.107 
(0.291) 
-.0007 
(0.842) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 9 -.089 
(0.618) 
-.109 
(0.265) 
-.004 
(0.719) 
<.001 
(a) 
Period 10 -.199 
(0.220) 
.078 
(0.569) 
-.001 
(0.752) 
<.001 
(a) 
Prior  .010 
(0.848) 
-.029 
(0.549) 
-.0002 
(0.818) 
<.001 
(a) 
 
μRA .175*** 
(<0.001) 
μBelief .234*** 
(<0.001) 
The results are obtained using a joint estimation of risk attitudes and beliefs from the lottery data and the driving 
simulator data. p-values are in parentheses.  The coefficients are marginal effects computed using the delta 
method.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
 (a) implies that a standard error cannot be computed by the delta method due to numeric issues, because the 
estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
μRA is the Fechner error for the lottery data; μBelief is the Fechner error for the belief data. 
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Table AA2: Rank Dependent Utility Estimates Across Periods and Demographic Effects  
 Treatment 0.2 
N=31 
Treatment 0.4 
N=40 
Treatment 0.6 
N=32 
Treatment 0.8 
N=38 
Risk Aversion: 
r .309 
(0.265) 
.149 
(0.762) 
.198 
(0.850) 
.769 
(0.481) 
γ 1.053*** 
(<0.001) 
.693* 
(0.073) 
.691 
(0.441) 
1.366 
(0.436) 
Beliefs:  
Constant  .850*** 
(<0.001) 
.543*** 
(0.007) 
.971*** 
(<0.001) 
.758** 
(0.028) 
Period 2 -.255 
(0.127) 
-.054 
(0.659) 
-.044 
(0.762) 
.092 
(0.762) 
Period 3 -.169 
(0.200) 
.208 
(0.113) 
-.125 
(0.567) 
-.119 
(0.754) 
Period 4 -.221 
(0.230) 
-.077 
(0.427) 
-.175 
(0.561) 
-.202 
(0.582) 
Period 5 -.290* 
(0.064) 
.035 
(0.562) 
-.162 
(0.474) 
-.355 
(0.517) 
Period 6 -.169 
(0.200) 
.001 
(0.996) 
-.055 
(0.713) 
.078 
(0.829) 
Period 7 -.102 
(0.329) 
.052 
(0.698) 
-.281 
(0.463) 
-.089 
(0.770) 
Period 8  -.536** 
(0.018) 
-.113 
(0.290) 
-.104 
(0.456) 
.100 
(0.745) 
Period 9 -.106 
(0.428) 
-.113 
(0.298) 
-.055 
(0.713) 
-.202 
(0.561) 
Period 10 -.202 
(0.132) 
.097 
(0.485 
-.137 
(0.425) 
.096 
(0.764) 
Female  .065 
(0.295) 
.012 
(0.951) 
.029 
(0.829) 
-.475 
(0.719) 
College 
Education 
-.093 
(0.470) 
-.014 
(0.948) 
-.087 
(0.779) 
.234 
(0.518) 
High income 
(>$100K) 
-.212 
(0.131) 
-.078 
(0.703) 
-.053 
(0.770) 
.242 
(0.483) 
 
μRA .173*** 
(<0.001) 
μBelief .225*** 
(<0.001) 
p-values are in parentheses.  The coefficients are marginal effects.  
*** means that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
** means that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
* means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
(a) implies that a standard error cannot be computed by the delta method due to numeric issues, because the 
estimated probabilities approach 0 or 1. 
μRA is the Fechner error for the lottery data; μBelief is the Fechner error for the belief data. 
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Figure AA1: Distribution of Wage by Congestion Risk  
 
Figure AA2: Distribution of Penalty by Congestion Risk  
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Figure AA3: Distribution of Toll by Congestion Risk  
 
Figure AA4: Distribution of Time Threshold by Congestion Risk  
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Appendix BB: More Figures for Chapter 3 
Figure BB1.1: Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting, 𝜼 =1 and 𝝋 =1 
 
Figure BB1.2: Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting, 𝜼 =1 and 𝝋 =0.50 
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Figure BB1.3: Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting, 𝜼 =1 and 𝝋 =1.50 
 
Figure BB1.4: Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting, 𝜼 =0.50 and 𝝋 =1 
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Figure BB1.5: Rank Dependent Utility Prelec Weighting, 𝜼 =1.50 and 𝝋 =1 
 
Figure BB2.1: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 1 
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Figure BB2.2: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 1.8 
 
Figure BB2.3: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 1.5 
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Figure BB2.4: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 1.2 
 
Figure BB2.5: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 0.8 
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Figure BB2.6: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 0.5 
 
Figure BB2.7: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 0.2 
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Figure BB2.8: Rank Dependent Utility TK Weighting, γ = 2.5 
 
Figure BB3.1: Rank Dependent Utility Power Weighting, γ = 1 
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Figure BB3.2: Rank Dependent Utility Power Weighting, γ = 1.5 
 
Figure BB3.3: Rank Dependent Utility Power Weighting, γ = 0.5 
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Appendix CC: More Literature Review for Chapter 3 
 This appendix provides a review of a number of recent ambiguity experiments.67  The 
implementation of ambiguity varies, such as the use of a bingo blower or an urn containing balls 
with unknown proportions.  The choice tasks may include allocating tokens across events with 
known or unknown probabilities, stating a reservation price for a lottery using the Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak method, or choosing between prospects in a list format to elicit certainty 
equivalents.  An overview is provided with respect to experimental design, model specifications 
and findings, and followed by a more detailed description of each study.  
 For the purpose of this review, models of uncertainty or ambiguity are categorized into 
two general specifications: the smooth specification (Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005)) 
and the kinked specification.  The smooth specification (or the smooth model) considers a set of 
priors for the possible outcomes, plus separate utility parameters to capture attitudes toward risk 
and attitudes toward uncertainty.  In evaluating any two-stage lotteries, the smooth model takes 
the EU of each one-stage lottery within each prior and then takes the Expected Value of all EUs 
across the possible priors.  The kinked specification also considers a set of priors but the 
unknown probabilities are skewed by decision weights.  The kinked specification includes 
models such as Choquet EU (Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989)), Rank Dependent Utility 
(Quiggin (1982)), 𝛼-MEU (Ghirardato et al. (2004)),68 Vector EU (Siniscalchi (2009)), and 
Contraction EU (Gajdos et al. (2008)).   
                                                          
67 For the experiments that are described in this appendix, subjects are provided with some information about the 
probability distribution on the unknown events, instead of a complete lack of information.  By definition, these 
experiments should be categorized as uncertainty experiments (instead of ambiguity experiments).  However, since 
these authors refer to their experiments as testing ambiguity instead of uncertainty, for purpose of discussing their 
studies we use the term ambiguity so to be consistent with the labeling.  
68 An alternative name is the Alpha-Maxmin EU model or Alpha EU (Ghirardato et al. (2004)).  We use the name 𝛼-
MEU throughout this essay.  
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The descriptive power of the specifications is contingent on the data set that is used to fit 
the models and the types of questions that are asked in the experiment.  For example, in 
experiments that involve one-stage probabilities (or simple lotteries), the 𝛼-MEU model 
performs better relative to the smooth model; in experiments that involve two-stage lotteries (or 
compound lotteries) where the second-order probability distribution may or may not be known, 
the smooth model performs better.  For these findings, see Ahn et al. (2010), Bossaert et al. 
(2010), Cubitt et al. (2012) and Attanasi et al. (2014).  
A number of studies report that SEU outperforms many ambiguity models in explaining 
choices.  For example, Hey and Pace (2014) report that SEU is just as good a predictor of 
observed choices as the more complicated ambiguity models (such as Choquet EU, 𝛼-MEU, 
Vector EU, and Contraction EU); Ahn et al. (2010) report that SEU explains the majority of the 
observed choices better than the kinked or smooth specification; Mangelsdorff and Weber (1994) 
report that SEU, assuming the principle of insufficient reason,69 is a better predictor of the 
observed choices than Choquet EU.   
The proportion of subjects who are ambiguity averse varies widely across experiments, 
relative to the proportion of subjects who are ambiguity neutral or ambiguity seeking.  This may 
not come as a surprise given that experiments vary with respect to the implementation of 
ambiguity, elicitation approach, and econometric specifications.  Furthermore, when examining 
the correlation between risk premium and ambiguity premium (i.e., when comparing the risk 
aversion and ambiguity aversion parameters), some studies report a positive correlation whereas 
                                                          
69 “Principle of insufficient reason” or the “principle of indifference” states that if one is ignorant of the ways an 
event can occur, the event will be assumed to occur equally likely in any way (first enunciated by Jakob Bernoulli).  
Mangelsdorff and Weber (1994) use the term “principle of insufficient reason” when referring to the assumption of 
equal probabilities for all outcomes.  
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others report a negative correlation.  For instance, see Bossaert et al. (2010), Cubitt et al. (2012), 
and Attanasi et al. (2014).  
  The rest of the appendix describes in detail several selected studies. The first group of 
studies consists of experiments with one-stage probability (Ahn et al. (2010) and Bossaert et al. 
(2010)), and the second group consists of experiments with two-stage probabilities (Conte and 
Hey (2013), Cubitt et al. (2012) and Attanasi et al. (2014)).70  
 
C1 Ahn, Choi, Gale and Kariv (2010) 
In this study subjects are presented with a portfolio choice task where they are asked to 
allocate tokens across three accounts given a fixed number of tokens, and each account 
corresponds to a state of nature that is to be selected at random.  The first account has 1/3 
probability of success, and the other two have probability of success that sum up to 2/3.  The 
allocation across the three account is made in one choice.  Subjects are asked to complete 50 
allocation choice tasks.  One of the choices is randomly selected for payment, and tokens are 
converted to real money.  The data are fit using three models: SEU, a kinked specification using 
the 𝛼-MEU model, and the smooth model.  For each subject and for each model specification, 
the parameters are estimated using nonlinear least squares.  SEU explains a majority of the 
observed choices, next is the 𝛼-MEU model, and last is the smooth model.   
 
 
                                                          
70 For more review of ambiguity experiments, see Hey (2016) and Etner, Jeleva and Tallon (2010).  
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C2 Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli and Zame (2010) 
 In a competitive market setting, subjects are presented with an opportunity to buy or sell 
securities.  They may choose from two types of securities.  One type is a bond that pays a fixed 
dividend.  Another type is stocks, three of them (x, y, and z), that pay dividends randomly but 
that are negatively correlated, such that in the experiment if state x is realized, stock x pays $0.50 
and stocks y and z pay nothing.71  The payout is determined by a draw from an urn that contains 
eighteen balls of red, green and blue.  The composition of the urn may or may not be known to 
the subjects depending on which treatment they are assigned to.  If they are assigned to the risky 
treatment, they are told the composition of the urn; if they are assigned to the ambiguous 
treatment, they are told only the proportion of red balls and the number of balls in total.  The 
experiment consists of eight trading periods, and in each period a ball is drawn without 
replacement to determine the payout, thus the total number of balls as well as the composition of 
balls in the urn changes throughout the course of the experiment.  Subjects are paid their 
cumulative earnings.  
 An 𝛼-MEU model is used for the observed choices, and the population appears to be 
heterogeneous with some being quite ambiguity averse.  Furthermore, a positive correlation 
between risk and ambiguity premiums is reported; i.e., a positive correlation between the risk 
aversion and ambiguity aversion parameters.  
 
 
                                                          
71 If two stocks are negatively correlated, when the earnings of one increases, the other is likely to decrease, thus the 
gain in one stock is likely to offset the loss in the other.  If the stocks are positively correlated, on the other hand, 
they tend to rise and fall together.  
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C3 Conte and Hey (2013) 
 In this study subjects are presented with two compound lotteries.  Each compound lottery 
is made up of a number of simple lotteries with binary outcomes (red or blue), and the 
compositions of the simple lotteries are known to the subjects.  The subject’s first decision is to 
choose whether they want to bet on red or blue.  The next decision is to choose which of the two 
compound lotteries they prefer to play out the color they choose.  For example, supposed in the 
first decision a subject choose the color ‘red’ to bet on, and supposed that the left-side compound 
lottery has 5 simple lotteries, and each simple lottery consists of majority red, whereas the right-
side compound lottery has 3 simple lotteries, and each simple lottery consists of majority blue.  
In this scenario, the subject would be more inclined to choose the left-side compound lottery to 
play out his or her chosen color (red), because the left-side compound lottery will have a higher 
chance of drawing a red relative to the right-side compound lottery.  
 An interesting design feature in this study is that one compound lottery is designated as 
the “changing lottery” whereas the other is the “unchanged lottery”.  After the subject makes a 
pairwise decision, one of the simple lotteries inside the “changing lottery” disappears.  Then in 
the next round the subject is asked again to make a pairwise decision, except this time the choice 
is between the updated “changing lottery” and the “unchanged lottery”.  This iterative process 
continues until the “changing lottery” is left with only one simple lottery.  In this way, as the 
distribution in the “changing lottery” becomes narrower, one can study how the narrowing of 
possible states affects subject’s pairwise decisions.  
 The experiment consists of 49 tasks with a total of 256 pairwise decisions.  To determine 
the payout, one of the 49 tasks is randomly selected, then conditional on that task a pairwise 
decision is chosen.  If the subject has chosen the left (right) compound lottery, then within that 
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left (right) compound lottery one of the simple lotteries is played out.  Observed choices are used 
to estimate four models (i.e., EU,72 the smooth model, RDU, and 𝛼-MEU).  The smooth model 
fares the best and 𝛼-MEU the least.   
 
C4 Cubitt, Kuilen and Mukerji (2012) 
In this study subjects are presented with a number of gambles, and the gambles are 
played out by a deck that has 10 playing cards.  An example of a gamble is: if a spade is drawn 
from a particular deck then the subject wins $20, otherwise nothing.  The drawing is performed 
using three decks of cards that are ranked by degree of ambiguity: deck #1 has 7 spades and 3 
hearts; deck #2 takes on two possible compositions, and deck #3 takes on four possible 
compositions. 
For each gamble the subjects are asked if they want to keep the gamble or choose a sure 
amount of money instead; if they keep the gamble then it is played out by deck #1.  Subjects go 
through a series of these choices in a list format and their certainty equivalent for deck #1 is 
elicited in this way.  In the next part of the experiment, deck #2 is used to play out the gambles.  
In contrast to deck #1 (whose composition is known), subjects are told that deck #2 can take on 
two possible compositions but the probability of each composition is unknown.  For each gamble 
the subjects face they are asked if they want to keep the gamble or to choose a sure amount of 
money instead; if they keep the gamble then it is played out by deck #2.  Using the same 
elicitation procedure as before, subjects go through a series of these choices in a list format that 
elicits their certainty equivalent for deck #2.  In the next part of the experiment, a different deck 
                                                          
72 Conte and Hey (2013) use the term EU instead of Subjective EU.  
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of 10 cards (decks #3) is used to play out the gambles. Deck #3 can take on four possible 
compositions but subjects are not told the probability of each composition.  The subjects, again, 
go through a series of choices in a list format that elicit their certainty equivalent for deck #3. 
At the end of the experiment, one of the choice tasks is randomly selected for payment.  
The data are used to estimate the smooth model and the 𝛼-MEU model, with stronger support for 
the former.  Each subject is categorized into ambiguity-seeking, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-
averse, and ambiguity-neutral preference holds the largest group of subjects.  Pooling across 
subjects, the estimation results show some ambiguity-aversion for the average subject.   
 
C5 Attanasi, Gollier, Montesano and Pace (2014) 
 This study involves two-stage lotteries, which is the feature of the smooth model 
(Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005)).  Three types of lotteries are implemented: a lottery 
with a known one-stage probability, a lottery that is partially-ambiguous, and a lottery with a 
second-stage probability that is either known or unknown.  Certainty equivalents are elicited for 
each type of lotteries and comparisons made between these elicited certainty equivalents.  
The experiment consists of ten tasks.  In the first part of the experiment (tasks 1 – 4), 
each subject is presented with four simple lotteries with known probabilities.  Each lottery has 
binary outcomes and the outcome is determined by an urn that has 5 white balls and 5 orange 
balls (thus a 50/50 chance).  These four lottery tasks are used to elicit risk preferences.  Next, the 
subjects is asked to choose one out of the four lotteries.  In task 5, the subject states a reservation 
price for the simple lottery that she chooses among tasks 1 – 4.  This reservation price is elicited 
using the BDM procedure.  In a latter part of the experiment, the elicited certainty equivalent for 
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this risky lottery is compared to the certainty equivalents for the ambiguous lotteries in tasks 6, 7, 
8, 9 and 10.   
In task 6, the chosen lottery from tasks 1 – 4 is changed from a risky distribution (of 
50/50) to an ambiguous distribution described as follows: instead of the chosen lottery (from 
tasks 1 – 4) being determined by a one-stage 50/50 distribution, the lottery is now determined by 
a distribution that has a second-order probability.  If a subject is assigned to the binomial 
treatment, the lottery is played out by an urn that has 10 balls, and these 10 balls are assembled 
by randomly selecting balls from a “construction” urn that has 50 white balls and 50 orange 
balls.  If the subject is assigned to the uniform treatment, there are 11 urns each containing 10 
balls that encompass all possible combinations of whites and oranges, and one of the 11 urns is 
chosen to play out the lottery (with equal probability).  If the subject is assigned to the unknown 
treatment, the lottery is played out by an urn containing 10 balls, and these 10 balls are 
assembled by randomly selecting balls from a construction urn that has 100 balls of unknown 
proportions of whites and orangs.  After a subject is assigned to one of the three treatments, she 
is asked to state a reservation price for this revised lottery that originally is chosen from tasks 1 – 
4, since now the original chosen lottery has become two-stage instead of one-stage.   
Next, the urn constructed in task 6 is used in tasks 7, 8 and 9.  As a test for partial 
ambiguity, the proportions for white and orange balls are narrowed down.  For example, in task 7 
the subject is told that there are between 3 to 7 white balls in the urn; in task 8 the subject is told 
that there are between 3 to 10 white balls in the urn; in task 9 there are between 3 to 10 orange 
balls in the urn.  Conditional on this new information, the subject is asked to state a reservation 
price for each revised lottery.  The certainty equivalents elicited for these (partially) ambiguous 
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lotteries is compared to the risky lottery in task 5.  At the end of the experiment, one of the ten 
tasks is randomly selected for payment.  Subjects are paid a fixed show-up fee.   
Roughly 90% of the subjects can be classified as averse, neutral or loving according to 
their operational definition of coherent-ambiguity attitudes, whereas the rest cannot be classified 
because they are incoherent.  Furthermore, when the distribution is unknown, subjects behave as 
if the probabilities are uniformly distributed, in line with the principle of insufficient reason.73  
This result is consistent with Hey and Pace (2014),74 who report that the estimated beliefs are 
closer to equal probabilities in the more ambiguous treatment than in the least ambiguous 
treatment.  
 
C6 Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, Hole and Rutström (2011) 
Recall that SEU assumes the axiom of ROCL such that any prior probability distribution 
for an event is reduced to a single (degenerate) probability estimate.  In contrast, uncertainty 
models do not assume ROCL and thus a probability distribution is not reducible to a single 
probability estimate.  In theory an uncertainty model preserves the characteristics of the 
subjective probability distribution whereas the SEU model doesn’t.  Keeping to the SEU 
framework, Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, Hole and Rutström (2011) perform an estimation 
procedure that allows one to preserve some distributional characteristics of the estimated belief.  
To do so, they estimate a distribution of beliefs, instead of a single probability estimate, by 
                                                          
73 Attanasi, Gollier, Montesano and Pace (2014) use the term “principle of insufficient reason” when discussing the 
assumption that subjects behave as if the probabilities are uniformly distributed when the distribution is unknown.  
74 Hey and Pace (2014) do not use the term “principle of insufficient reason” to describe the estimated beliefs being 
closer to equal probabilities in their most ambiguous treatment.  
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estimating the parameters that give rise to the shape of the belief distribution.  In this way, one is 
able to obtain more information about the underlying belief. 
Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, Hole and Rutström (2011) present each subject with a 
range of bookies offering odds on the outcome of some unknown event.  As the subject allocates 
earnings over the range of offering odds, the individual probability distribution of the unknown 
event is elicited.  The study is conducted with stationary probabilities, and subjective 
probabilities are corrected for risk attitudes by including a lottery choice task and inferring 
probabilities with joint estimation methods.  Each subjects completes 9 betting tasks in total and 
one of them is randomly selected for real payment.  
The study examines events that have underlying objective probabilities that differ across 
a range of probabilities, and reports that in the low-probability treatment where the objective 
probability is 0.1 or 0.2, in each case the mode and the mean of the subjective distribution are 
significantly greater than the objective probability.  As for the medium- and high- probability 
treatments, where the objective probabilities are 0.5 or 0.55, and 0.75 or 0.8, respectively, the 
mean of the subjective probability distributions are virtually the same as the objective 
probabilities.  Thus, results for the low probability range appears to be consistent with past 
studies (ABPW (2011); KSW (2014)) that report a concave probability region, but not for the 
high probability range.  
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